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CASH FLOW ACCOUNTING AND THE COST OF DEBT 
SUMMARY 
 
The aim of this study is to examine why firms may manipulate not just their earnings 
but also their cash flows, and to investigate the effects of this behaviour in debt markets 
with respect to the cost of debt. This research addresses current concerns about 
accounting rules (both GAAP and IFRS) which allow companies discretion in the 
presentation of their operating cash flow in financial statements. Using a sample of 
8,684 UK and 23,935 USA firm-years from 1998 to 2010, the reported operating cash 
flow is decomposed into two components, unmanaged and managed, in order to 
examine the association between the estimated discretionary part of operating cash flow 
and the cost of debt. The results show that the cost of debt has a significantly positive 
association with the managed component of operating cash flows. By using path 
analysis, it is further shown that the effect of cash flow management in increasing the 
cost of debt is largely through its impact on accounting quality. Also it is found that the 
market positively prices abnormal operating cash flow information when firms 
experience financial problems, especially when companies are faced with low  cash 
flows.  
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
 
1.1 Background and motivation  
Although it is often assumed that cash flow is an objective accounting measure, or at 
least assumed to be more objective than accrual-based earnings, there is increasing 
evidence that reported cash flows themselves are not immune to manipulation (Kim et 
al, 2010; Lee, 2009; Zhang W., 2008; Zhang R., 2006; Roychowdhury, 2006; Frankel, 
2005; Hardiman, 2005; Henry, 2004). This indicates in turn that there will be a demand 
for predictions of likely cash flow levels. Indeed, the finding of an increase in cash flow 
forecasting by analysts that is reported in Defond and Hung (2003) suggests that such 
information has already been gaining market attention, providing managers with 
incentives to meet or beat these cash flow targets.  
There is already a considerable body of evidence that firms engaging in earnings 
management are rewarded for achieving earnings benchmarks such as avoiding losses, 
increasing profit levels and meeting the earnings per share benchmarks set by analysts 
in their forecasts (e.g. see the overview by Ronen and Yaari, 2007). In the same vein, 
with respect to cash flow, Zhang R. (2006) has provided evidence of firms engaging in 
operating cash flow manipulation to achieve targets such as reporting a positive figure 
for operating cash flow (OCF), meeting cash flow forecasts and cash-dividend targets, 
Frankel (2005) has pointed to working capital reductions that are designed to increase 
reported OCF, Hardiman (2005) has observed that some companies misclassify long-
term customer receivables as investing cash flows again to increase reported OCF, and 
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Roychowdhury (2006) has demonstrated other means through which firms may 
manipulate their cash flow, particularly with respect to their operational activities. 
Each of these studies, however, focuses on cash flow manipulation in the 
context of achieving earning targets. It is important to note, nevertheless, that cash flow 
management does not always have the same impact on earnings as it does on operating 
cash flow. Some activities increase earnings but decrease cash flow (e.g. sales 
discounts, overproduction), whilst others increase cash flow but have no impact on 
earnings (e.g. delayed vendor payments and quicker accounts receivable collection). 
Thus, it is possible that firms do not engage in cash flow management solely to increase 
earnings. For instance, it may also serve to influence the perceptions of lenders. If, say, 
cash flow management is informative about credit spreads, then these firms may exhibit 
a lower cost of debt. On the other hand if the management of the reported OCF is just 
the result of garbling, and credit analysts can recognize its overstatement as such, then 
these firms could exhibit a higher cost of debt as creditors punish managers for 
manipulating operating cash flow. If creditors scrutinising the OCF are less likely to be 
fooled by garbling than equity stakeholders, then examining the signalling versus 
garbling debate through the lens of credit markets may add to our understanding of why 
firms manipulate cash flow. By documenting the importance of cash flow information, 
more emphasis is placed by these recent research results on increased managerial 
incentives to meet or beat cash flow targets, and in turn on the likelihood that cash flows 
(and not just earnings) may be affected by deliberate manipulation in order influence 
capital markets.  
At the same time, we now understand that a higher quality of public financial 
statement information (e.g. higher quality of reported accounting numbers, higher 
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quality of related disclosures) can be associated with both a lower cost of equity (e.g., 
Francis et al, 2004; Botosan, 1997; Frankel et al, 1995) and a lower cost of debt (e.g., 
Heflin et al, 2011; Francis et al, 2005; Yu, 2005; Moerman, 2005; Sengupta, 1998).  
In this study, building on the above, it is predicted that managed OCF will be 
correctly priced 1) when it is easier to detect and 2) when bondholders are highly 
motivated to scrutinise the cash flow information. Specifically, easier detection of cash 
flow management by bondholders is predicted when the managed component of OCF is 
used to meet cash flow benchmarks. Also, it should be expected that bondholders will 
increasingly be motivated to scrutinise the components of OCF as firms approach 
financial problems. That is, knowledge of these disaggregated components may have a 
greater role in determining borrowing costs especially when the firm‘s financial 
condition is relatively weak. 
The overall aim therefore is to examine transactions that impact on cash flows 
and the extent to which cash flow management is reflected in credit ratings and credit 
spreads. In this sense, the research study underlying this thesis will build on extant work 
that seeks to indentify the determinants of credit spreads, particularly Li and Richie 
(2009) who report that income smoothing appears to be a significant determinant of 
credit spreads and therefore of the cost of debt capital, and Provost et al (2008) who 
show that creditors who are able to see through managers‘ attempts to opportunistically 
influence earnings perceptions penalise such firms by demanding a higher cost of debt. 
The study will also take into account liquidity in debt markets, following Chen et al 
(2007) who report that bond liquidity is an important factor in explaining corporate 
yield spreads, and Tang and Yan (2007) who document liquidity effects with respect to 
credit default swap spreads.  
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In examining the question of whether cash flow management influences the cost 
of debt capital, two separate samples are examined in this study, each comprising of 
cash flow data reported between 1999 and 2010. These are: (i) a sample of 8,684 firm-
year observations for UK firms and (ii) a sample of 23,935 firm-year observations for 
USA firms. It is found in both locations that, in general, the market appears to recognise 
cash flow management and that it is reflected in debt costs. In particular, a positive and 
significant association is found between the cost of debt and managed OCF when firms 
have losses, low cash flow and low earnings levels. This suggests that bondholders and 
creditors are more likely to detect and price the components of OCF when firms have a 
greater likelihood of experiencing financial problems.  
It is also argued in the thesis that cash flow management not only increases the 
cost of debt directly, as mentioned above, but also indirectly by impacting on 
accounting quality which in turn may influence the cost of debt. That is, it is first 
documented how cash flow management can negatively affect accounting quality, and 
then shown how the documented reduction in accounting quality is associated with an 
increase in the cost of debt. The third main finding concerns the way in which the debt 
market prices abnormal OCF, especially when firms report lower earnings and lower 
cash flow at the same time. 
Thus, whilst prior research often focuses on the impact of earnings 
manipulation, this thesis adds to the small body of literature on cash flow manipulation. 
As indicated already, the results provide evidence of managed operating cash flows and 
of their debt pricing implications. From a practical viewpoint, this study is equally 
relevant to interested parties such as creditors and policy makers, as well as academic 
researchers. First, with respect to credit market participants, the results suggest that 
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managed cash flow has different bond and debt pricing implications for different firms, 
and that, depending on the level of financial distress or default risk, creditors are likely 
to value cash flow management differently. Second, the study is informative for 
accounting regulators because the flexibility in current generally accepted accounting 
principles allows for the operating section of the Statement of Cash Flows to contain 
non-operating transactions that may mislead creditors regarding the operating cash flow 
performance. If transactions reported under the operating section of the Statement of 
Cash Flows do not result from operations, economic substance may be misrepresented 
A simple example is that, under IFRS, overdrafts can be offset against cash and cash 
equivalents, thus bypassing disclosure in the operating section of the Cash Flow 
Statement, although they are used to finance working capital. Poor quality cash flow 
information of this type may limit financial statement users‘ ability to evaluate a firm‘s 
performance, which is inconsistent with the Financial Accounting Standards Board‘s 
emphasis on more transparent financial statements. In a 2005 ‗Speech by SEC Staff‘, 
concerns were raised about the discretionary classification of finance subsidiary 
activities resulting in an artificial increase in operating cash flows, and ultimately the 
SEC ruled that this treatment was inappropriate (Hardiman 2005). Hence, from a policy 
perspective, this concern of the US security market regulator warrants further 
examination of the transparency of cash flow information, and this thesis provides some 
initial investigation in this respect.  
 
1. 2 The intended contribution  
This thesis aims to contribute to our understanding of earnings management and 
managers‘ opportunistic behaviour in financial reporting in a number of ways.  
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First, this study will rigorously examine the impact of the manipulation of Cash 
Flow Statements on the cost of debt. Previous studies have examined the effect of real 
earnings manipulation on cash flows (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Roychowdhury 
2006), but their main focus has always been on earnings management, i.e., income 
statement manipulation. Zhang W.(2008) and Lee (2009) are the first to focus on the 
management of Cash Flow Statements, examining real activities and reporting 
techniques used in  cash flow manipulation, such as reporting short-term securities as 
trading securities instead of available-for-sale or held-to-maturity securities. However, 
their work does not investigate any externalities connected with such accounting 
behaviour. The research presented in this thesis builds on this prior understanding of 
cash flow accounting, and examines the relation between cash flow manipulation and 
the cost of debt. The results provide evidence that the credit markets are responsive to 
cash flow manipulation in that there is an observable effect on the cost of debt, which is 
analogous to the links drawn between earnings management and its price effect in the 
equity market. Figure 1.1 provides summary of relevant prior work, and illustrates the 
added contribution of the research reported in this thesis, which fills a gap by 
documenting the link between debt market pricing, the differential persistence of 
operating cash flow, and the accounting manipulation of reported cash flow.  
Second, this study aims to contribute to the literature that investigates the 
valuation effects of information asymmetry and information risk on the cost of debt. In 
brief, whilst Biddle and Hilary (2006) show that higher quality accounting enhances 
investment efficiency by reducing information asymmetry between managers and 
outside suppliers of capital, Verdi (2005) finds that uncertainty has a significant positive 
relation with the cost of capital and that information asymmetry has a significant 
negative relation. Thus, this thesis is able to confirm these more general prior findings 
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with evidence of a significantly negative asymmetric ‗cash flow manipulation‘ effect in 
debt markets. 
Third, given that Zhang W. (2008) only considers the upward management of 
cash flows, and as it is also possible that managers in some years manage operating cash 
flows downwards (e.g. for benchmarking purposes, when firms achieve an OCF greater 
than forecast, they may have an incentive to save part of OCF for the future), we 
consider both upward and downward cash flow management in this study. 
Finally, addressing a more general issue in financial accounting research, this 
thesis develops an approach to the validity of the accounting data sample that is 
employed in the analysis, with the suggestion that such procedures might be reported 
upon more fully in future accounting research. This is based on a joint working paper 
(Izadi et al, 2010), where all publications in three UK-based journals (Accounting and 
Business Research, Journal of Business Finance and Accounting and the British 
Accounting Review) were reviewed for the years 2005 to 2009, and the complete set of 
research studies was identified which drew on the Worldscope, Thomson Financial or 
Extel sources (35 papers in all). We found that the data collected by these authors was 
invariably trimmed in order to remove values in the extreme percentiles, but that there is 
little explanation of the treatment of any missing values, apparent zeros or blank cells, 
nor of any attempts to validate and reconstruct the accounting identities involved. This 
is not as surprising as it may seem, as all of these studies selected headline items as 
variables of interest, and did not explore therefore the articulation within financial 
statements. In this thesis, however, because the focus is on OCF (the reported Operating 
Cash Flow), a financial statement line item which is expected by the standard setters to 
reconcile with balance sheet changes, the research design places more emphasis on the 
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validity of the accounting numbers in commercial databases, the articulation of the 
financial statements from which the databases are constructed, and the nature of 
resulting values that are unrecorded, missing or zero. In some respects, therefore, the 
study reported in this thesis is amongst the first to address some of the limitations of 
accounting databases previously examined by Lara et al (2006) and Alves et al (2007), 
each of whom have mainly demonstrated that employing different databases can lead to 
different results for the same estimations. Here, the databases are combined in 
producing more comprehensive sets of information, and the financial statement 
articulations are validated, with a view to minimising the inclusion of so-called ‗missing 
values‘ and also to correct for some database errors that have been discovered in the 
process.  
 
1. 3 Structure of the thesis 
The remaining seven chapters of this thesis are as arranged follows. The following three 
chapters (2, 3 and 4) review the theoretical background and the empirical evidence on 
capital structure and the cost of debt, on cash flow reporting and on cash flow 
manipulation. Chapter 5 describes the theoretical framework for the analysis and the 
development of the hypotheses that are then tested. Chapter 6 explains the sampling 
process and the research methods used in the analysis. Chapter 7 presents and discusses 
the empirical results, and Chapter 8 sets out the conclusions and the possible 
implications of the results of this study.  
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Figure 1.1: How prior research motivates this thesis 
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     Chapter 2  
Cash Flow Reporting and the Cost of Debt 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter, Chapter 1, provided an overview of the thesis, explaining the 
objectives of the study and indicating its intended contribution. This chapter provides a 
review of the main research papers that have focused on the relation between cash flows 
and the cost of debt, since it was first discussed in Minton and Schrand (1999). The 
purpose of this chapter is to identify any limitations in the previous research, and to 
determine any outstanding research questions that need to be addressed. 
 
2.2 Alternative perspectives on cash flow manipulation and the cost of debt 
Amongst financial statement users, it seems to be accepted that the operating section of 
the Cash Flow Statement provides a key metric in assessing a firm‘s ability to generate 
cash from internal operations and remain viable (Luo, 2008). Indeed, this intended use 
is summarised by the international accounting regulator as follows:  
A statement of cash flows, when used in conjunction with the rest of 
the financial statements, provides information that enables users to 
evaluate the changes in net assets of an entity, its financial structure 
(including its liquidity and solvency) and its ability to affect the 
amounts and timing of cash flows in order to adapt to changing 
circumstances and opportunities (International Accounting Standard 
IAS7, Paragraph 5).  
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Lenders in particular have come to rely on the Statement of Cash Flows to evaluate 
whether existing or potential borrowers can repay a loan, using the information to 
determine how well a business is performing and, more importantly, how a company is 
generating and using its cash.
1
 Although creditors may generally have viewed operating 
cash flow (OCF) as a more reliable metric than net income, successive financial 
reporting scandals seem to have caused many to question the age-old axiom that ―cash 
is a fact and earnings an opinion.‖2 Not only are analysts, lenders and regulators more 
closely scrutinising revenue recognition, expense accrual and related disclosures, at the 
same time it seems that corporate financial officers are now applying their earnings 
management skills to cash flows. OCF manipulation is not just found in major business 
frauds like Enron and WorldCom, but the press reports that it has manifested itself in 
such well-known corporate names as Boeing, Comcast, Ford, General Dynamics and 
Harley-Davidson (Barsky and Catanch, 2007). 
For the US, the underlying problem is the flexibility of cash flow reporting 
permitted by FAS-95 (Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 95, Statement 
of Cash Flows). Although the calculation of the individual components presented in a 
Statement of Cash Flows is largely mechanical (a reconciliation of changes in a 
company‘s beginning and ending balance sheets), the classification of these individual 
components into operating, investing and financing activities is often highly judgment-
based. Clearly, managers may have incentives to include other cash flows in OCF if 
                                                          
1  See Richard A. Turpin, E.L. Kittrell and John G. Fulmer Jr., Insights from the Statement of Cash Flows, 
COMMERCIAL  LENDING REV., Jan.–Feb. 2005, 39–42. 
2 See David Henry, Fuzzy Numbers, BUSINESS WEEK, Oct. 4, 2004. 
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they believe that a higher OCF will improve their chances of, say, getting a loan, or that 
it will enhance their business opportunities in some other way.
3
  
There are a variety of ways that managers can distort OCF, thereby negatively 
affecting the data used by lenders in evaluating credit quality (Barsky and Catanch, 
2007). In addition, prior research suggests that firms may have incentives to manage 
reported OCF, even in the absence of an effect on bottom-line earnings. Several studies 
have documented that managers engage in activities to manage the presentation of items 
in financial statements even when there is no change in bottom-line earnings. Engel et al 
(1999) find that firms use the proceeds of trust-preferred stock issuances to retire debt in 
order to reclassify obligations out of the liability section of the balance sheet. Bowen et 
al (2002) provide evidence that Internet firms with greater individual investor interest 
and those that seek external financing adopt aggressive revenue-reporting practices that 
increase both revenues and expenses equally and thus do not affect bottom-line 
earnings. McVay (2006) finds that managers inflate core earnings by opportunistically 
shifting expenses from core expenses to special items, while Robinson (2007) finds that 
managers are willing to incur costs to shift an expense from a core expense to a tax 
expense. There is also evidence of capital market benefits associated with meeting or 
beating cash flow benchmarks, suggesting that firms may have incentives to manage 
reported OCF. Call (2007) finds that when setting stock prices, investors place more 
weight on OCF for firms with analyst cash flow forecasts, even after controlling for 
earnings. DeFond and Hung (2003) and Zhang W. (2007) document that the stock 
market reaction to cash flow surprise is positive, even after controlling for an earnings 
surprise. Cash flow information is useful to the credit market because, as mentioned 
above, creditors use financial statements to predict the amounts, timing and 
                                                          
3 See Debra C. Jeter, Using the Statement of Cash Flows, COMMERCIAL LENDING REV., July–Aug. 2005, at 3–8, 
44. 
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uncertainties of future cash flows, so we may expect that the credit market also reacts to 
cash flow surprises.  
A summary of the issues investigated to date in the context of the relationship 
between the market for debt and cash flow reporting is shown in Table 2.1. Below, the 
main themes that are considered in this stream of research are discussed in greater 
detail, focusing first on tests of the relationship between cash flow and debt financing, 
and, second, on the nature of reported cash flow, including measures of accounting 
quality. 
 
2.3 Evidence of the relationship between cash flow and debt financing  
The level of a firm‘s net cash flows appears to have a first-order effect on the costs of 
accessing external capital (Minton and Schrand, 1999). The results of Minton and 
Schrand‘s study indicate that low cash flow firms have worse S&P bond ratings, higher 
equity betas, and higher equity price risks than firms with median cash flows. High cash 
flow firms have better S&P bond ratings and lower dividend payout ratios. They 
emphasise that cash flow volatility not only increases the likelihood that a firm will 
need to access capital markets, but that it also increases the costs of doing so. Minton 
and Schrand‘s study is directly related to this thesis as it is assumed here that firms, in 
order to access the capital markets, especially the debt market, may have incentives to 
meet or beat cash flow targets, and that cash flows in turn may be affected by deliberate 
manipulation in order to influence the market for debt capital, not only with respect to 
bond ratings but also more generally with respect to bank lending.  
14 
 
 
For lending decisions, bank loan officers are presumed to use the financial 
information and reports published by potential borrowers, in particular cash flow 
information and, hence, the Statement of Cash Flow. In research by Kwok (2002), 
Where subjects were drawn from four groups of frequent users of financial reports 
(bank loan officers, auditors, financial analysts and accounting academics), each subject 
was presented with the annual reports of two loan applicant companies to make two 
independent lending decisions based on the information provided. The results show that 
cash flow was the second most used piece of financial information after earnings, but 
that the majority of the subjects obtained this information from other financial 
statements rather than directly from the Statement of Cash Flow, most notably from 
changes over the period in the balance sheet. Whilst the results suggest that loan officers 
do not use the cash flow information provided by the Statement of Cash Flow, but rely 
on the accounting information in the accrual-based financial statements, this viewpoint 
is not up to date, given the changes in accounting standards that have taken place. The 
evidence is that, when considering the broader context of the relationship between a 
metric such as OCF (operating cash flow) and debt financing, it is the Cash Flow 
Statement that is likely to be generally viewed by creditors as a more reliable source 
than other financial statements (Sharma and Iselin, 2003). 
OCF has been predicted to have a negative association with the interest rate. 
Indeed, it is evident that firms that can generate more cash internally are in a better 
position to service their debts, as indicated by Pittman and Fortin (2004), whose results 
confirm that OCF is negatively and significantly correlated with the cost of debt (Panel 
A, Table 2.2). 
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We also know that more profitable firms enjoy greater stability of cash flow and 
therefore may achieve a lower cost of debt financing (Anderson et al, 2004). By 
measuring firm performance as a ratio of cash flows to total assets, these authors find 
firm performance to be negatively related to yield spread (Panel B, Table 2.2). They 
also use cash flow volatility as a proxy for default risk and suggest that the average 
impact of a change of one standard deviation in this variable is associated with about a 
26 basis point change in the cost of debt. We may infer from this that the less profitable 
firms are likely to see substantially higher debt costs. Therefore, this thesis argues that 
firms with weak performance are more likely to try to manipulate financial statements, 
particularly the Cash Flow Statement, in order to limit the cost of debt.  
To test the benefits associated with manipulating accounting benchmarks in the 
debt market, credit ratings and initial bond yield spreads have been used as proxies for a 
firm‘s cost of debt, and abnormal cash flow, abnormal accruals and the unexpected 
change in effective tax rates as alternative accounting manipulation proxies (Jinang, 
2008). Although the focus is on earnings management and not on cash flow 
management, Jinang finds a significant negative correlation between OCF and credit 
ratings and initial bond yield spreads when OCF is used as a control variable in the 
earnings management models (Panel C, Table 2.2). 
The six published research papers discussed above demonstrate the considerable 
agreement that exists concerning the importance of cash flow analysis in the debt 
market. On the one hand, there are tradeoffs between the costs and benefits of real cash 
flow management that would lead in equilibrium to an optimal cost of debt. On the 
other hand, there is clear evidence of cash flow manipulation in order to report to the 
market a positive figure for cash flow, especially OCF, which may lead to suboptimal 
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debt pricing if not transparent. Given that this is the case, and considering the incentives 
for managerial cash flow manipulation, this thesis extends this prior work by 
decomposing OCF into ‗normal‘ and ‗abnormal‘ components which are, respectively, 
estimates of the ‗unmanaged‘ and ‗managed‘ cash flows. Then, by analysing these two 
components of OCF, the thesis provides a better informed modelling of debt pricing.  
 
2.4 The quality of reported cash flow and related accounting information  
Cash flow is a measure of solvency and liquidity, and is well known as a traditional 
metric used in evaluating credit and bankruptcy risks (Beaver 1966; Ohlson 1980). 
There is also evidence of greater demand for high quality forecast cash flows for firms 
where accounting, operating and financing characteristics suggest that such additional 
cash flow information will be useful in interpreting earnings and assessing firm viability 
(Defond and Hung, 2003), findings which are consistent with financial analysts 
responding to market-based incentives to provide market participants with value-
relevant information. More specifically, Defond and Hung find that analysts are more 
likely to make a forecast of cash flows for firms with (1) large accruals, (2) more 
heterogeneous accounting choices relative to their industry peers, (3) high earnings 
volatility, (4) high capital intensity, and (5) poor financial health. It follows that the 
management of cash flow can be a way to mask poor performance. Defond and Hung 
document that when earnings are affected by subjectivity, cash flows are useful in 
validating the information in earnings that contain large accruals. This finding is 
consistent with the findings of Penman (2010) and Wild et al (2001), who suggest that 
market participants will rely on higher quality in cash flow information in assessing 
whether earnings are likely to contain material misstatements.  
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Cash flow is also seen as the primary element that investors use to price and 
identify accruals quality as a measure of information risk associated with accounting 
earnings (Francis et al, 2005). That is, accruals quality tells investors about the mapping 
of accounting earnings into cash flows. Relatively poor accruals quality weakens this 
mapping and, therefore, increases information risk. Using a large sample of firms over 
the period 1970-2001, Francis et al examine the relationship between accruals quality 
and costs of both debt and equity, although focused mainly on the cost of equity. They 
define the realised cost of debt as the reported interest expense in a given year divided 
by the average of the interest-bearing debt for that year and the preceding year. Using 
this metric, Francis et al document a significant negative impact of accruals quality on 
the cost of debt. This result is consistent across several alternative specifications of the 
accounting quality metric. This thesis adds that cash flow quality, especially cash flow 
from operations, can also affect information quality. Poorer cash flow quality may 
increase information risk, resulting directly in an increase in the cost of debt.  
One of the important issues that must also be addressed concerns the link 
between quality and volatility of cash flow. In principle, the effect of information 
quality on the assessed variance of a firm‘s cash flows is diversifiable, but the effect on 
the assessed covariance is not, which is precisely what the innovative work of Lambert 
et al (2007) deals with. Empirically, most studies find that information quality is indeed 
associated with the cost of capital. This suggests that either information risks are non-
diversifiable, or that investors are under-diversified. That investors may be under-
diversified is particularly a concern in the debt market, since this market is relatively 
illiquid with fewer trades by fewer investors compared to the equity market (Biais and 
Green, 2007). 
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Gu and Zhao (2006) also ask to what extent information quality affects the cost 
of debt, and to what extent private information affects the cost of debt differently from 
the cost of equity. They argue that, when bonds are rated, cash flow and accrual 
components of earnings take on different weights. They break down the commonly-
used ROA ratio into two components: cash-based (OCF divided by average assets) and 
accrual-based (income before extraordinary item minus operating cash flows, divided 
by average assets). Building on other studies that have investigated the volatility of cash 
flows (Minton and Schrand, 1999) and the volatility of earnings (Ahmed et al, 2002), 
Gu and Zhao (2005) find that the difference between the two, a measure of income 
smoothing due to accruals, separately contributes to bond ratings, and the greater the 
income smoothing, the larger is the weight OCF then accruals in bond ratings.
4
  
Prevost et al (2008) also ask about the extent information to which accounting 
quality affects the cost of debt. In fact, they examine the relation between earnings 
management and the marginal cost of debt to the firm, using a sample of traded 
corporate bonds for the period 1994-2005 whose marginal cost of debt is captured by 
market-determined yield spreads, while earnings management is proxied by three 
alternative estimates of abnormal discretionary accruals. They find that abnormal 
accruals have a negative price impact on all bonds in general. However, they also find 
that the effect is more severe for non-investment grade bonds. The study concludes that 
creditors are able to see through managers‘ attempts to opportunistically influence 
earnings perceptions by manipulating accruals, and penalise firms for doing so by 
demanding a higher rate of return. 
                                                          
4
 Note also that Gu and Zhao (2006) examine two measures of the cost of debt: annual S&P senior bond ratings and 
yield spreads on new bond issuances. Bond ratings by S&P provide an assessment of a bond issuer‘s 
creditworthiness. In the bond rating sample, Gu and Zhao find a significant positive relationship between OCF and 
rating, and in the new issuance yield spread sample they find a significant negative relationship between OCF and the 
yield spread 
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Further evidence also shows that firms with higher income smoothing rankings 
exhibit lower costs of debt and higher credit ratings (Li and Richie, 2009). Multivariate 
analysis in this case reveals that higher financial leverage and lower credit ratings are 
associated with higher borrowing costs, but that such borrowing costs can be reduced by 
smoothing reported income. Furthermore, larger firms and firms with greater stock 
return volatility and who exhibit higher income smoothing rankings will experience 
relatively higher borrowing costs. These results also support the notion that, for smaller 
firms with lower stock return volatility, income smoothing represents information 
signalling rather than garbling. Li and Richie argue that to achieve income smoothing 
(especially over the long term), a manager may also need to manipulate OCF. Since 
creditors scrutinise OCF, if the management of OCF results in garbling, and credit 
analysts recognise this, then these firms could exhibit a higher cost of debt and a lower 
firm valuation as creditors punish managers for distorting OCF. 
Cash flow quality is again a major concern when rating agencies assign credit 
ratings to firms (Standard and Poor‘s, 2008), and it has long been recognised that senior 
executives at the major bond rating agencies consider that the cash flow operation to 
long-term debt ratio is a key variable in their decision process (Backer and Gosman, 
1980). In this respect, Beaver et al (2006) argue that the investment grade and non-
investment grade boundary is a critical point in the distribution of such ratings. Certified 
credit ratings are used in several contractual settings, and a downgrade below 
investment grade has real economic consequences, such as the violation of debt 
covenants or the loss of investment from firms that can only hold investment grade 
bonds. Thus, firms have incentives to manage reported OCF to avoid downgrades, 
particularly at the investment and non-investment grade cut off. 
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Most recently, Kim et al (2010) have examined the relation between earnings 
management decisions and the slack in the firm‘s net worth debt covenant. Using 
private debt covenant data, they find that the overall level of earnings management is 
higher when the net worth covenant slack is tighter. Moreover, they find that this effect 
is more pronounced for loan-years with the tightest slack, which is a setting where the 
benefits of managing earnings are greater. Within the sub-sample of loan-years with the 
tightest slack, Kim et al find that earnings management is higher for borrowers that 
experienced increases in bankruptcy risks in the previous year.
5
 These results suggest 
that: (1) firms use earnings management to avoid violations of debt covenants; and (2) 
firms are more likely to do so when their ability to renegotiate the technical covenant 
violations is restricted.   
In this final section, the studies reviewed above have shown how the debt 
market may be sensitive to quality of accounting information, and more specifically the 
quality of cash flow. It follows that further examination of any measurable effect of 
cash flow manipulation on the cost of debt can help us to improve our understanding of 
these linkages between the quality of financial reports and the value placed on corporate 
debt by the market.  
2.5 Summary  
As explained above, previous research has widely documented a significant negative 
relationship between cash flows and various measures of the cost of debt (Minton and 
Schrand, 1999; Kwok, 2002; Pittman and Fortin, 2004; Anderson et al, 2004; Jinang, 
2008). That is, lower cash flows are associated with a higher cost of debt, and this has 
                                                          
5 Note that Kim et al‘s results are largely robust in controlling for endogeneity of the tightness of debt covenant slack, 
and they also find that the positive relation between the tightness of debt covenant slack and real earnings 
management exists both before and after the adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
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implications for the quality of reported cash flow information. Considering the 
incentives for cash flow management, this thesis builds on prior work by decomposing 
OCF into normal (or unmanaged) operating cash flows (NOR_OCF), and abnormal (or 
managed) operating cash flows (ABN_OCF). However, we need to consider in detail 
not only the cash flow metric but also the cost of debt itself. The purpose of the next 
chapter therefore is to review published research to date in relation to capital costs, 
capital structure and specifically the cost of debt.  
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Table 2.1 
A chronological summary of prior studies on the relationships investigated between cost 
of debt and cash flow and liquidity. 
Name  Year Key finding  
Minton and 
Schrand, JFE 
1999 Low cash flow firms have worse S&P bond ratings than firms with high 
cash flows; cash flow volatility not only increases the likelihood that a firm 
will need to access capital markets, it also increases the costs 
 
Kwok, IJA 2002 Bank loan officers‘ use of financial information and reports, in particular 
cash flow information and the Statement of Cash Flow, in making lending 
decisions 
  
Defond & Hung, 
WP 
2003 Analysts tend to forecast cash flows for firms where accounting, operating 
and financing characteristics suggest that cash flows are useful in 
interpreting earnings and assessing firm viability 
 
Anderson, Mansi 
& Reeb, JAE 
  
2004 Unlike Monks and Minnow (1995), find that firm performance (cash flow / 
total assets) is negatively related to yield spread 
 
Pittman & Fortin, 
JAE 
2004 Firms that can generate more cash internally are in a better position to 
service their debts; operating cash flow (OCF) is negatively and 
significantly correlated with the cost of debt 
 
Francis, LaFond, 
Olsson & 
Schipper, JAE 
 
2005 Measuring accruals quality (AQ) as the standard deviation of residuals from 
regressions relating current accruals to cash flows, they find that poorer AQ 
is associated with larger costs of debt and equity 
 
Gu and Zhao, WP 2005 The stronger the income smoothing affects the larger weight on accruals in 
bond ratings  
 
Lambert, Leuz 
and Verrecchia, 
JAR  
2007 While the effect of information quality on the assessed variance of a firm‘s 
cash flows is diversifiable, the effect on the assessed covariance is not 
 
 
Gu and Zhao, WP 2006 Although both cash flows and accruals are positively related to bond 
ratings, the weight on OCF is larger than on accruals, consistent with the 
lower predictive power of accruals for future cash flows. They also find a 
significant positive relationship between operating cash flows and rating, 
and in the new issuance yield spread sample they find a significant negative 
relationship between cash flows from operating and the yield spread 
 
Jinang, AR 2008 Finds a significant negative relation between OCF and the cost of debt 
 
Prevost Skousen 
and Rao, WP 
2008 Abnormal accruals have a negative price impact on all bonds in general . 
Also, creditors are able to see through managers‘ attempts to 
opportunistically influence earnings perceptions and penalixe firms for 
doing so by demanding a higher rate of return 
 
Li and Richie, 
WP  
2009 Find firms with higher income smoothing rankings exhibit a lower cost of 
debt and higher credit ratings 
 
 Kim and Qi, AR 2010 Firms use real earnings management to avoid violations of debt covenants 
AR: The Accounting Review; JAE: Journal of Accounting and Economics; JFE: Journal of 
Financial Economics; IJA: The International Journal of Accounting; JAR: Journal of 
Accounting Research; WP: Working Paper 
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Table 2.2 
Prior research incorporating operating cash flow as a predictor variable in debt pricing 
models 
Panel A: Pittman and Fortin (2004) 
 
CODit = β0 +β1 OCFit + β2 LEVit + β3 SIZEit + β4 Ageit + β5 BigSixit + β6 Age*BigSixit 
+ β7 Primeit + Β8 Defaultit + β9AssetStructureit + β10NegEquityit + γIndustryi + δYeart + 
εit 
Predictor Variables  Coefficient  
Intercept 0.0703 
*** 
Operating Cash Flow (OCF) -0.0069 
** 
Leverage (LEV) 0.0326 
*** 
Firm size (SIZE)  0.0031 
*** 
Age  -0.0031 
*** 
Big Six auditor -0.0143 
*** 
Age *Big Six auditor 0.0019 
*** 
Prime rate 0.3297 
*** 
Default premium 0.174 
 
Asset structure 0.0038 
*** 
Negative book equity 
 
0.0102 
*** 
   
Adjusted R
2
 16%  
N  3,339  
COD, the dependent variable, is interest expense divided by the average of total short- and long-term debt 
during the year. OCF is operating cash flow scaled by total assets, LEV is the ratio of long-term debt to 
total assets, and SIZE is log total assets. Fixed effects are estimated for industry (γ) and year (δ). 
Significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels respectively. 
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Panel B: Anderson, Mansi and Reeb (2004)  
 
Spreadit = β0 + β1OCF + β2SIZE + β3LEV + β4BoardIndit + β5Big Boardsit + β6Small 
Boardsit + β7Durationit + β8BondAgeit + β9Ratingit + β10Blockit + β11NLCreditit + 
β12Volatilityit + γYearit + δIndustryit + εit 
Predictor Variables Coefficient  
Intercept  86.029 
*** 
Operating Cash Flow (OCF) -99.852 
*** 
Firm size (SIZE) -13.138 
*** 
Leverage (LEV) 0.569 
** 
Board independence -50.432 
*** 
Big boards -32.665 
*** 
Small boards 23.123 
** 
Duration 4.301 
*** 
Bond age 8.012 
*** 
Rating -5.095 
*** 
NLCredit (Non investment grade debt) 136.643 
*** 
Block (Number of outside blockholders) 3.081 
 
Volatility of Stock Return 238.361 
*** 
   
Adjusted R
2
 64%  
N 1,052  
Spread, the dependent variable, is the yield spread. COD, the dependent variable, is interest expense 
divided by the average of total short- and long-term debt during the year, LEV is the ratio of long-term 
debt to total assets, OCF is operating cash flow scaled by total assets,  and SIZE is log total assets. 
Dummy variables are added for industry (γ) and year (δ). Significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) 
levels respectively. 
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Panel C: Jinang (2008) 
 
Ratingit+1 = α0 + α1Benchmarkit + α2EarningsControlit + α3Ratingit + β1OCFit + β2 
Sizeit + β3 Levit +   β4StdRoait + β5Timesit + β6RNDit + β7StdRetit + β8 BM + ∑t βt Yearit 
+ εit 
Predictor Variables Coefficient with LagRating  Coefficient without LagRating  
Benchmark;  Profit -0.522 *** -0.587 *** 
Benchmark; Incr -0.300 *** 0.098 *** 
Benchmark; Surp -0.063  -0.021  
EarningsControl; EPS -0.57 ** -1.172 *** 
EarningsControl; ∆EPS 0.009  0.574  
EarningsControl; UE_EPS -2.091 ** -2.757 *** 
Operating Cash Flow (OCF) -0.552 ** -0.110  
Firm size (SIZE) -0.222 *** -0.719 *** 
Leverage (LEV) 1.088 *** 1.574 *** 
Rating 2.679 *** --  
StdRoa -0.404  0.795  
Times -0.242 *** -0.659 *** 
RND 2.278 *** 5.323 *** 
StdRet 17.306 *** 54.152 *** 
BM 0.475 *** 0.318 *** 
     
Adjusted R
2
 85%  48%  
N 2,484  2,484  
Rating, the dependent variable, is thefirm‘s senior rating at t+1. LEV is the ratio of long-term debt to total 
assets, OCF is operating cash flow scaled by total assets, and SIZE is log total assets. Dummy variables 
are added for industry (γ) and year (δ). Significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels respectively  
26 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 
Capital Structure and the Cost of Debt 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter (Chapter 2) provided a theoretical perspective on cash flow 
management and the cost of debt, and described the relevant evidence that has been 
published to date. The purpose of this next chapter is to review prior studies that inform 
our understanding of debt pricing, starting with capital structure theory.  
 
3. 2 Capital structure theory  
Over the past four decades, one of the central areas of modern finance research has been 
on the factors that influence capital structure and the corporate financial decisions that 
are made in this respect. Much theoretical work characterises the choice between debt 
and equity in a trade-off context in which firms choose their optimal debt ratio by 
balancing the benefits and costs. Modigliani and Miller (1958) started the debate when 
they demonstrated that firm valuation and a firm‘s average cost of capital are 
independent of the financing choice under a set of perfect market assumptions. This 
suggested in turn that investment opportunities designed to increase firm value should 
be evaluated using a single discount, the weighted average cost of capital, i.e. the 
proportion of debt multiplied by the expected return on debt plus the proportion of 
equity multiplied by its expected return. As we know from the work of Brealeyet al 
(2008), a reduction in weighted average cost of capital would result in the acceptance of 
more investment opportunities and consequently lead to an increase in firm value. 
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Equity shareholders demand a higher rate of return than debtholders since debtholders 
enjoy a prior claim. Nevertheless, according to Modigliani and Miller (1958), the 
weighted average cost of capital cannot be reduced simply by borrowing more and 
increasing the proportion of debt, because extra borrowing leads shareholders to 
demand a higher expected rate of return. Consequently, the cost of equity capital 
increases by just enough to maintain the overall weighted average cost of capital 
(Brealeyet al, 2008). 
Recent research on the net benefits to leverage is reported in Korteweg (2010). 
By generalising the Modigliani-Miller firm valuation formula, Korteweg estimates how 
the net benefits of debt vary with leverage and other covariates, explaining the observed 
variation in stock and bond betas and valuations. For identification he assumes within-
industry homogeneity with respect to asset betas, but allows the net benefit function to 
vary with individual firm characteristics. Although this is a very different approach to 
the one used in the research reported in this thesis, it is important to note that Korteweg 
estimates median net benefits to leverage of about 4% relative to total firm value, which 
therefore places a significant discount on the cost of debt. 
Other recent research relating to leverage and the cost of debt, by Binsbergen et 
al (2010) who estimate the marginal cost function for corporate debt, introduces an 
easy-to-use formula that allows for the implementation of firm-specific marginal cost 
functions, identifying an optimal debt policy against which firms‘ actual debt choices 
can be benchmarked. Binsbergen et al‘s estimates indicate that the optimal capitalised 
net benefits of debt are about 3.5% of asset value, with the cost of over-levering being 
greater than the cost of under levering, again implying a significant discount on the cost 
of debt. 
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The interest tax shield  
In 1963, Modigliani and Miller modified their discussion of corporate debt to 
specifically recognize corporate taxes. Under the tax regulations at the time, interest 
payments made to bondholders would be deducted from corporate income before 
computation of taxes owed, and this is still mainly the case. MM conclude that, due to 
the fiscal deductibility of interest, the market value of an indebted company must be 
greater than that of the same company without debts. The weighted average cost of 
capital declines at first with an increase in debt, then rises, the minimum point being the 
point of optimal capital structure as shown in Brealey et al (2008). There are two 
reasons why moderate issues of debt may initially reduce the weighted average cost of 
capital. Firstly, shareholders don't notice or appreciate the financial risk created by 
moderate borrowing, and initially accept a rate of return lower than they should, then 
they eventually react when borrowings become excessive. Secondly, imperfections may 
simply allow firms to borrow at lower interest rates.  
In practice, returns to debtholders, in the form of interest, are deducted from 
earnings before computing corporate tax liabilities, whilst returns to shareholders, in the 
form of dividends, are appropriated from earnings after corporate taxes have been paid. 
In this way, the interest tax shield provides debt finance with a comparative advantage, 
with a reduction in taxable income increasing the return on equity to shareholders. The 
interest tax shield reduces the cost of debt, so a greater return is available from the 
investments that debt is used to finance. Modigliani and Miller thus proposed that the 
value of a firm using debt finance is equivalent to the firm value if all equity was 
financed plus the present value of the interest tax shield (Brealeyet al, 2008). 
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At the extreme, Modigliani and Miller suggest a firm should be all debt financed 
to maximise the benefit derived from the interest tax shield. DeAngelo and Masulis 
(1980) argued that companies that enjoy non-debt tax shields have fewer incentives to 
become indebted. However, in the real world, the interest tax shield is only of benefit if 
a firm has income available to shield. As the magnitude of firms' taxable income varies, 
so does the benefit derived from the interest tax shield on debt. It follows that firms with 
large amounts of taxable income and thus high marginal tax rates might be expected to 
benefit to a greater extent from the interest tax shield than firms with little taxable 
income or low marginal tax rates arising from taxable losses or other non-debt tax 
shields (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980). This points clearly to the relationships 
investigated later in this thesis in the context of accounting manipulation, where the sum 
of reported income plus accruals (including tax payables), i.e. cash flow, are related to 
the cost of debt. 
Financial distress  
The theory discussed so far has ignored the default potential of debt. Returns to 
debtholders (in the form of interest) are fixed payments made from income, whereas 
returns to shareholders are at management's discretion. If fixed interest payments are not 
made, debtholders might exercise their option to force liquidation and a firm could 
experience bankruptcy. In this event, a firm could be faced with the direct cost of legal 
and court fees and indirect costs reflecting the difficulty of managing firm 
reorganisation. Even if interest payments are met and liquidation not pursued, the 
increase in the likelihood of financial problems can be expected to incur costs. In the 
stakeholder theory of capital structure, Titman and Wessels (1988) suggest that the 
behaviour of various stakeholders is affected by financial problems, and it is worth 
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noting now the key firm-specific characteristics that may accentuate such financial 
problems, as follows: 
• Less profitable firms are less likely to be able to meet interest payments when 
business fluctuates compared to firms with higher profitability. 
• Firms with diverse business operations are more likely to withstand fluctuations in 
certain areas of business activity. 
• Debt-holders are more likely to recover their investments in firms with standardised 
tangible assets that are easily liquidated. 
• Firms providing quality products or products of a certain nature which require an 
element of after-sales service, are more likely to lose custom in the face of 
possible bankruptcy. If customers recognise that 'come-back' could be limited, 
they will be reluctant to pay high prices or even do business. 
• Firms that are heavily reliant on specially trained and experienced employees are 
more likely to succumb to demands for higher wage claims as compensation for 
job insecurity in order to maintain their workforce. 
• Firms which require inputs from specialised suppliers are more likely to succumb 
to increased input prices and decreased credit facilities. 
Also, firms that are heavily reliant on debt provide less incentive for shareholders to 
contribute new capital as the shareholders would bear the cost of value-increasing 
projects while returns would be captured by debtholders (Myers, 1977). With such 
financial problems leading potentially to default, it is worth noting the recent work, by 
Almeida and Philippon (2007), Chen et al (2008) and Bhamra et al (2010) which 
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derives risk-neutral probabilities of default. Using such probabilities, Almeida and 
Philippon estimate that the expected cost of distress is approximately equal to the tax 
benefits of debt, suggesting that on average observed capital structure is consistent with 
optimal choices (see also Graham, 2000). More specifically, the authors provided a 
point estimate of the cost of default that is about 4% of firm value for investment grade 
firms and about 9% for speculative debt. Binsbergen et al (2010) estimate that the all-in 
cost of debt is about 6% of firm value for investment grade firms. These estimates are 
larger than Almeida and Philippon‘s, which is logical because their estimates reflect 
default costs while Binsbergen et al include default as well as other costs of debt (such 
as agency costs). Overall, the analysis by Binsbergen et al shows that default costs, as 
estimated by Almeida and Philippon, amount to approximately half of the total costs of 
debt, leaving about half of the costs to be explained by other factors and theories. 
 Later in this thesis, the potential arising from financial problems that was 
discussed by the above authors is reconsidered as a motivating factor for cash flow 
management, and related again to the cost of debt. 
  
3.3 How firms determine their levels of debt and equity  
According to capital structure theory, firms have what is often referred to as a target 
debt ratio, which is determined by various trade-offs between the costs and benefits of 
debt. A traditional view in corporate finance is that firms strive to maintain an optimal 
capital structure that balances the costs and benefits associated with varying degrees of 
financial leverage. When firms depart from this optimum, it is thought that they respond 
by rebalancing their leverage back to the optimal level (Leary and Roberts, 2005). Fama 
and French (2002) note that firms' debt ratios do adjust towards their targets in this way, 
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but that it appears to take a long time to return their leverage to its optimal level. 
Nevertheless, as Baker and Wurgler (2002) show, the difficulty of timing equity 
issuances with high market valuations will itself have an impact on corporate capital 
structures. This fact leads them to conclude that capital structures are the cumulative 
outcome of historical market timing efforts, rather than the result of a dynamic 
optimising strategy. Welch (2004) finds that equity price shocks have a long lasting 
effect on corporate capital structures as well. He concludes that stock returns are the 
primary determinant of capital structure changes and that corporate motives for net 
issuing activity remain uncertain.  
These findings share the common theme that shocks to corporate capital 
structures have a persistent effect on leverage, which the last two studies interpret as 
evidence against firms rebalancing their capital structures towards an optimum. Most 
empirical tests, however, implicitly assume that this rebalancing is costless: in the 
absence of adjustment costs, firms can continuously rebalance their capital structures 
towards an optimal level of leverage, whereas, in the presence of such costs, it may be 
suboptimal to respond immediately to capital structure shocks (Leary and Roberts, 
2005). 
Given the above, researchers have attempted to model the process of how firms 
determine their levels of debt, and to date they have done so mainly in terms either 
static trade-off theory, or pecking order theory (e.g. Sunder and Myers, 1999; Fama and 
French, 2002;  Frank and Goyal, 2003; Cotei and Farhat, 2009). The following provides 
an overview of these theories of capital structure, drawing general conclusions about the 
debt policies of firms. 
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The static trade-off theory of capital structure 
In the traditional static trade-off theory of capital structure, each firm has an optimal 
debt ratio, at which the value of the interest tax shield from borrowing is balanced 
against the associated costs of bankruptcy or financial distress (Myers, 1984; Belkaoui, 
1999).
6
 The trade-off between the interest tax shield benefit and the costs of financial 
distress is illustrated in Figure 3.1. The straight line (AB) shows the value of a geared 
firm with increased levels of debt but without the increased costs of financial distress 
(i.e. firm value increases in line with debt as a result of the interest tax shield). The 
curved line (AC) shows the value of the firm when including the costs of financial 
distress. Up to the point X, financial distress is immaterial and firm value is increased 
with the use of debt by the interest tax shield. After X, the costs of financial distress 
arising from increased debt are larger than the increase in benefit from the interest tax 
shield. Firm value is thus maximised at X, the optimal debt ratio. 
It follows that the curved line representing firm value with financial distress 
costs will vary according to individual financial distress potential. In firms with 
characteristics enhancing financial distress, X, the point of optimal capital structure 
would be lower. The opposite is true for firms with characteristics mitigating financial 
distress. The degree of benefit derived from interest tax shields could also alter the 
shape of the diagonal straight line in Figure 3.1; this explains why optimal debt ratios 
would deviate from firm to firm. Moreover, in individual firms the characteristics 
determining financial distress and the degree of benefit obtained from the interest tax 
shield are unlikely to remain static in a dynamic business environment, and therefore 
                                                          
6 Value of firm = Value of an all equity firm + PV of interest - PV of costs of Tax shield financial distress 
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individual optimal debt ratios could deviate over time. Although this provides one 
explanation as to why the actual debt ratios observed for a particular firm might deviate 
over time, actual deviations may also reflect deviations from optimal capital structure. 
Under the static trade-off theory, a firm is supposed to substitute debt for 
equity, or equity for debt, until the value of the firm is maximised. According to Myers 
(1984), there must be costs and time lags involved in adjusting to the optimal capital 
structure when events cause a firm to deviate; in this case, actual deviations in debt 
ratios over time would reflect deviations from optimal capital structure. However, there 
does not appear to be any theoretical suggestion that adjustment costs are a major 
concern. Consequently, under the static trade-off theory, actual debt ratios are presumed 
to be optimal and therefore actual deviations over time correspond only to changes in 
optimal capital structure. 
Pecking order theory 
In the pecking order theory, firms do not have a target amount of debt in mind, but the 
amount of debt financing employed depends on the profitability of the firm. Firms 
follow a hierarchy or pecking order of financial sources. Firms prefer internal funds, 
and equity issues are avoided by issuing debt to meet external financing requirements 
for as long as possible (Donaldson, 1961).The pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf, 
1984 and Myers, 1984) and its extensions (Lucas and McDonald, 1990) are based on 
the idea of asymmetric information between managers and investors. Managers know 
more about the true value of the firm and the firm‘s riskiness than less informed outside 
investors. To avoid the underinvestment problem, managers will seek to finance the 
new project using a security that is not undervalued by the market, such as internal 
funds or riskless debt. Therefore, this affects the choice between internal and external 
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financing. The pecking order theory is able to explain why firms tend to depend on 
internal sources of funds and prefer debt to equity if external financing is required. 
Thus, with this view, a firm‘s leverage is not driven by the trade-off theory, but it is 
simply the cumulative results of the firm‘s attempts to mitigate information asymmetry 
(Cotei and Farhat, 2009). 
 The previous study of evaluating the efficiency of the trade-off theory versus 
the pecking order theory has produced mixed evidence. Sunder and Myers (1999) test 
pecking order and static trade-off as contending theories of capital structure and find 
more supportive evidence for the pecking order theory versus the trade-off theory. 
Hovakimian et al (2001) examine the firms‘ debt-equity issuance (reduction) choice and 
find that deviation from the target leverage plays a more significant role in the 
repurchase decision than in the issuance decision of securities. Their results are 
consistent with the pecking order model in the short-run and reversion to the target 
leverage in the long-run, but there are many counter results. For instance, Fama and 
French (2002) find evidence both in favour and against each of the theories, Frank and 
Goyal (2003)  inconsistent with the pecking order theory, especially for small firms, and 
Byoun and Rhim (2005) that both of the theories explain significant variations in the 
firms‘ total debt.  Finally, in a more recent study, Cotei and Farhat (2009) find evidence 
that the trade-off theory factors play a significant role in determining the proportion of 
debt to be issued or repurchased under the pecking order assumptions, and that the 
pecking order factors are major determinants of the rate of adjustment under the trade-
off theory assumptions. These empirical results imply that the pecking order theory and 
the trade-off theory are not mutually exclusive, and we shall need to consider further 
insights into the debt financing decision in order to understand leverage of debt on 
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equity, and the associated costs that will be investigated here in the context of cash flow 
manipulation. 
 
3.4 The conflict between shareholders and managers 
The theory discussed so far is based on the assumption of maximising firm value. 
However, the potential for conflict of interest arises when different parties with their 
own vested interests become involved in a firm. Two types of conflict between the 
providers of equity finance and managers, and between the providers of equity finance 
and those of debt finance have been identified by researchers. 
The managers of a firm are in the best position to decide how resources should 
be allocated to maximise firm value. Nevertheless, if managers do not themselves 
contribute a significant amount of equity finance (i.e. they consider their personal share-
holding to be immaterial) they may be less concerned with maximising shareholder 
wealth and more interested in appropriating resources for their personal benefit. Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) argue that the larger the fraction of equity held by managers, the 
more efficient with resources they become and the more they concentrate their energies 
on enhancing firm value. They also argue that the use of debt provides a vehicle for 
increasing managers' shareholdings. If the absolute investment by managers is held 
constant, an increase in the fraction of the firm financed by debt will increase the 
managers' share of equity and mitigate the loss from the conflicts of interest between 
managers and shareholders. Jensen (1986) further argues that managers will attempt to 
avoid shareholder control by using internal funds (for example free cash flow) to 
expand the firm size beyond the optimal size and to accept projects with a negative net 
present value (for example over investment).Shareholders can prevent management 
37 
 
 
from undertaking such action by reducing the free cash flow through increasing the 
firm‘s debt. The presence of debt causes the manager to pay out cash as interest and 
repayments. Moreover, debtholders will have the firm declared bankrupt if it cannot 
meet its obligations to them.  
Similarly, Grossman and Hart (1982) indicate that, as well as causing managers 
to consume fewer perks, the use of debt creates an incentive for them to 'work harder 
and make better investment decisions'. The reason for this is to reduce the possibility of 
bankruptcy which could cost managers personally in terms of their loss of control and 
reputation. But the degree of agency benefit to be derived from issuing debt is far from 
certain. Debt is not the only vehicle for mitigating conflicts of interest between 
managers and shareholders. The personal stake or share-holding of managers in a firm 
can be enhanced through various compensation schemes tailored to maximise 
shareholder objectives. Also, proponents of this agency benefit of debt argument appear 
to suggest that debt is chosen with curtailing the allocation of resources to personal 
benefit specifically in mind. Yet, the levels of managers who are most likely to be in a 
position to seriously exploit resources are the same managers who take the decision to 
issue debt; it is unlikely that they would be issuing debt to control their own actions. 
Nevertheless, the arguments here invoke a strong expectation that managers may 
rationally engage in accounting manipulation exercises which influence debt policy, 
including the levels and the costs of debt. 
Another form of conflict between managers and shareholders is that managers 
and shareholders may disagree over a firm‘s operating decisions. Harris and Raviv 
(1990) suggest that because of the managers' personal loss of control and reputation, 
they could be reluctant to cease operations when liquidation would be preferable to 
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shareholders. They propose that the use of debt gives debt providers the option to force 
liquidation in the event of default, which would also benefit shareholders if liquidation 
was the best strategy. Nevertheless, Harris and Raviv further note that forcing 
liquidation in itself incurs costs relating to the production of information necessary for 
decisions concerning future prospects. These additional costs would not be of benefit to 
shareholders. In this context, the use of debt appears to provide a benefit if liquidation is 
the best option and the costs of liquidation are less than the costs of continued 
operations. Furthermore, the use of debt and the commitment to fixed interest payments 
enhances the possibility of liquidation in the first instance. It seems highly unlikely that 
managers would view issuing debt as providing the benefit of instigating liquidation 
when they themselves would decline to do so. Stulz (1990) also suggests that conflict 
may arise when managers want to invest all available funds and are reluctant to payout 
cash to investors. The use of debt reduces free cash flow and prevents over-investment, 
another agency benefit of debt. However, it is important to note that debt payments may 
exhaust more than 'free cash', reducing funds available for profitable investments, 
implying a cost to using debt. Again, these arguments in finance theory suggest that 
managers may rationally engage in accounting manipulation exercises which influence 
the level and the cost of debt, as mentioned above. 
 
3.5 The conflict between shareholders and debtholders 
Recent research shows that, as deteriorating market liquidity pushes down bond prices, 
it amplifies the conflict of interest between the shareholders and debtholders because, to 
avoid bankruptcy, the equity holders have to absorb all of the short-fall from rolling 
over maturing bonds at the reduced market values. He and Xiong (2009) examine this 
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role of deteriorating market liquidity, revealing a trade-off between short-term debt‘s 
cheaper financing cost and higher future bankruptcy cost in determining firms‘ optimal 
debt maturity structure and liquidity management strategy. As a result, shareholders 
choose to default at a higher fundamental threshold even if there is no potential for 
firms to raise more equity, with a greater fraction of short-term debt then further 
exacerbating the situation by forcing the equity holders to realise the rollover loss at a 
higher frequency. This spiral creates the kind of debtholder-shareholder conflict that is 
posited here. 
Such conflict between equity holders and debtholders has also been identified in 
the agency cost literature, and these too have implications for the hypotheses that will 
be developed in Chapter 5 of this thesis. Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that the 
use of debt finance provides managers acting on behalf of shareholders with an 
incentive to invest sub-optimally in very risky projects. If an investment yields large 
returns, shareholders capture the majority of the gain, as returns to debtholders are 
fixed. However, if the investment fails, debtholders bear the consequences, as a result of 
shareholders' limited liability. If debtholders anticipate this behaviour and incorporate 
restrictive covenants in debt contracts in order to prevent it, the return on investment 
financed by debt is decreased. 
Smith and Warner (1979) suggest using restrictive covenants on debt such as 
including interest coverage requirements or prohibitions against investing in new 
unrelated lines of business. Restrictive covenants are irrelevant if managers are only 
interested in pursuing relatively safe projects out of adverse reputational considerations. 
Restrictive covenants reduce management flexibility by restricting the firm‘s investment 
and financing opportunities. Smith and Warner also suggested that secured debt may 
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provide the issuer with a means to mitigate agency costs of debt. Furthermore, the issue 
of convertible debt, where debtholders have the option to convert to shareholders, could 
be used to reduce the need for restrictive covenants. Firms may also use the 
convertibility option to mitigate the agency costs of debt. Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
argue that such conversion rights enable debtholders to recapture any positive wealth 
transfers to shareholders and to gain from any increase in risk. 
Maturity of debt is another option that firms can use to mitigate agency costs. 
Myers (1977) observes that, if debt matures before growth options are exercised, the 
firm‘s incentive to deviate from a firm-value-maximizing exercise policy is eliminated. 
Billett et al (2007) argue further that short-term debt can mitigate both under- and over-
investment incentives by making the debt less sensitive to changes in firm value and by 
allowing for more frequent re-pricing of debt.  
According to Diamond (1989), managerial reputation also plays an important 
role in mitigating the conflicts between shareholder and debtholder. He suggests that the 
longer the period of non-default the better is a firm's reputation for safety and lower will 
be its borrowing costs; this suggests that older firms will choose safe projects to 
maintain reputation. Younger firms with a lesser reputation may choose risky projects 
with higher prospective returns, but, if they survive, they will eventually prefer safe 
projects. 
Altogether, the above tells us that the terms of debt contracts, particularly 
covenants and maturity, are firmly linked to managerial behaviour by finance theorists, 
and we should expect these features of debt, and the debtholder-shareholder conflicts 
they entail, to be apparent as factors that motivate cash flow accounting choices when 
managers seek to influence market appraisals of debt costs.  In an innovative accounting 
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study on this issue, Ahmed et al (2002) provide evidence suggesting that accounting 
does indeed help mitigate these debtholder-shareholder conflicts, specifically with 
regard to the influence of accounting conservatism over dividend policy and the 
reduction in debt costs. These authors use a market-based measure and an accrual-based 
measure of conservatism and find that both measures are significantly positively 
correlated with two of the three proxies for bondholder-shareholder conflicts over 
dividend policy (standard deviation of ROA and the dividend-to-asset ratio). They 
conclude that firms facing more severe bondholder-shareholder conflicts over dividend 
policy choose more conservative accounting. 
In summary, whilst the benefits of issuing debt appear to arise mainly from 
conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers (even tthough issuing debt may 
incur costs when there is conflict over operating decisions), it is also the case that costs 
will arise when conflicts of interest between shareholders and debtholders cause 
debtholders to impose restrictions. This leads back to the Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
proposal that an optimal capital structure can be obtained by trading-off these agency 
costs and benefits to debt, and that this will maximise the value of the firm. For the 
purposes of this thesis, the debtholder-shareholder and debtholder-manager conflicts are 
seen as key motivating factors in the flows of accounting information between these 
parties.  
 
3.6 Other empirical evidence regarding the cost of debt   
Many studies have examined the relationship between cost of debt and firm 
characteristics. In order to provide a coherent review, an outline of previous researchers' 
intentions is provided on a study-by-study basis and findings are summarised according 
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to the relationships being tested and the proxies used. A tabulated summary of the 
hypothesised connections between debt costs and the characteristics of the firm is 
shown in Table 3.1.  
A potential link between a firm's overall disclosure quality and its cost of debt 
financing was investigated by Sengupta (1998). Measuring the cost of debt as the yield 
on newly issued debt, thus capturing the marginal cost of debt to the firm, the paper 
provides evidence that those firms with high disclosure quality ratings from financial 
analysts enjoy a lower effective interest cost. Since debt financing is an important 
source of external financing for publicly traded firms, the results have important 
implications for understanding the motives and consequences of corporate disclosures. 
Demirtas et al (2006) examine earnings management around the time of initial 
bond ratings. Using a sample of 1,257 industrial bonds with initial ratings from 
Moody‘s between 1980 and 2003, the authors document increasing (positive) current 
accruals in the years and quarters leading up to the initial rating followed by declining 
(negative) accruals. The results imply that firms opportunistically inflate earnings prior 
to issuing initial (rated) debt. In additional tests, Demirtas et al show that the inflated 
earnings were associated with higher ratings and, by implication, lower costs of debt. 
Their combined evidence suggests that rating agencies are fooled by managerial 
discretionary behaviour with regard to earnings management. The issue of whether 
firms manage earnings before issuing bonds to achieve a lower cost of borrowing was 
also studied by Liu et al (2010), who find significant income-increasing earnings 
management prior to bond offerings. They also find that firms that manage earnings 
upward issue debt at a lower cost. Their results are consistent with studies that report 
earnings management around equity issuance, and indicate that, like equity holders, 
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bondholders fail to see through the inflated earnings numbers in pricing new debt. Note 
however that Demirtas et al and Liu et al (unlike the current thesis) did not examine the 
direct impact of abnormal accruals on the market price of debt, nor  the impact of cash 
flow management. It is conceivable that, even if ratings agencies are ―fooled‖ by 
earnings management, bond buyers may be able nevertheless to see through the 
earnings management and price the debt appropriately. 
Prior earning management research documents that firms attempt to beat three 
earnings benchmark (zero earnings, last year's earnings, and analyst's forecasted 
earnings) and that there are both equity market and compensation-related benefits 
associated with beating these benchmarks. Jiang (2008) investigated whether and under 
what conditions beating these three earnings benchmarks reduces a firm's cost of debt, 
using two proxies for a firm's cost of debt: credit ratings and initial bond yield spread. 
Jiang‘s results suggest that firms beating earnings benchmarks have a higher probability 
of rating upgrades and a smaller initial bond yield spread. Additional analyses indicate 
that (1) the benefits of beating earnings benchmarks are more pronounced for firms with 
high default risk; (2) beating the zero earnings benchmark generally provides the 
biggest reward in terms of a lower cost of debt; and (3) the reduction in the cost of debt 
is attenuated but does not disappear for firms beating benchmarks through earnings 
management. In summary, Jiang‘s results suggest that there are benefits associated with 
beating earnings benchmarks in the debt market. However, given that cash flow may be 
the more important metric for the debt market, we may ask whether the strong focus on 
earnings management focus is appropriate. 
The role of accounting quality in improving bond liquidity and its implication on 
the cost of debt has been investigated by Subramanyam et al (2010).  They argue that 
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high accounting quality not only reduces information asymmetry, but also decreases 
overall uncertainty in the market, in the way improving liquidity and reducing the cost 
of debt. Subramanyam et al find the accounting quality significantly reduce cost of debt 
(Table 3.1 panel D), they also show that the previously documented effect of accounting 
quality in reducing the cost of debt is largely through the improved liquidity. 
Considering these results from Subramanyam et al, this thesis goes on to argues how 
cash flow manipulation may affect accounting quality, thus increasing information 
asymmetry, and consequently influencing the cost of debt. 
 
3. 7 Summary 
This chapter has reviewed the prior studies in relation to capital structure and cost of 
debt. The chapter explained how firms determine their levels of debt and equity. Capital 
structure theory, interest tax shields and financial distress investigated. Moreover this 
chapter explained the trade-off theory and the conflict between shareholders, managers 
and debtholders. In addition the chapter documented evidence about the cost of debt and 
capital structure and relationships between the cost of debt and other firm characteristics 
in the previous studies. Nevertheless, we also need to know about structure of Cash 
Flow Statement and consider in detail how firm can manipulate OCF. The purpose of 
the next chapter is to review the studies in the area of the Cash Flow Statement and cash 
flow manipulation. The incentives for cash flow manipulation and different common 
methods for doing this are also discussed. 
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Table 3.1  
Prior research of relationships between cost of debt proxies and other firm characteristics 
Panel A: Partha Sengupta, (1998) 
Definition Sign Sig/Insig 
YIELD; Yield to maturity on first debt issued in year t + 1.   
DISC: Average of total FAF disclosure score over the years t, t-1 and t-2 NEG SIG 
DE: Total liabilities divided by market value of equity at the end of year t POS SIG 
MARGIN: Income before extraordinary items of year t divided by net sales of year t  IN-SIG 
TIMES: Income before extraordinary items plus interest expense, divided by interest expense  IN-SIG 
LASSET: Log of the book value of total assets at the end of year t  IN-SIG 
STDRETN: Standard deviation of daily stock returns over year t POS SIG 
LSIZE: Log of the dollar amount of the debt issued  IN-SIG 
LMATUR: Log of the number of years to maturity of the debt POS SIG 
TBILL: Yield on equal maturity U.S. Treasury bonds  POS SIG 
BC: Average yield on AAA bonds minus the average yield on 30-year US Treasury bills  POS SIG 
CALL: Number of years to first call divided by the number of years to maturity  IN-SIG 
CONVER:T 1, if the debt is convertible; 0 otherwise NEG SIG 
SUBORD: 1, the debt is subordinated; 0 otherwise POS SIG 
RATE: 1,2,...,6 for bonds rated Aaa, Aa, A, Baa, Ba and B, respectively   
   
Adjusted R
2
  75% 
N  114 
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Table 3.1  
(Cont.) 
 
Panel B: Anderson and Mansi, (2009) 
Definition Sign Sig/Insig 
YIELD SPREAD: Dependent variable   
ACSI: A measure of customer satisfaction NEG SIG 
COD: Difference between the firm‘s‘ cost of debt less the cost of debt on a US Treasury security with similar effective maturity   
SIZE: Natural log of the firm‘s total assets NEG SIG 
Profitability: Ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortisation divided by total assets NEG SIG 
LEV: Ratio of long-term debt to total assets POS SIG 
Advertising: Ratio of advertising expenditures divided by sales POS SIG 
Risk: Firm‘s standard deviation of the cash flow ratio for the past five years  IN-SIG 
Rating: The portion of the rating (average of both Moody‘s and S&P) variable unexplained by ACSI NEG SIG 
              Duration:  A linear combination of the weighted durations of each bond for each firm, where duration refers to Macaulay 
duration and represents a security‘s effective maturity 
NEG SIG 
Age: Weighted average difference between the observation year date and the date of the original bond issue POS SIG 
   
Adjusted R
2
  65% 
N  2,574 
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Table 3.1  
(Cont.) 
 
Panel C: Anderson and Mansi,(2009), Second Model 
Definition Sign Sig/Insig 
Credit Rating: Average of both Moody‘s and S&P bond ratings    
ACSI: A measure of customer satisfaction  POS SIG 
COD: Firm‘s cost of debt less yield on US Treasury bond with similar effective maturity    
SIZE: Natural log of the firm‘s total assets POS SIG 
Profitability: Ratio of EBITDA to total assets POS SIG 
LEV: Ratio of long-term debt to total assets NEG SIG 
MTB: Book value of assets plus premium of market over book value of equity, divided by book value of assets NEG SIG 
ADV: Ratio of advertising expenditures to sales NEG SIG 
Risk: Standard deviation of the cash flow ratio for the past five years NEG SIG 
Coverage: Linear combination of weighted durations of each bond for each firm NEG SIG 
   
Adjusted R
2
  69% 
N  2,555 
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Table 3.1  
(Cont.) 
 
Panel D: Mansi S A, Maxwell W F and Wald J K, (2009) 
Definition Sign Sig/Insig 
Yield  Spread:  log(Yield Spread)   
SIZE: The log of total assets NEG SIG 
LEV: The ratio of short- and long-term debt to total assets  POS SIG 
ROA: The ratio of earnings before interest and tax to total assets  NEG SIG 
Rating: Residual credit rating NEG SIG 
HighYield:  Dummy that takes on a value of one if the debt rating is noninvestment grade  POS SIG 
Duration:  Debt duration  NEG SIG 
Age: The log of debt  IN-SIG 
Call: Dummy that takes on a value of one if the bonds are callable  POS SIG 
FirmRisk: The standard deviation for cash flows for the previous five years   IN-SIG 
Intangibles: Intangibles as a fraction of firm assets  NEG SIG 
   
Adjusted R
2
  76% 
N  8,345 
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Table 3.1  
(Cont.) 
 
Panel E: Pizzo, Moscariello, Skerratt and Gregoriou, (2009) 
Definition Sign Sig/Insig 
COD: Realised cost of debt   
LEV: Interest-bearing debt to total assets NEG SIG 
SIZE: Log of firm j's total sales  IN-SIG 
Tangibility: Percentile of PPE in company j's total assets NEG SIG 
IntCov: Operating income to interest expense  IN-SIG 
NIBE: Standard Deviation of firm j's net income before extraordinary items  IN-SIG 
ROA: Return on assets  IN-SIG 
Z_score  IN-SIG 
Euribor:  Yearly average six-months interbank interest rate POS SIG 
Industry dummies  IN-SIG 
IFRS: Dummy variable  IN-SIG 
   
Adjusted R
2
  25% 
N  233 
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Table 3.1  
(Cont.) 
 
Panel F: Subramanyam K R, Qi and Zhang, (2010) 
Definition Sign Sig/Insig 
YIELD_SPREAD(Dependent)   
AQ: Accounting quality measure as developed in Dechow and Dichev (2002) NEG SIG 
NEG_BIDASK: Firm liquidity measure 2, calculated as the (negative) average of bid-ask spreads across bonds issued by the firm, weighed by offering 
amount 
NEG SIG 
AGE: Logarithm of AGE POS SIG 
MATURITY: Logarithm of MATURITY POS SIG 
OFFER: Logarithm of OFFER NEG SIG 
BM: Book-to-market ratio POS SIG 
CRATIO: Current ratio calculated as current assets divided by current liabilities POS SIG 
LEV: Sum of current liabilities and long-term debt over total assets POS SIG 
LOGNUMAN: Logarithm of one plus the number of analysts issuing an annual forecast for the firm in the fiscal year  IN-SIG 
SIZE: Logarithm of Total assets NEG SIG 
ROA: Return on assets calculated as operating income  over average total assets NEG SIG 
SDOCF: Rolling standard deviation of cash flows from operations over the past seven years POS SIG 
TANGIBLE: Tangibility ratio calculated as net property, plant and equipment  divided by total assets POS SIG 
   
Adjusted R
2
  80% 
N  1,700 
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Table 3.1 
 (Cont.)  
 
Panel G: Shaw K W, (2011) 
Definition Sign Sig/Insig 
SPREAD: The bond yield to maturity minus the yield on a US Treasury bond of comparable maturity on the issuance date 
OPT: The number of shares related to CEO unexercised stock options, deflated by total common shares outstanding POS SIG 
STK: The number of the firm‘s common shares held by the CEO, deflated by total common shares outstanding POS SIG 
RES_RATING: The residual from a regression of RATING on CEO incentive variables POS SIG 
RATING: The Standard and Poor‘s credit rating on the new issue 
DEBT: The ratio of total long-term debt to total assets POS SIG 
EBITDA: Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortisation, scaled by total assets IN-SIG 
TIMES: Earnings plus interest expense, scaled by interest expense POS SIG 
LASSET: The total book value of assets NEG SIG 
LSIZE: The net proceeds ($millions) of the new debt issue POS SIG 
LMATURITY: The number of years to maturity for the bond issue POS SIG 
CALL: The ratio of the years to first call over the years to maturity IN-SIG 
INV_OPP: The factor score from a factor analysis employing research and development expenditures, the book to market ratio, and capital expenditure IN-SIG 
STDRET: The standard deviation of monthly stock returns POS SIG 
MKT_RATE: The interest rate on a 10-year US Treasury bond, issued in the same month as firm i‘s debt in year t NEG SIG 
INST: The percentage of outstanding shares held by institutional owners NEG SIG 
TOP5: The percentage of outstanding shares held by the five largest institutional owners POS SIG 
CEO: An indicator variable which equals 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the firm‘s board of directors, and 0 otherwise NEG SIG 
TRANSP: A measure of financial transparency based on returns-earnings regressions NEG SIG 
AQ: Accruals quality, based on regressions of working capital accruals on lagged, current, and one-year ahead operating cash flows NEG SIG 
RET: Annual stock return NEG SIG 
   
Adjusted R
2
  73% 
N  598 
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Figure 3.1  
 
Static trade-off theory of capital structure 
 
 
Source: Samuels, J.M., Wilkes, F.M., and Brayshaw, R.E., 'Management of Company 
Finance' sixth Edition, Chapman and Hall, 1995, p453 
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Source: Thomson S.J. (2003), ‗The Role of Leasing in UK Corporate Financing Decisions, 
Accounting Treatment and Market Impact‘, PhD Thesis, University of Stirling P. 39 
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Chapter 4 
Cash flow reporting and cash flow manipulation 
 
4.1 Introduction  
The previous chapter (Chapter 3) explained the theoretical perspectives on capital 
structure and the cost of debt in detail. The purpose of this chapter is not only overviews 
the Cash Flow Statement history but also reviews the  cash flow manipulation studies. 
Moreover the incentives for cash flow manipulation and different ways for doing 
manipulation are also given.  
 
4.2 Cash Flow Statements and the classifications of cash flows 
The cash flow statement explains the change during the period in cash and cash 
equivalents, and classifies cash inflows and outflows as relating to operating, investing, 
or financing activities.  
The Cash Flow Statement appears to have received little or no support from 
accountants until the early 1960s. At that time there was little concern over the use of 
‗cash flow‘ data in the financial analysis, cash flow being interpreted as profit plus 
depreciation (Winjum, 1972). In 1961 AICPA recognised the importance of funds 
statements by publishing an Accounting Research Study (ARS) No. 2: ―Cash flow 
analysis and fund statements‖. Before that, accountants had prepared funds statements 
primarily as a management report. The Accounting Principles Board (APB) responded 
in October 1963 by issuing APB Opinion No. 3 (The Statements of Sources and 
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Application of Funds), which recommended fund statements on a supplementary basis. 
Because of the favourable response of the business community to this pronouncement, 
the APB issued Opinion No. 198, ―Reporting Changing in Financial Position‖, in March 
1971. This opinion required that a statement of changing financial position be presented 
as a basic financial statement and be covered by the auditor‘s report. In 1981 the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) reconsidered funds flow issues as part 
of the conceptual framework project in 1976. At this time the FASB decided that cash 
flow reporting issues should be considered as a standard. As a result, in November 1987 
the FASB released the statement of cash flows (SFAS No. 95). In 1991 the Accounting 
Standards Board (ASB) in UK issued cash flow statement (FRS No. 1), and in 1992, the 
International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) issued cash flow statement 
(IAS7). The financial community adopted the concept of comprehensive cash flow 
reporting, particularly for evaluating the results of operations, because of the belief 
those traditional measures of income and working capital from operations are not a 
good surrogate for cash flow from operations (Mostafa, 2005). 
In the United States, The FASB Statement No. 95, Statement of Cash Flows 
(SFAS-95, 1987) and Statement No. 117, Financial Statements of Not-for-Profit 
Organizations (SFAS 117, 1993) require most business and not-for-profit enterprises to 
provide a cash flow statement for each period for which results of operations are 
provided. 
Classification of cash flows  
Cash flows are to be classified according to operating, investing and financing 
activities. As we know from the work of Wallace et al 1997, the basis of such 
classification is derived from financial theory, which states that an enterprise derives the 
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cash used for investing activities and settlement of outstanding financial obligations in 
an accounting period from internal and external sources. Internal cash sources emanate 
from the net cash generated from current operations and perhaps from disinvesting and 
depletion of cash resources at start of the period. External cash sources come from 
financing activities such as borrowing, and receiving cash from the sale of equity shares 
to existing and new shareholders (Wallace et al 1997). 
 
4.3 The objective and Scope of IAS 7 
According to IAS 7, Information about the cash flows of an enterprise is useful in 
providing users of financial statements with a basis from which to assess the ability of 
the enterprise to generate cash and cash equivalents and the needs of the enterprise to 
utilise those cash flows. The economic decisions taken by users require an evaluation of 
the ability of an enterprise to generate cash and cash equivalents and of the timing and 
certainty of their generation. The objective of this statement (IAS 7) is to require the 
provision of information about the historical change in cash and cash equivalents of an 
enterprise by means of a Cash Flow Statement that classifies cash flows during a period 
from operating, investing and financing activities. An enterprise should prepare a Cash 
Flow Statement in accordance with the requirements of IAS 7 and should present it as 
an integral part of its financial statements for each period for which financial statements 
are prepared. Users of an enterprise‘s financial statements are interested in how the 
enterprise generates and uses cash and cash equivalents. This is the case regardless of 
the nature of the enterprise‘s activities, and irrespective of whether cash can be viewed 
as the product of the enterprise, as may be the case with a financial institution. 
Enterprises need cash for the same reasons, however different their principal revenue- 
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producing activities might be. They need cash to conduct their operations, to pay their 
obligations, and to provide returns to their investors. Accordingly, this standard requires 
all enterprises to present a Cash Flow Statement (IAS 7, Paragraph 1, 2 and 3). 
Benefits of Cash Flow Information  
Indicated in Lightstone (2011) academics have long advocated the importance and 
usefulness of the cash flow statement citing the studies of Gup and Dugan (1988); 
Hodgson and Stevenson-Clark (2000); Sharma and Iselin (2003); Purr (2004). As is 
summarised by IAS7, a cash flow statement, when used in conjunction with the other 
financial statements, provides information on liquidity, viability and adaptability that 
enables investors, creditors, and others to assess the changes in net assets of an 
enterprise, its financial structure and its ability to affect the amounts and timing of cash 
flows in order to adapt to changing circumstances and opportunities. Cash flow 
information is useful in assessing the ability of the enterprise to generate cash and cash 
equivalents and enables users to develop models to assess and compare the present 
value of the future cash flows of different enterprises. It also enhances the comparability 
of the reporting of operating performance by different enterprises because it eliminates 
the effects of using different accounting treatments for the same transactions and events. 
Analysts and other users of financial information often, formally or informally, develop 
models to assess and compare the present value of the future cash flow of entities. 
Historical cash flow information is often used as an indicator of the amount, timing and 
certainty of future cash flows. It is also useful in checking the accuracy of past 
assessments of future cash flows and in examining the relationship between profitability 
and net cash flow and the impact of changing prices. 
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4.4 The format of Cash Flow Statements under IAS 7 
Cash and cash equivalents 
The definitions of cash and cash equivalents are central to the preparation and 
interpretation of Cash Flow Statements. The international accounting regulator defines 
cash and cash equivalents as follows: 
Cash comprises cash on hand and demand deposits and Cash 
equivalents are short-term, highly liquid investments that are readily 
convertible to known amounts of cash and which are subject to an 
insignificant risk of changes in value. (IAS7, Paragraph 6). 
  
According to the IAS 7 paragraph 7 cash equivalents are held for the purpose of 
meeting short-term cash commitments rather than for investment or other purposes. For 
an investment to qualify as a cash equivalent it must be readily convertible to a known 
amount of cash and be subject to an insignificant risk of changes in value. Therefore, an 
investment normally qualifies as a cash equivalent only when it has a short maturity of, 
say, three months or less from the date of acquisition. Equity investments are excluded 
from cash equivalents unless they are, in substance, cash equivalents, for example in the 
case of preferred shares acquired within a short period of their maturity and with a 
specified redemption date. 
Preparation of Cash Flow Statements 
IAS 7 requires cash flows to be classified into operating, investing and financing 
activities. Classification by activity provides information that allows users to assess the 
impact of those activities on the financial position of the entity and the amount of its 
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cash and cash equivalents. This information may also be used to evaluate the 
relationships among those activities (IAS7, Paragraph 11). 
Cash flows from operating activities 
Cash flows from operating activities are in general the cash effects of transactions and 
other events relating to operating or trading activities. Net cash flow from operating 
activities represents net increases or decreases in cash resulting from operations shown 
in the income statements in calculating profit from operations. According to the IAS 7 
an entity shall report cash flows from operating activities using either:  
The direct method, whereby major classes of gross cash receipts and 
gross cash payments are disclosed; or the indirect method, whereby 
profit or loss is adjusted for the effects of transactions of a non-cash 
nature, any deferrals or accruals of past or future operating cash 
receipts or payments, and items of income or expense associated with 
investing or financing cash flows (IAS7, Paragraph 18). 
 
 IAS7 permits a choice between two possible methods for reporting net cash flow from 
operating activities. Nevertheless, entities are encouraged to report cash flows from 
operating activities using the direct method. The direct method provides information 
which may be useful in estimating future cash flows and which is not available under 
the indirect method
7
 (IAS7, Paragraph 19). 
Although the IAS7 prefers the direct method, the indirect method is widely used 
in practice (Barsky and Catanach, 2007). Accordingly CFA institute (2007) indicates; 
                                                          
7 According to Barsky and Catanach (2007) the use of the indirect method for preparing the cash flow statements 
presents several opportunities for misreporting the cash flow position.  
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The indirect method chosen by the vast majority of companies fails to 
provide adequate information for analysis. Instead of providing the 
essential information on cash inflows and outflows, the indirect 
method begins with net income and “patches” the income number, 
purging noncash elements and adjusting for changes in cash flows not 
reflected in current period income. Put simply, the only pure cash flow 
number in the operating cash flow section of an indirect method cash 
flow statement is the total, Cash Flows from Operations (CFA 
institute, Financial Reporting for Investors, 2007, p.13). 
 
 
CFA Institute, reflecting on users‘ experience with cash flow statements prepared under 
current accounting standards, observed in 1993: 
. . . Cash flow statements that have appeared in published financial 
reports have been much less useful in analysis than we might have 
expected. First, almost no public company presents its cash flows from 
operations using the direct format; virtually all use the indirect 
format. We have learned . . . that it is extremely difficult or impossible 
in most cases for financial statement users to calculate reasonable 
estimates of gross operating cash flows (direct method) using only the 
data provided in financial reports in the indirect format (Financial 
Reporting in the 1990s and Beyond, 1993, p. 65
8
). 
 
                                                          
8
 Report titled Financial Reporting in the 1990s and Beyond was published in 1993, by the Financial Accounting 
Policy Committee of the Association for Investment Management and Research (AIMR).  
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CFA institute concludes if cash flow information is essential to investors, and the 
indirect method does not provide the needed information or enable investors to generate 
it from the data, then companies must be required to use the direct method
9
. 
Cash flows from investing activities 
The separate disclosure of cash flows arising from investing activities is important 
because the cash flows represent the extent to which expenditures have been made for 
resources intended to generate future income and cash flows. Only expenditures that 
result in a recognised asset in the statement of financial position are eligible for 
classification as investing activities (IAS7, Paragraph 16).  
Investing activities include (i) acquiring and disposing of plant assets, other 
productive assets and financial investments (except cash equivalents and trading 
securities); and (ii) making loans to and collecting loans from other entities. Investing 
outflows include payments to make or acquire loans, payments to acquire debt or equity 
securities of other entities, and payments to acquire plant assets and other productive 
assets. Investing inflows include receipts from collecting or disposing of loans, receipts 
from sales of debt or equity instruments of other entities, and receipts from sales of 
plant assets and other productive assets.  
Cash flows from financing activities  
The separate disclosure of cash flows arising from financing activities is important 
because it is useful in predicting claims on future cash flows by providers of capital to 
the entity (IAS7, Paragraph 17). 
                                                          
9
 Contrariwise the UK ASB requires the indirect method as it does not believe that the benefits to the 
users of the direct method outweigh the costs of preparing it. 
62 
 
 
Financing activities include: (i) obtaining resources from owners and providing 
them with a return on, and a return of, their investment; (ii) receiving resources that are 
donor restricted for long-term purposes; (iii) borrowing money and repaying amounts 
borrowed, or otherwise settling the obligation; and (iv) obtaining and paying for other 
resources obtained from creditors on long-term credit. Financing inflows include 
proceeds from issuing debt or equity securities, proceeds from contributions and 
investment income that are donor restricted for long-term purposes, income tax benefits 
of windfall stock option deductions, receipts from certain derivative instruments with 
off-market terms and/or up-front payments at inception, and proceeds from other short- 
or long-term borrowing. Financing outflows include dividend payments, outlays to 
reacquire or retire equity securities, repayments of amounts borrowed, receipts from 
certain derivative instruments with off-market terms and/or up-front payments at 
inception, and payments of debt issuance costs. 
The format and the classification of Cash Flow Statements in UK 
Although there is general agreement between different accounting standard-setters 
across the world on the objectives of Cash Flow Statements, there are differences 
between them regarding the format and the classification of Cash Flow Statements. In 
this section the format of Cash Flow Statements in the UK will be reviewed in detail.  
According to UK FRS1 (1991, revised in 1996) the Cash Flow Statement should 
contain the following headings: 
1. Operating activities 
2. Return on investments and servicing of finance 
3. Taxation 
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4. Capital expenditure and financial investment 
5. Acquisitions and disposals 
6. Equity dividends paid 
7. Management of liquid resources 
8. Financing 
The UK IAS 7 has indicated that the last two headings could be merged together 
under a single heading but a subheading should be given for each one. It also requires 
the first six headings be reported in the above sequence. Comparing the UK FRS1 
(1991, revised in 1996) with those of other countries reveals many differences, the main 
differences being: (i) differences in defining cash; and (ii) differences in classification 
of some components of Cash Flow Statements. These differences might explain why the 
number of main headings in Cash Flow Statements varies between countries. For 
instance, in the US Cash Flow Statements contain three main headings: operating, 
investing and financing cash flows. 
 
4.5 Cash flow manipulation – redefining net liquid assets  
Only a handful of the thousands of public companies worldwide report OCF use the 
direct method (CFA institute, Financial Reporting for Investors, 2007) and majority of 
companies use the indirect method to report OCF.
10
 This routine and mechanical 
technique reconciles accrual net income to OCF. The most common adjustments to net 
                                                          
10 See ACCOUNTING TRENDS & TECHNIQUES, 59th ed. (New York: American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants, 2005). 
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income include those related to non-cash income and expense items, gains and losses 
reported for investing activities and changes in working capital components. However, 
the indirect method‘s apparent simplicity masks the multiple opportunities that it 
provides for misreporting OCF. Mulford and Comiskey (2005) identify a number of 
areas that illustrate the flexibility available in reporting OCF when this method is used. 
Four possible manipulation opportunities are as follows: 
 Bank overdrafts: should bank overdrafts be reported as operating or financing 
activities? 
 Investment securities: how are operating cash flows affected by the balance-
sheet classification of investment securities? 
 Notes receivable: does the nature of a particular receivable (that is, dealer versus 
customer) affect OCF? 
Receivable securitisations: are such activities operating or financing activities? 
4. 5.1 Bank overdrafts 
A bank overdraft arises when cheques written and presented for payment exceed an 
available bank balance, and a book overdraft is a negative cash balance recorded on a 
company‘s books. It is not an overdraft at the bank, but rather an excess of outstanding 
cheques on a company‘s books over its reported bank cash balance. A book overdraft 
becomes a bank overdraft when outstanding cheques are presented for payment 
(Mulford and Comiskey, 2005).While FAS No. 95, ‗Statement of the cash flows‘, does 
not make specific reference to the cash flow classification of overdrafts, the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) indicates that ―cash overdrafts should be reported as 
financing activities.‖ 11  Unlike accounts payable, which are owed to vendors in the 
                                                          
11 See C. Davine, Current SEC Developments (speech at the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 23rd 
Annual National Conference on Current SEC Developments, Washington, D.C., 1996). 
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normal course of operations, book overdrafts are substantively financing arrangements 
since monies are owed to a bank, not to vendors. FAS No. 95 clearly indicates that 
outside sources of cash should be reported as financing activities. Therefore, if a book 
overdraft is reported as a current liability together with accounts payable or accrued 
expenses, and subsequently included in calculating the change in current liabilities 
when the indirect method is applied, book overdrafts will appear to be a source of funds 
that increases operating cash flow (Mulford and Comiskey, 2005). 
IAS 7 clarifies that bank overdrafts which are repayable on demand and which 
form an integral part of an entity‘s cash management are also included as a component 
of cash equivalents. 
Most companies report changes in overdraft balances in financing cash flow. In 
research conducted by the Georgia Tech Financial Analysis lab,
12
 61 per cent of 
companies reporting overdrafts included changes in overdraft balances in financing cash 
flows, while 16 per cent reported changes in overdraft balances in operating cash flows. 
The remaining 23 per cent of firms reporting overdrafts did not provide sufficient 
information to determine whether overdrafts were reported in financing or operating 
cash flows. 
4.5.2 Investment securities 
FAS-115 (Accounting for Certain Investments in Debt and Equity Securities) requires 
that investments in debt and equity securities be classified in the balance sheet as either 
trading, available for sale (AFS) or hold to maturity (HTM), depending on management 
intent. Classifying cash flows for these securities is less clear. Generally, the acquisition 
and disposition of AFS and HTM securities are considered investing activities, while 
                                                          
12 Mulford and Maloney, Cash flow reporting in the presence of Overdrafts, p.7. 
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trading security cash flows are reported as operating activities. A potentially misleading 
disclosure problem arises when non-financial companies report trading securities as 
operating activities (which GAAP mandates), because these transactions are not likely 
to be recurring (Mulford and Comiskey, 2005). Moreover, Barsky and Catanach (2007) 
ask is it logical for a retailer to trade investment securities as part of its normal, 
recurring business operations? No: retailers‘ primary business purpose is to sell goods 
and services, not securities. Significant investment trading activities for a non-financial 
company are themselves a red flag that indicate weak cash flows related to core 
operations. From a disclosure perspective, misclassifying investment security cash 
flows as operating activities can greatly distort reported OCF (Barsky and Catanach, 
2007). Nautica Enterprises‘ statement of cash flows from 2000 through 2002 illustrates 
just how OCF can be manipulated by misclassifying investment security cash flows 
(Table 4.1). During this period, Nautica was an independent retail apparel company, 
well-known for its sportswear, active wear, jeans and accessories. Its auditor was Grant 
Thornton. Between June 2001 and June 2003, the company‘s stock price declined by 
half, from $20 to $10 per share, before rising again to $14 just before Nautica‘s 
acquisition by VF Corporation in August 2003. The company‘s 2002 cash flow 
statement in Table 4.1, Panel A, also reveals significant operational pressures. First, the 
company experienced an impairment loss on long-lived assets. Next, operating cash 
inflows from short-term investments plummeted from those of prior years. Additionally, 
OCF increased dramatically through unusually large liquidations of accounts receivable 
and inventory. These cash inflows were then used to satisfy outstanding trade 
obligations. Collectively, these transactions suggest that Nautica was experiencing 
financial problems and, therefore, had an incentive to mislead the investing public. 
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As indicated previously, Nautica‘s investment activity should be considered 
quite unusual for a retail apparel company and, clearly, is not an operating activity. 
Panel A of Table 4.1 suggests that the company initiated significant security trading 
activity in 2000 and 2001 to compensate for its deteriorating retail clothing operations. 
This strategy appears to have bought Nautica some time before the equity markets 
declined in 2002.
13
 In fact, because of asset liquidations and securities transactions, the 
company reported increasing OCF for the period 2000 through 2002, without a 
corresponding increase in net earnings. Confirmation of Nautica‘s intent to manipulate 
OCF can be found in Panel B of Table 4.1, which provides extracts from the company‘s 
2000 cash flow statement. Before 2001, Nautica reported its investment security cash 
flows as investing activities, not as operating activities. Note that the $21,116,000 of 
cash inflows for short-term investments was reported in the 2000 Cash Flow Statement 
as investing activities (Panel B), while the very same cash flows were reported as 
operating activities in 2001 and 2002 (Panel A). According to the 2001 10-K accounting 
policy note, the company changed its classification of short-term investments from AFS 
to trading securities, apparently to present a more favourable picture of OCF. 
Adjusting Nautica‘s OCF for security misclassifications and asset liquidations 
between 2000 and 2002 yields a very different picture. Had securities sales been 
reported in the investing activities section, rather than as operating activities (Panel A, 
Table 4.1), OCF would have approximated $62.6 million and $49.6 million in 2000 and 
2001 respectively, a significant difference from the reported amounts of $83.9 million 
and $78.0 million respectively. This resulted in the overstatement of OCF by $28.4 
million (57 per cent) in 2001 and $21.1 million (34 per cent) in 2000. To complete the 
                                                          
13 See http://bigcharts.marketwatch.com/ for evidence of significant equity market price declines between 2000 
and 2002. 
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story, 2002 OCF were adjusted for nonrecurring asset liquidations. The result is OCF of 
approximately $35 million, a reduction of almost 62 per cent from the $91.1 million 
reported previously (Panel A, Table 4.1). Nautica‘s manipulation of OCF illustrates just 
how critical it is that lenders carefully compare a company‘s current financial 
statements with those previously issued to identify inconsistencies in cash flow 
reporting. 
4.5.3 Notes receivable 
As is summarised by Barsky and Catanach (2007), manufacturing companies commonly 
have two types of financing receivable: one to finance sales to its own customers (dealer 
receivables), and another to finance sales to its dealers‘ customers (retail receivables). 
Dealer receivables are clearly part of OCF since they represent cash collections from 
the manufacturer‘s customers related to the sale of inventory. However, retail 
receivables are more appropriately classified as investing activities since they are 
created by the dealer, not by the manufacturer. Instead, the manufacturer is investing in 
receivables related to dealer sales. OCF misstatements are possible because 
manufacturing companies commonly report changes in both types of financing 
receivables solely as investing activities.
14
 Therefore, OCF will be overstated when 
dealer receivables are reported as investing activities. 
General Motors‘ (GM) 2003 statement of cash flows and related notes show 
how OCF can be distorted by misclassifying dealer receivables. Between March 2000 
and December 2003, GM‘s stock price steadily declined from a high of about $90 per 
share to approximately $40 per share. Panel A of Table 4.2 also indicates that GM‘s 
OCF steadily declined during these same three years. Finally, Panel A also shows that 
                                                          
14 See Jonathan Weil, Outside Audit: Cash Flow Doesn’t Lie—Or Does It? WALL ST. J. (online), Apr. 16, 2004. 
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net cash outflows from financing receivables consistently increased from $11.6 billion 
($107.6 billion less $96.0 billion) in 2001 to $41.9 billion ($149.4 billion less $107.5 
billion) in 2003. This increase suggests that GM relied on product financing to effect 
product sales during this period. These three factors indicate that the company‘s 
management had incentives to misreport results of operations. GM‘s auditor during this 
period was Deloitte & Touche. 
Panel B of Table 4.2 reveals that GM misclassified an increase of $4.1 billion 
($25.5 billion less $21.4 billion) in dealer receivables as an investing cash flow, rather 
than as a cash flow from operations. This practice caused GM to overstate its OCF by 
117 per cent in 2003. In 2004, the SEC forced GM, Ford and a dozen other companies 
to change their practices of reporting dealer receivables as investing activities in the 
statement of cash flows.
15
 This example illustrates how important it is for lenders to 
know what reporting practices are peculiar to specific industries and to understand their 
potential effects on cash flow disclosures and intercompany comparisons. 
4.5.4 Notes payable 
Financing of operating costs with notes payable to suppliers (even notes that bear 
interest) is reported in the operating section of the Cash Flow Statement. Payments of 
the principal on those notes, as well interest on them, are also reported as operating uses 
of cash. Payments on notes payable to suppliers for purchases of operating-related items 
such as inventory are properly classified as operating cash flow. Cash flow 
classification, however, is less clear when those same notes are payable to lenders 
(Mulford and Comiskey, 2005). 
                                                          
15 See Diva Gullapalli, Little Campus Lab Shakes Big Firms, WALL ST. J., Mar. 1, 2005. 
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4.5.5 Receivable securitisations 
As we understand from Mulford and Comiskey, (2005), in a securitisation, receivables 
are pooled and an undivided interest in the pool is sold, thus creating a security backed 
by receivables. As part of this process, a company (the sponsor) transfers receivables by 
‗sale‘ to a special-purpose entity (SPE), which is wholly owned by the sponsoring 
company. The SPE then borrows funds using the receivable assets as collateral and 
passes the loan proceeds back to the sponsor company, which continues to service the 
receivable. Securitisation is accounted for as a sale of receivables, so the proceeds 
received by the sponsor from the receivable transfer (sale) are reported as OCF. Two 
questions should concern lenders when evaluating OCF when asset securitisations are 
present: firstly, should securitisations really be considered financings rather than 
operating activities? And secondly, does this practice provide a temporary or permanent 
boost to OCF? Since securitisations qualify as sales for both accounting and legal 
purposes, it appears appropriate to classify them as operating activities. This treatment 
is consistent with that afforded to outright sales of receivables and factoring 
arrangements. However, reporting asset securitisations as OCF may be misleading if 
lenders perceive these cash inflows to be a permanent rather than a temporary cash 
flow. In reality, securitisation accelerates the collection of OCF-related receivables, and 
OCF are effectively being ‗borrowed‘ from the future (Mulford and Comiskey, 2005).  
 
4.6 Cash flow manipulation – other reporting issues 
A variety of other reporting factors can also affect the operating cash flow number so 
critical to a lender‘s credit decision-making process. These are summarised in Table 4.3 
and discussed below. 
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4.6.1 Capitalised operating costs 
Whether a cost is capitalised or expensed can have a major impact on reported cash 
flows. Nevertheless, GAAP allows managers a great deal of flexibility in deciding 
whether operating costs are capitalised or expensed. Clearly, if incurred costs benefit 
future periods, they should be capitalised and the related cash outflows reported as 
investing cash outflows. However, as noted previously, when companies are 
experiencing financial difficulties, managers may choose to capitalise rather than 
expense certain costs in order to overstate OCF. Several common costs that lenders may 
wish to scrutinise include capitalised interest costs, software development costs, 
customer acquisition costs, film production costs and oil exploration costs. The decision 
facing loan officers is whether these cash outflows are more appropriately reported as 
investing cash outflows or operating cash outflows. 
4.6.2 Insurance reimbursements 
Proceeds received from insurance settlements should be reported in the statement of 
cash flows according to the activity or asset class to which they relate. For example, 
cash receipts from insurance settlements related to long-term asset investments such as 
buildings and plants (such as hazard reimbursements) should be reported as investing 
inflows, not OCF. However, many companies ignore the reason for the insurance 
reimbursement and report the cash inflow as an operating activity, thereby potentially 
overstating OCF. Again, credit analysts must decide whether these temporary cash 
inflows should be included in OCF for underwriting and loan review purposes. 
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4. 6.3 Business acquisitions 
Increases in working capital (for example, accounts receivable and inventory) are 
reported as uses of cash when the indirect method is used to report OCF. Conversely, 
working capital declines represent sources of cash. However, GAAP requires that 
working capital increases resulting from a business acquisition be reported as an 
investing activity since these assets and liabilities were purchased, not created by a 
company‘s operations. This creates a potential cash flow reporting problem, since 
GAAP also requires that the subsequent liquidation of the acquired working capital 
accounts be reported as an operating activity. Consequently, a company can temporarily 
increase OCF through an acquisition. Clearly, lenders should be alert for potential cash 
flow classification problems associated with major business acquisitions made by their 
borrowers. 
4. 6.4 Vendor-related payables 
Loan officers should also determine if OCF are increasing because payments on vendor 
payables are slowing. If a company is experiencing cash flow difficulties, it may delay 
payment for as long as possible; thereby receiving what is essentially a free temporary 
loan. GAAP requires that increases in vendor payables be reported as operating sources 
of funds when the indirect method is used. Therefore, postponing payment of vendors 
may provide a temporary boost to OCF. The result is that an increase in OCF may not 
be positive. 
4. 6.5 Customer-provided financing  
When revenue is collected in advance of being earned, the proceeds received are 
reported as a liability, a form of customer-provided financing. That liability, typically 
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referred to as deferred revenue, reflects an obligation borne by the receiving company to 
provide goods or services to its customers. When those goods or services are provided, 
the underlying revenue is earned and is reported on the income statement. That 
recording of revenue is offset by a reduction in deferred revenue. 
Deferred revenue is the result of customer-related collections. Accordingly, 
collections leading to increases in the deferred revenue liability are reported as 
operating and not as financing sources of cash. Later, when the underlying revenue is 
earned, increasing revenue and reducing deferred revenue, no operating cash flow is 
provided. As a result, reductions in deferred revenue are reported as subtractions from 
net income when computing operating cash flow (Mulford and  Comiskey, 2005). 
4.6.6 Income tax considerations 
GAAP generally requires that cash receipts or disbursements related to all taxes be 
reported as OCF. While this practice is appropriate for taxes related to operating 
activities, it is not acceptable for taxes that are incurred due to investing or financing 
activities. Consequently, when faced with unusual and significant tax cash inflows or 
outflows that are reported as operating activities, lenders should determine if they really 
relate to operating activities. If not, these tax cash flows should be reclassified to the 
investing or financing sections of the statement of cash flows. For example, tax 
payments related to gains on the sale of a business or buildings are better classified as 
investing activities. 
4. 6.7 Nonrecurring operating transactions 
OCF can also be affected by nonrecurring cash flow items. These are cash transactions 
that do not appear with any regularity, or that are very irregular in amount, and that are 
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not derived from the core operating activities of a company.
16
 Examples include 
restructuring cost payments, litigation settlements, merger-related charges, income tax 
refunds and contract termination fees. Such items should be removed from reported 
OCF to obtain a more sustainable measure of OCF. 
 
4.7 Basic approaches to the identification of cash flow manipulation  
Barsky and Catanach (2007) mentioned predicting expected OCF is often considered 
the Holy Grail for those involved in the credit analysis process, since cash flow is so 
critical to answering questions about borrower performance and potential debt service. 
However, managers have at their disposal a variety of cash flow manipulation 
techniques that even the major independent auditing firms appear powerless, unwilling 
or unable to combat. The following checklist has prepared by Barsky and Catanach can 
help guide lenders in their search for sustainable OCF.  
Compare net income and operating cash flow 
The indirect method format of the operating activity section of the statement of cash 
flows facilitates such a comparison. In addition to providing insight into the quality of 
earnings, comparing net income and OCF focuses attention on the composition of OCF 
and their permanence. Are reported OCF reasonable given a company‘s stated strategy 
and historical operations? Do the changes in working capital accounts make sense for 
the company? For example, consider the disparity between the two metrics reported by 
Nautica in Panel A of Table 4.1 for 2002. The $73.9 million difference ($91.1 million 
less $17.2 million) would lead one to conclude that Nautica was pursuing an asset 
                                                          
16 See Charles W. Mulford and Eugene E. Comiskey, CREATIVE CASH FLOW REPORTING (Hoboken, NJ: John 
Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2005). 
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liquidation strategy and that OCF were generally temporary in nature (Barsky and 
Catanach, 2007). 
Reconciling balance sheet changes with note disclosures  
This step tells lenders if they can rely on the reported cash flow numbers. The indirect 
method of the operating activities section of the statement of cash flows is largely a 
product of a company‘s balance sheet. Consequently, changes in working capital 
amounts and other reported items should be traceable to the balance sheet and related 
note disclosures. If reported indirect method reconciling items cannot be easily verified 
using simple addition and subtraction, then the operating activities section of the 
statement of cash flows has been poorly prepared and its contribution to cash flow 
analysis should be considered suspect. For example, a number of OCA‘s working 
capital changes (Panel B, Table 4.1) could not be verified from the company‘s balance 
sheet, raising questions about the quality of reported cash flow disclosures. 
Investigating large and unusual reconciling items  
As noted above, nonrecurring cash flow items can distort OCF and lead to flawed credit 
analysis. Therefore, bankers should verify that OCF only include cash flows related to a 
company‘s core operations. Nautica‘s significant cash inflows from short-term 
investments in 2000 and 2001, together with its 2002 asset impairment loss, fall into 
this category (see Panel A, Table 4.1). Once identified, the banker should adjust 
reported OCF to arrive at a more sustainable measure of cash flow. 
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4. 8 Advanced modelling of cash flow expectations  
OCF and earnings are complementary measures of firm performance. Investors 
advocate the use of OCF to gauge the credibility of earnings on the basis that OCF is 
more real than earnings.
17
 However, cases of cash flow misreporting have raised 
concerns that managers exercise discretion in financial reporting and in the timing of 
transactions to alter reported OCF. Despite the concerns about misreporting of OCF, 
there is limited research about when, why and how firms manage reported OCF (Lee, 
2009).  
Several pieces of literature on manipulation of numbers reported in financial 
statements have focused on manipulation of income. These results provide an important 
counter to the notion that reported earnings can be managed, but cash flows cannot. In 
contrast, a few studies suggest that cash flows are not immune to manipulation (see for 
example Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Frankel, 2005; Roychowdhury, 2006; Zhang 
W., 2008 and Lee, 2009).  
Firms reporting small positive annual profits engage in real activities to avoid 
negative earnings (Roychowdhury, 2006). Some of these activities, such as reducing 
discretionary expenses, may also be examples of myopic behaviour to manage cash 
flows to meet certain benchmarks. Zhang R. (2006) finds indications that managers take 
actions to report positive OCF, to avoid missing analyst cash flow forecasts, and to 
meet cash-dividend targets. Zhang W. (2008) finds that firms that just meet cash flow 
forecasts engage in higher rates of manipulation of real activities to increase cash flows. 
Lee (2009) finds that OCF is managed by shifting items between the Cash Flow 
Statement categories and by timing certain transactions.   
                                                          
17 See The Wall Street Journal article ―Cash Flow Reigns Once Again‖ by Lauricella (2008) and others such as Fink 
(2000), Glassman (2002), Henry (2004) and Robinson (2006) and Lee (2009). 
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In order to provide a logical review, an outline of previous researchers‘ 
intentions is provided on a study-by-study basis. A summary of the research that has 
investigated cash flow manipulation is shown in Table 4.4.  
Cash flow from operations and changes in working capital have been 
manipulated to increase earnings (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997). Burgstahler and 
Dichev find evidence consistent with the manipulation of cash flow from operations to 
effectively move observations from small losses to small positive earnings. They plot 
the 25
th
, 50
th
 and 75
th
 percentiles of unscaled cash flows for each earnings interval and 
find that the distribution of cash flows shifts upwards in the first interval to the right of 
zero, and interpret this as suggesting the existence of cash flow manipulation. However, 
the focus of their paper is on earnings rather than on cash flow management. 
Frankel (2005) finds a significant fourth quarter reduction in working capital and 
that managers attempt to exceed OCF benchmarks. This decrease is subsequently 
reversed in the first quarter of the next fiscal year. This temporary decrease in fourth 
quarter non-cash working capital remains significant after controlling for seasonal 
variation in the firm‘s activity level as proxies by quarterly contemporaneous/lead/lag 
sales and net income. Consistent with capital market incentives to manage reported cash 
flows, Frankel finds firms attempt to beat benchmarks based on operating cash flow 
levels, changes and forecast errors. Examining contracting incentives, he finds that 
firms mentioning working-capital-related compensation targets have larger fourth 
quarter working capital declines, but these declines are not more likely to reverse. 
Frankel suggests the discontinuity in the OCF level distribution is most pronounced for 
firms near bankruptcy. Nevertheless Frankel consider capital market incentives for cash 
flow management, his main focus is on working capital manipulation for benchmark 
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purposes. For the purposes of this thesis not only change in working capital but also 
others technique in operating cash flow manipulation and effects on debt market are 
considered.    
While much of the prior research on earning management focuses on detecting 
abnormal accruals, Rochowdhury (2006) investigates evidence that firms engage in 
earnings management not only by manipulation of accruals with no direct cash flow 
consequences, but also that they have incentives to manipulate real activities during the 
year. He finds evidence consistent with managers manipulating real activities to avoid 
reporting annual losses: sales manipulation, decreasing discretionary expenses and 
reporting lower costs of goods sold by overproduction, to improve reported margins 
among firms reporting small positive annual profits. Roychowdhury focuses on cash 
flow manipulation to achieve earnings targets, so it is argued here that operating cash 
flow management doesn‘t always result in a one-direction impact on earnings. For 
example, Roychowdhury examines activities to increase earnings including discounts 
on sales, overproduction and reduced discretionary expenses. However, these activities 
do not result in a consistent directional movement of OCF and earnings. All three are 
likely to increase earnings but sales discounts and overproduction lead to lower OCF, 
while reduction of discretionary expenses increases operating cash flow. 
Given the extensive evidence on the existence of real earnings management, 
Gunny (2007) examines the extent to which real earnings management affects 
subsequent operating performance. The study focuses on the four types of real earnings 
management activities: (1) myopically investing in R&D to increase income; (2) 
myopically investing in SG&A to increase income; (3) timing income recognition from 
the disposal of long-lived assets and investments; and (4) cutting prices to boost sales in 
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the current period and/or overproducing to decrease COGS expenses. The study finds 
that analysts recognise the future earnings implications of all four types of real earnings 
management. This empirical study likewise priors focus on cash flow manipulation for 
achieving earnings targets. 
Zhang R. (2006) examines management of cash flow operations, its causes and 
the market‘s reaction to cash flow management. He uses a sample for the 19 years from 
1987 to 2005, and for detecting discontinuities in cash flow distributions he uses the 
methods of Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and DeGeorge et al (1999). This study has 
several findings. For instance, Zhang R. finds unusually high frequencies of small 
positive cash flows, small positive cash flow surprises, and small cash-flow/cash-
dividend differences. He emphasises that these findings indicate that managers take 
actions to report positive cash flows and positive cash flow surprises, and to reach cash-
dividend targets. By using goodness-of-fit and best-fitted-distribution tests the study 
suggests that this is a fairly widespread phenomenon: 5.52 per cent of firms with small 
positive cash flows manage cash flows to achieve positive cash flows, 14.95 per cent of 
firms with small positive cash flow surprises manage cash flows to reach the analyst 
forecasts threshold, and 7.05 per cent of firms that just reach cash-dividend targets 
manage cash flows to reach them. Zhang R. also compares the prevalence of cash flow 
management to that of earnings management, as well as the association between several 
cross-sectional firm characteristics and abnormal cash flows for investigating managers‘ 
incentives to manipulate cash flows. To calculate normal cash flows, Zhang R. adopts a 
model suggested by Dechow et al (1998), using the firm-year‘s sales and the estimated 
relation between cash flows and sales for the corresponding industry-year. The study 
predicts that those firms‘ cash flow management will increase with the importance of 
cash flow information. It also explores the relation between cash flow management and 
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accrual management. The results suggest that firms with low accrual management, a 
large magnitude of total accruals, high capital intensity and low probability of financial 
distress tend to manage cash flows. Zhang R. also investigates the persistence of 
abnormal and normal cash flows and whether the market misprices abnormal cash 
flows. In accord with intuition, the results suggest that abnormal cash flows are less 
persistent than normal cash flows. The Mishkin (1983) test has been used to examine 
whether the market rationally prices abnormal cash flows with respect to their one-year-
ahead earnings implications. The results show that the market rationally anticipates the 
lower persistence of abnormal cash flows compared to normal cash flows, but it still 
underprices both components of cash flows. However empirical results in this study 
confirm the result of prior studies about cash flow manipulation with more detail.  
Firms‘ incentives to opportunistically manipulate real activities to meet analysts‘ 
cash flow forecasts and the economic consequences of such manipulation have been 
investigated by Zhang W. (2008). She estimates manipulation of real activities and tests 
whether suspect firms engage in more manipulation of real activities with the 
approaches suggested by Roychowdhury (2006). The study uses earnings growth as a 
proxy for operating performance and runs a regression similar to that of Lev and Nissim 
(2004), when testing whether current manipulation of real activities impairs a firm‘s 
operating performance in future years. Using a sample from 1993 to 2005, Zhang has 
made several findings. First, the suspect firms engage in more manipulation of real 
activities, particularly under-production, to inflate cash flow. Second, current 
manipulation of real activities among suspect firms impairs the firms‘ future operating 
performance. Third, an additional analysis found that firms with analyst cash flow 
forecasts coverage have higher abnormal cash flow and lower abnormal discretionary 
expenditure than other firms. The study primarily examined whether firms manipulate 
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real activities to meet analyst cash flow forecasts, and how the manipulation of real 
activities influences a firm‘s performance in future years. A further analysis investigated 
whether cash flow forecasts‘ coverage motivates managers to manipulate cash flow with 
the purpose of increasing cash flow. Zhang provides evidence that firms just meeting 
cash flow forecasts manipulate cash flow upwards, at least through production 
reduction. These results are consistent with the notion that in order to be rewarded by 
market return, managers opportunistically manipulate real activity to meet cash flow 
forecasts. Furthermore, Zhang shows that manipulation of real activities among suspect 
firms impairs these firms‘ operating performance in the subsequent year. These findings 
support the arguments in earlier literature that manipulation of real activities may have 
significantly negative economic consequences. Finally, Zhang finds that firms followed 
by cash flow forecasts tend to have a higher abnormal cash flow, primarily through the 
reduction of discretionary expenditures. These results are consistent with the notion that 
firms with cash flow forecasts conduct more manipulation of real activities, because 
they have a higher risk of being detected for accrual manipulations and experience 
greater pressure to meet cash flow forecasts. These results implying the cash flow are 
not immune from manipulation.   
Firms manage reported OCF in response to incentives (Lee, 2009). Lee 
distances cash flow operating management from earnings management and examines 
two questions: (1) what are the incentives to manage reported OCF? And (2) what are 
the mechanisms through which OCF is managed? He identifies five firm characteristics 
that are associated with stronger incentives to manage reported OCF: (i) financial 
distress; (ii) a long-term credit rating near the investment/non-investment grade cut-off; 
(iii) less persistent earnings; (iv) a trend of diverging earnings and OCF; and (v) the 
existence of analyst cash flow forecasts. Lee documents how firms manage operating 
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cash flows by shifting items between the statements of cash flows categories 
(classification) and timing when they have high incentives. For testing the hypothesis 
that firms manage reported OCF at times when the incentives to do so are high, Lee 
divides OCF into expected and unexpected components by modelling expected OCF 
based on Dechow et al (1998). The results show that unexpected OCF increases 
incentives to manage reported OCF. In terms of magnitude, he finds that a standard 
deviation change of one in one of the firm characteristics listed above increases 
unexpected OCF by an amount that is between 1 per cent and 10 per cent of total OCF, 
depending on the firm characteristic. To understand how OCF can be managed, Lee 
conducted an array of tests based on the familiar equation: earnings = cash flows + 
accruals. Each component in the equation consists of items in the operating and non-
operating (financing and investing) categories. To document classification, Lee used a 
sample of firms that restated OCF due to classification errors and firms that reported tax 
benefits from the exercise of stock options as a separate line item in the Cash Flow 
Statement (tax benefit sample) for the years 1994 to 2000. For the restatement sample, 
there is evidence that firms are more likely to restate OCF when managerial incentives 
to manage OCF are stronger. The coefficients suggest that depending on the firm 
characteristic, on average, a one standard deviation or one unit increase in the firm 
characteristic changes the odds of having a cash flow restatement by at least 15 per cent. 
For the tax benefit sample, Lee investigates whether the decision to classify the 
cash inflow from the tax benefit of stock options exercised in the operating section 
versus the financing section is associated with incentives to manage reported OCF. He 
finds some evidence that firms are more likely to classify the tax benefit in the operating 
section of the Cash Flow Statement at times when incentives to manage OCF are 
stronger. Depending on the firm characteristic, a one standard deviation or one unit 
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increase in the firm characteristic changes the odds of classifying the tax benefit in the 
operating section of the Cash Flow Statement by 3 per cent to 22 per cent. Taken 
together, the results suggest that firms use classification to manage reported OCF. Next, 
Lee investigates whether firms manage reported OCF by carefully timing certain 
transactions, such as delaying payments to suppliers or accelerating collections from 
customers. The results show that incentives to manage OCF are positively associated 
with a shorter cycle in the fourth quarter of the year that reverses in the next quarter. 
Further analysis on timing reveals that the association is stronger for non-December 
year-end firms. For these firms, it is likely that the fiscal year-end of their customers or 
suppliers does not match their own year-end, making them more amenable to timing the 
transaction in a favourable way for the firm. 
Last, Lee‘s main findings on classification are weaker when the firm has analyst 
cash flow forecasts. Lee tests the conjecture that timing is a more effective tool than 
classification if firms are motivated to meet or beat analyst cash flow forecasts. Using a 
sample of firms that have analyst earnings forecasts and cash flow forecasts, the study 
documents a prominent upward shift from the left of zero to the right of zero in a 
distribution of cash flow forecast errors. The discontinuity suggests that firms manage 
OCF to meet or beat analyst cash flow forecasts. Again these results also implying the 
cash flow are not immune from manipulation. The thesis will use the result of this study 
and other cash flow manipulation study widely.    
In addition to accrual manipulation, however, firms can manage earnings by 
altering real activities (see for example Gunny, 2005; Roychowdhury, 2006; Zhang R., 
2006). The distinction is important, because while accrual-based earnings management 
activities have no direct cash flow consequences, manipulations of real activities affect 
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cash flows. Cohen and Zarowin (2010) examine both real and accrual-based earnings 
management activities around SEOs (seasoned equity offerings). They refer to real 
activities manipulation as actions managers take that deviate from normal business 
practices. They contribute to the literature by showing that SEO firms engage in real 
activities manipulation in the year of the SEO, and the decline in post-SEO performance 
due to the real activities management is more severe than that due to accrual. 
Manipulation of real activities affects cash flows while accrual-based earnings 
management activities have no direct cash flow consequences. Cohen and Zarowin 
examine both real and accrual-based earnings management activities around seasoned 
equity offerings. They find that real earnings management is more likely than 
discretionary accruals to be associated with earnings declines. The evidence shows that 
the effects of real earnings management activities on subsequent operating performance 
are likely to be greater than the effects of accrual earnings management. Combined with 
the empirical evidence documented in Roychowdhury (2006) and Zhang R. (2006), 
Cohen and Zarowin (2010) suggest that future research on earnings management should 
focus on real activities manipulation as well as accrual-based manipulation. 
The above research papers demonstrate reported cash flows are not immune to 
manipulation. However these studies mainly focus on cash flow manipulation in the 
context of achieving earning targets. The thesis argues it is also possible that firms do 
not engage in cash flow manipulation just for earnings targets.  
 
4. 9 Summary  
This chapter has demonstrated the history of Cash Flow Statements, classification   
rules under Statement No. 95 and the benefits of cash flow information. It has also 
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discussed the incentives for cash flow manipulation in more detail. Moreover the 
chapter explained the common methods of cash flow manipulation and the basic 
approaches to identification of cash flow manipulation. The final section of this chapter 
provided a coherent review of previous studies investigating cash flow manipulation. 
The following chapter (Chapter 5) investigates the hypotheses of this study. These 
include cash flow management, cash flow management and the cost of debt, and 
incentives for cash flow management. Furthermore, the chapter gives a hypothesis 
development for the direct and indirect effects of cash flow manipulation on the cost of 
debt capital. 
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Table 4.1 
 Nautica Enterprises, Inc. Reported Operating Cash Flows (2000 and 2002 10-Ks) 
 
Panel A: Cash flows from operating activities 
 Year ended 
 March 
2/2002 
March 
3/2001 
March 
4/2000 
Net earnings $17,259 $46,103 $46,163 
Adjustments to reconcile net earnings to net cash provided by 
operating activities 
   
Deferred income taxes -6,921 -2,478 -1,035 
Depreciation and amortisation 29,045 22,968 17,072 
Provision for bad debts 5,161 1,451 1,424 
Loss on impairment to long-lived assets 7,870 — — 
Changes in operating assets and liabilities, net of assets and 
liabilities acquired: 
   
Short term investments -804 28,445 21,116 
Accounts receivable 14,342 -17,935 -768 
Inventories 41,766 -24,142 -3,667 
Prepaid expenses and other current assets 1,902 -2,024 -20 
Other assets -1,824 -36 -2,686 
Accounts payable trade -15,394 14,833 -548 
Accrued expenses and other current liabilities 109 7,054 3,292 
Income taxes payable -1,363 3,779 3,458 
Net cash provided by operating activities 91,148 78,018 83,801 
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Table 4.1  
(Cont.) 
 
Panel B: Cash flows Cash flows from operating and investing activities 
 Year ended 
 March  
4, 2000 
February 
27,1999 
February 
28,1998 
Net earnings    $46,163 $58,708 $56,418 
Adjustments to reconcile net earnings to net cash provided by 
operating activities, net of assets and liabilities acquired: 
   
Minority interest in net loss of consolidated subsidiary  — -405 -785 
Deferred income taxes  -1,035 -1,119 -453 
Depreciation and amortisation 17,072 12,552 8,979 
Provision for bad debts  1,424 531 748 
Changes in operating assets and liabilities:    
Accounts receivable  -6,562 -21,867 -20,600 
Inventories -3,667 -3,486 -4,224 
Prepaid expenses and other current assets  -20 -552 -575 
Other assets  -2,686 -2,491 -1,120 
Accounts payable—trade -548 10,854 -3,054 
Accrued expenses and other current liabilities 9,086 6,140 8,780 
Income taxes payable  3,458 1,771 9,960 
Net cash provided by operating activities  62,685 60,636 54,074 
Cash flows from investing activities:    
Purchase of property, plant and equipment  -33,289 -20,224 -21,370 
Acquisitions, net of cash acquired  — -1,650 -2,837 
Sale (purchase) of short-term investments  21,116 -2,764 -52,343 
Payments to register trademark  -277 -169 -304 
Net cash used in investing activities  -12,450 -24,807 -76,854 
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Table 4.2 
General Motors Reported Operating Cash Flows and Financing Receivables (2003, 10-
K) 
 
Panel A: Reported Operating Cash Flows 
 December 31, 
(dollars in millions) 2003 2002 2001 
Net cash provided by operating activities  $7,600 $15,482 $12,180 
Cash flows from investing activities:    
Expenditures for property -7,330 -6,871 -7,832 
Investments in marketable securities—acquisitions -28,660 -39,386 -38,248 
Investments in marketable securities—liquidations  24,253 35,688 37,560 
Net change in mortgage servicing rights  -2,557 -1,711 -2,075 
Increase in finance receivables  -149,419 -143,024 -107,566 
Proceeds from sale of finance receivables 107,505 117,276 95,949 
Proceeds from sale of business units 4,148 — — 
Operating leases—acquisitions -11,761 -16,624 -12,938 
Operating leases—liquidations  9,952 13,994 11,892 
Investments in companies, net of cash acquired (Note 1) -201 -870 -1,283 
Other  -1,422 1,004 126 
Net cash used in investing activities  -55,492 -40,524 -24,415 
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Table 4.2  
(Cont.) 
 
Panel B: NOTE 8. Finance Receivables and Securitisations Finance Receivables—Net 
Finance receivables—net included the following: 
(dollars in millions) December 31 
Consumer:  2003 2002 
Retail automotive  87,163 78,857 
Residential mortgages 46,307 15,238 
Total consumer  133,470 94,095 
   
Commercial automotive:   
Wholesale  25,517 21,459 
Leasing and lease financing 1,465 5,910 
Term loans to dealers and others  3,912 4,190 
Commercial and industrial  9,783 9,464 
Commercial real estate:   
Commercial mortgage 180 621 
Construction  2,053 1,963 
Total commercial  42,910 43,607 
Total finance receivables and loans 176,380 137,702 
Allowance for financing losses -3,243 -3,059 
Total consolidated finance receivables— net  173,137 134,643 
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Table 4.3 
Other Common cash flow reporting issues  
Capitalised operating costs Capitalisation choices can potentially overstate operating 
cash flows since capitalised costs are usually reported as 
investing cash outflows. 
Insurance reimbursements  If insurance proceeds relate to a long-lived asset, they should 
be reported as investing cash inflows rather than as operating 
cash flows. 
Business acquisitions  Acquisitions can temporarily boost operating cash flows, 
since acquired working capital is initially classified as an 
investing activity, while subsequent liquidations are reported 
as operating activities. 
Vendor-related payables  Postponing vendor payments   temporarily increases OCF, 
since increases in accounts payable appear to be sources of 
operating funds when the indirect method is used. 
Income tax considerations  Operating cash flows may be misstated because GAAP 
requires that all tax cash receipts and disbursements be 
reported as operating activities, thus ignoring the nature of 
the 
transaction originating the cash flow. 
Nonrecurring operating transactions  Unusual or irregular cash flow amounts not related to the 
core activities of a company should be deducted when 
computing operating cash flows. 
Sourse: Barsky and Catanach, (2007), page 10 
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Table 4.4  
A chronological summary of prior studies on the relationships affecting cash flow 
manipulation  
Name  Year key finding  
Burgstahler and 
Dichev, JAE 
1997 Cash flow from operations and changes in working capital 
have been manipulated to increase earnings  
Graham, Harvey 
and Rajgopal, JAE 
2005 Executives consider cash flow measures to be more 
important to external constituents than earnings when the 
firm is in financial distress 
Frankel, WP 2005 Significant fourth quarter reduction in working capital; 
managers attempt to exceed OCF benchmarks 
Melendrez, 
Schwartz and 
Trombley, WP  
2005 Only firms that beat both earnings expectations and cash 
flow expectations are rewarded with higher returns 
Gunny, WP 2005 Four types of real earnings management are associated with 
significantly lower future earnings and cash flows after 
controlling for size, performance, level of accruals and 
industry 
Roychowdhury , 
JAE 
2006 Firms reporting small positive annual profits engage in real 
activities to avoid negative earnings  
Zhang R., WP  2006 Managers take action to report positive OCF, to avoid 
missing analyst cash flow forecasts and to meet the cash-
dividend target 
Zhang W., WP 2008 Firms which just meet cash flow forecasts engage in higher 
real activities manipulation to increase cash flows 
Lee , WP 2009 OCF is managed by shifting items between the categories of 
Cash Flow Statements and by timing certain transactions 
Cohen and Zarowin, 
JAE  
2010 Real earnings management is more likely than discretionary 
accruals to be associated with earnings declines 
JAE: Journal of Accounting and Economics; WP: Working Paper 
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Chapter 5 
 Hypotheses Development 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous section has reviewed the prior research related to this study. It comprised 
three parts: the first part reviewed the cost of debt and the cash flow management 
literature; the second part explained the capital structure theories and the cost of debt 
literature; and the third part explained the effect of cash flow management on the cost of 
debt. This chapter explains the hypotheses of this study. These include cash flow 
management, cash flow management and the cost of debt, and incentives for cash flow 
management. In addition, the chapter gives a hypothesis development for the impact of 
cash flow accounting directly and indirectly on the cost of debt capital. 
 
5.2 The cost of debt and cash flow management 
5.2.1 Cash flow management 
Although Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) may be clear in their 
definition of OCF, there is considerable flexibility permitted in its calculation: an 
examination of the Statements on GAAP as well as the research literature on the Cash 
Flow Statement clearly indicates that there are grey areas in cash flow reporting that are 
open to various interpretations (see for example Everingham and Watson, 2002). 
Although  cash flow information is based on the actual receipt and payment of cash, and 
is sometimes naively thought not to be open to manipulation, we know that managers 
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may manipulate OCF in at least two possible ways: (i) by undertaking activities before 
the end of the financial year to influence the reported change in working capital (e.g. 
selling off inventory, reducing the collection period on accounts receivable, delaying 
payments to suppliers or changing credit terms, and selling accounts receivable when 
they need cash sooner than the collection period allows); and (ii) by reclassifying 
financial statement line items (e.g. reporting changes in trading investment securities 
under the operating section of the statement of cash flows, offsetting overdrafts or 
reclassifying them from financing to operating activities, and so on).
18
 All of these 
manipulations may impact on cash flow, but the former may or may not change 
earnings, while the latter will have no impact on earnings. 
As mentioned above, managers have numerous opportunities to engage in OCF 
management in order to manipulate the stated cash available from the normal recurring 
operating activities of a business.  For example, for the operating section of the Cash 
Flow Statement, which provides an assessment of a firm‘s ability to generate cash from 
internal operations and still remain viable, most firms adopt indirect methods of 
adjusting earnings by accruals to present the cash flow from operations (Luo, 2008). 
Under the indirect method of presentation of cash flow from operations, net income is 
reconciled by accruals to derive OCF, yet net income could contain many nonrecurring 
items, the associated cash positions of which are included in total OCF. Companies can 
classify income items to be nonrecurring based on their functional properties, such as 
income generated from discontinued operations. Companies also can opportunistically 
classify certain negative or positive items as nonrecurring to influence investor 
perception of the firm‘s performance. In this respect, it is worth noting that this is not 
                                                          
18
 For example, in accordance with GAAP, a book overdraft should be reclassified as accounts payable, since a 
company owes money to a bank, not to vendors. Overdrafts are a financing agreement and if the indirect method is 
used increases in accounts payable can directly boost OCF. 
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merely a preoccupation by researchers – several global firms have been accused of 
overstating OCF, and in various ways.
19
 
Managers realise that analysts are scrutinising OCF with regard to recent rule 
changes on revenue recognition and restatement. Analysts need sustainable OCF 
numbers for forecasting, yet under existing accounting rules (both GAAP and IFRS) 
firms may include several transactions in the operating section of the statement of cash 
flows that do not result from normal operations.
20
 These transactions include: working 
capital changes, factoring accounts receivable, purchases and sales of securities 
classified as trading, and establishing and using finance subsidiaries. Under GAAP, all 
four of these transactions may be reported in the operating section of the statement of 
cash flows. Managers may engage in any of these activities and/or deliberately time 
such transactions to manage OCF, leading to abnormal or unsustainable OCF. More 
pointedly, the evidence of Roychowdhury (2006) suggests that firms do indeed 
manipulate OCF through operational activities such as price discounts, sales increases 
and overproduction to lower the cost of goods sold, mainly where the end result is to 
report small profits rather than breaking even or a loss, and positive earnings changes 
rather than no growth. 
Also mentioned in Chapter 1 is the possibility that cash flow management may 
be intended to achieve two separate goals. First, firms may manipulate OCF in order to 
achieve earnings targets, and second, they may be seeking to achieve cash flow targets. 
Nevertheless, regardless of the reason, the manipulation of OCF impacts on the quality 
                                                          
19
 For example: General Motors and Ford (misclassification of loans); Rite Aid and Halliburton (securitisation 
transactions); and General Mills and Universal Security (investment returns): see www.glgroup.com/Council-Events.  
20 Business Week outlines four examples of specific transactions related to financing and investing decisions but 
reported under OCFs (Henry, 2004).  
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of reported financial information. The first of these findings is consistent with firms 
engaging in cash flow manipulation in order to avoid losses and report positive 
earnings. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) divide earnings into cash flow from 
operations, changes in working capital and other accruals, and find that firms are 
manipulating cash flows from operations to transform small losses into small positive 
earnings. Again, this is consistent with firms manipulating OCF to achieve earnings 
targets. 
Providing evidence that firms try to meet cash flow targets, Frankel (2005) 
examines working capital reductions that increase OCF. Specifically, decreases in 
current assets and increases in current liabilities result in an increase of OCF. He finds a 
significant fourth quarter reduction in working capital and that managers attempt to 
exceed OCF benchmarks. That is, managers are orchestrating decreases in working 
capital to achieve cash flow targets. Further, he demonstrates a contracting incentive to 
engage in manipulation by showing that cash flow management is more prevalent in 
firms where ‗working capital‘ wording is found in executive compensation contracts. 
This provides specific evidence that managers are rewarded for meeting working capital 
or OCF targets. This thesis contributes to the evidence of managers‘ incentives to 
manipulate OCF for credit market rewards. Zhang R. (2006) also provides evidence of 
firms engaging in OCF management to achieve targets such as positive OCF, meeting 
forecasts and cash-dividend targets. Consistent with earlier literature on OCF, Zhang 
finds the abnormal cash flow component has lower persistence. This is consistent with 
OCF management producing unsustainable lower-quality financial information. 
As discussed, prior research often focuses on cash flow manipulation to achieve 
earnings targets, and it is argued here therefore that OCF management doesn‘t always 
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result in a one direction impact on earnings. For example, Roychowdury examines 
activities to increase earnings including discounts on sales, overproduction and reduced 
discretionary expenses. However these activities do not result in consistent directional 
movement of OCF and earnings. All three are likely to increase earnings, but sales 
discounts and overproduction lead to lower OCF, while reduction of discretionary 
expenses increases OCF. 
Lee (2009) shows (see Figure 5.2) how reported OCF can be managed with no 
change in earnings. He begins with this equation: earnings = cash flows + accruals. 
Each component in the equation consists of items in the operating and non-operating 
(financing and investing) categories. With this simple framework Lee illustrates how 
firms can manage reported OCF using classification and timing.  
OCF in firms can be manipulated in two ways. First, the manager achieving this 
aim will have done some of the manipulating activity during the fiscal year, before the 
end of the financial year. Activities affecting changes in working capital may include 
selling off inventory, reducing the collection period on accounts receivable, and 
delaying payments to suppliers, selling accounts receivable when cash is needed, sooner 
than the collection period allows. Second, managers can play games with the 
classification of some items by shifting them between the statement of cash flow 
categories, namely operating, financing and investing, for example by reporting trading 
investment securities under the operating section of the statement of cash flows, or 
through overdrafts classification. Some of activities in the first group (manipulating 
activity during the fiscal year) may or may not change earnings. For example, decreases 
in working capital, delayed vendor payments and quicker accounts receivable collection 
have no impact on earnings, as the payable or receivable is previously recorded with the 
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purchase or sale. When a firm factors accounts receivable, the sale is recorded and only 
the cash inflow, the lowering of accounts receivable, and possibly a loss on the sale is 
recorded. Only the loss may reduce earnings. When trading securities are sold, only the 
unadjusted gain or loss impacts earnings, as the unrealised gains and losses are 
continuously recorded in earnings. Finally, finance subsidiaries may increase sales and 
thus earnings via ease of financing to customers. All of the activities related to 
massaging the presentation of cash flow in the financial statement have no impact on 
earnings, so overall, it can be said that there is no direct relationship showing all the 
discussed transactions that may increase OCF or directly increase earnings. Therefore, it 
is argued here that firms do not use OCF management solely to increase earnings. 
5.2.2 Cash flow and cost of debt  
Cash flow information is useful to the bond market because creditors use financial 
statements to predict the amounts, timing and uncertainties of future cash flows 
(Statement of Financial Accounting Concept No.1). Cash flow adequacy is a major 
concern when rating agencies assign credit ratings to firms (Standard and Poor‘s 2008). 
Backer and Gosman (1980) find that senior executives at the major bond rating agencies 
consider the OCF to long-term debt ratio to be a key variable in their decision-making 
process. Minton and Schrand (1999) document that cash flow volatility is associated 
with worse S&P ratings and higher costs of accessing external capital. Bhojraj and 
Sengupta (2003) find that bonds of firms with high levels of accruals underperform 
bonds of firms with lower accruals. By assuming that high levels of accruals are 
accompanied by low levels of cash flows, this suggests that firms with higher cash 
flows relative to accruals are required to pay lower costs of debt. Prior literature has 
documented a significant negative relationship between cash flows and various 
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measures of the cost of debt (see for example Pittman and Fortin, 2004; Minton and 
Schrand, 1999; Anderson, 2004). That is, higher cash flows are associated with lower 
costs of debt. 
Beaver et al (2006) argue that the investment grade and non-investment grade 
boundary is a critical point in the distribution of ratings. Certified credit ratings are used 
in several contractual settings, and a downgrade below investment grade has real 
economic consequences, such as violation of debt covenants or the loss of investment 
from firms that can only hold investment grade bonds. Thus, firms have incentives to 
manage reported OCF to avoid downgrades, particularly at the investment and non-
investment grade cut-off (Lee, 2009). Lee finds that firms with a long-term credit rating 
near the investment grade cut off and firms with less persistent earnings have higher 
unexpected OCF. 
To analyse the relation between OCF and the cost of debt, OCF is divided into 
‗normal‘ and ‗abnormal‘ components. By subdividing OCF in this way, this permits the 
examination of how the credit market prices unmanaged OCF associated with actual 
operations and managed OCF that is likely due to strategic choices by firm 
management. Similar to Geile (2007), who applies Healy and Wahlen‘s (1999) 
definition of earnings management, we define cash flow management as managers‘ 
judgment and choice of transactions to alter financial reporting, either to mislead 
external users or to produce positive outcomes in response to compensation contracts.  
5.2.3 Normal and abnormal operating cash flow   
There are several possible explanations for the association between normal and 
abnormal OCF and cost of debt. First, if there is a negative association of similar 
magnitude for both the unmanaged (normal) and managed (abnormal) components of 
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OCF and the cost of debt, this suggests that the market is not efficient and does not 
distinguish between the managed and unmanaged components of OCF. However, I 
know the market may identify the managed component of OCF but choose not to price 
the information differently from the unmanaged component, and therefore I do not 
consider this probability in the hypothesis. 
Second, if both components of OCF are negatively associated with the cost of 
debt, but the managed component has a stronger negative association than the 
unmanaged component, the debt market interprets this as a positive signal. For example, 
if a manager has knowledge that future cash flows are likely to increase, the manager‘s 
decisions currently depend on this knowledge. The market may infer this knowledge 
from the observed decision. Managers are likely to be rewarded for reducing 
information asymmetry and uncertainty, thus incurring a lower cost of debt. 
Third, if the managed component of OCF is either less negatively associated 
with cost of debt than the unmanaged component or not associated with cost of debt at 
all, the credit market places less or no weight on the managed cash flow information. 
Such pricing implies that the market is relatively efficient in processing cash flow 
information by lowering the weight of or discarding the information regarding the 
managed component, and thus relying largely on unmanaged OCF. 
Lastly, if the managed component of OCF has a positive association with the 
cost of debt, the market is relatively efficient and assesses a penalty for managing OCF. 
The managed component of OCF may be interpreted as a signal regarding the quality of 
all cash flow information, or even a signal regarding total firm information risk and 
uncertainty. The market may penalise the firm with an increase in the cost of debt via a 
positive association with the managed component of cash flows and/or a less negative 
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association between the unmanaged component and the cost of debt. Given the increase 
in the cost of debt associated with either the managed or unmanaged components of 
OCF, the firm would have been better off without engaging in cash flow management. 
The above alternatives imply either a positive, negative or zero association 
between the cost of debt and managed OCF. Accordingly, H1 can be stated in null form 
as follows:  
H1 (null). Managed OCF has no association with the cost of debt. 
 
5.2.4 Incentives to manage operating cash flows 
Typically regulators and financial statement users are more concerned with misleading 
or aggressive applications of GAAP than conservative applications. Specifically, they 
are concerned about firms overstating performance. Therefore, the following discussion 
focuses on one circumstance when firms have incentives to manage OCF and where an 
efficient market is likely to detect and assess a penalty for the behavior. 
When firms are in financial problems, cash flow information may become more 
important because the firm is closer to default. Scrutiny is likely to increase as risk 
increases. That is, the credit market has greater incentives to correctly detect and price 
financial information when a firm is at greater risk of default. Cash flow manipulation 
reflects managers‘ choices that may result in unsustainable OCF and which may 
mislead investors. This is consistent with Zhang‘s (2006) finding that the abnormal 
component of OCF has less persistence. In this situation the users are highly motivated 
to identify OCF management. A manager‘s attempt to mislead investors should be 
viewed as a negative signal regarding the firm. As a result, the credit market can assess 
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a penalty in the form of a higher cost of debt. In summary, when firms opportunistically 
meet OCF benchmarks or have financial problems, the credit market is more likely to 
detect the quality of the components of OCF and correctly price the information. 
Prior studies suggest that firms in financial problems situation are closer to 
default and thus incur higher costs of debt. Financial problems can be indicated by 
losses, low levels of cash flows or low levels of earnings. Alternative measures of 
financial problems include the Altman Z-score and a firm‘s credit rating. Hayn (1995) 
suggests that loss firms are valued differently and have a lower earnings return relation, 
concluding that losses provide less information than profits about a firm‘s future. Both 
the poor performance and increased uncertainty embedded in losses suggest loss firms 
have a higher default risk. 
Casey and Bartzcak (1985) find that cash flows do not provide incremental 
information in distinguishing between bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms, but Sharma 
(2001) finds that they do. Furthermore, while Gombola et al (1987) and Gentry et al 
(1985) find that cash flows are not significant in predicting firm failure, Pervits et al 
(1994) find that cash flows appear to be more important to analysts in evaluating 
companies that are highly leveraged, and Graham et al (2005) document that executives 
consider cash flow measures to be more important to external constituents than earnings 
when the firm is in financial distress. Zang (2005) asserts that for a financially 
distressed firm, the marginal cost of deviating from optimal business decision-making is 
likely to be high. Finally, Zhang W. (2008) finds that a firm with a low probability of 
financial distress is more likely to manipulate cash flows. 
Minton and Schrand (1999) find a positive association between quarterly OCF 
volatility and various proxies for external financing costs, including the cost of debt. 
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This suggests that firms with more volatile cash flows incur a higher cost of debt. They 
show that firms with low levels of OCF have high cash flow variability.
21
 This suggests 
that both the volatility of the cash flows and the interaction between cash flow levels 
and cash flow volatility may be important to investors. The importance of cash flow 
levels is also shown in Ali (1994), where small cash flow changes appear to contain 
incremental information regarding earnings; however, this effect does not hold in firms 
with large cash flow changes. These results indicate that investors place differential 
importance on cash flows depending on the level or change in cash flow values. 
Similarly, creditors are concerned with a firm‘s proximity to default and the ability of 
the firm to pay interest payments. If OCF levels are low, creditors become increasingly 
concerned about a firm‘s ability to maintain a payment schedule. However, extremely 
high levels of OCF do not generally impact bondholders positively because they are not 
compensated above a contracted amount. Prior literature identifies whether a loss is 
transitory or persistent by the combined information in cash flow and earnings values. 
For example, Joos and Plesko (2005) conclude transitory losses are made up of positive 
cash flows and negative accruals, while persistent losses include large negative cash 
flows and negative accruals. If the combined information from cash flows and earnings 
implies different future scenarios, then the interaction of managed cash flows and 
earnings levels is also likely to impact creditors‘ predictions of future performance. 
Melendrez et al (2005) also support the use of combined information from cash flows 
and earnings by showing that the market prices cash flow surprises differently 
depending on earnings performance. 
                                                          
21 Minton and Schrand (1999): ―For firms that have cash flows that are in the lowest three deciles when compared to 
firms in their respectively two digit SIC code (LO), the average cash flow variation is 6.574, compared to cash flow 
variation of .368 for firms in the highest three deciles (HI).‖ 
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Again, this implies investors consider the interaction of cash flow and earnings 
information. Documenting that earnings are priced in the cost of debt, Jiang (2008) 
shows reporting profits have the largest effect on cost of debt for high default risk 
firms.
22
 The samples is partitioned into low and high groups using credit ratings and Z 
scores and predict that the low groups represent firms with relatively more distress and 
therefore higher default risks. Creditors are interested in a firm‘s ability to pay the 
interest and principal from current OCF. Therefore, a stronger association is predicted 
here between managed OCF and the cost of debt the closer a firm is to default. 
When firms are underperforming, financial statement users may rely on multiple 
indicators of financial strength, thus drawing more attention to OCF quality. The 
majority of previous studies supporting the importance of cash flow information for 
distressed firms are consistent with cash flows being a traditional measure in evaluating 
credit and bankruptcy risks (Beaver, 1966; Ohlson, 1980; DeFond and Hung, 2003). 
Creditors have incentives to accurately assess the future implications reflected in current 
financial information. For example, if managers use cash flow management to improve 
reporting results, the underlying cash flow information is likely to be of lower quality. 
Since distressed firms are already close to default, bondholders cannot afford to let cash 
flow management go undetected. Therefore, creditors have greater incentives to detect 
and correctly price cash flow management for firms in financial problems. 
H2. Managed OCF has an incremental positive association with 
the cost of debt when firms (a) report losses, (b) have low levels of 
cash flow, or (c) have low levels of cash flow and earnings in the 
same time. 
                                                          
22
 Jiang classifies firms with a rating of BBB or less as having a high default risk. 
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5.2.5 Cash flow management, accounting quality and the cost of debt 
Earlier studies show that information quality affects the estimation risk of firms (Barry 
and Brown, 1984, 1985; Coles and Loewenstein, 1988; Coles et al, 1995). The quality 
of accounting information impacts lenders‘ estimates of future cash flows from which 
the debt repayments will be serviced (Bharath et al, 2008); in addition, large abnormal 
operating accruals indicate unexpected deviations between earnings and OCF that make 
it harder for the lenders to reliably estimate future OCF. Accounting quality also affects 
debt contract design in systematically different ways depending on the lender‘s ability 
to process information and renegotiate the contract ex post. In the case of private debt, 
Bharath and Shumway (2008) find that there is substantial variation in all contract terms 
based on variation in borrower accounting quality, while for public debt, they find that 
the higher risk from poorer accounting quality is entirely reflected in the interest spread, 
and that firms with poorer accounting quality face significantly higher interest costs. 
Easley and O‘Hara (2004) and Leuz and Verrecchia (2004) predict that firms 
with more information risks will have higher costs of capital. In both models, 
information risk concerns the uncertainty or imprecision of information used or desired 
by investors to price securities. Francis et al (2004), assuming that investors value 
securities based on their assessments of future cash flows, seek a measure that captures 
information uncertainty in cash flows. They believe the information about cash flows is 
supplied by earnings (i.e. cash flow equals earnings less accruals), and accruals quality 
is a more primitive construct for information risk concerning cash flows than are other 
earnings attributes. Therefore, Francis et al use accruals quality as the proxy for 
information risks. Nevertheless, there is no direct relationship that shows all the 
transactions that may affect cash flow directly supply by earning. Therefore, it is argued 
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here that cash flow is not always supplied just by earnings and cash flow management 
(quality of cash flow) may also affect information risk. Using accounting quality as the 
proxy for information risk, this formalizes the prediction that accounting quality is 
decreasing in cash flow management; stated in null form, the hypothesis is: 
H3 (null). Managed OCF has no association with accounting 
quality. 
Although classic asset pricing models assume that information issues are 
irrelevant because they can be diversified away (Subramanyam et al, 2010), this 
assumption has been questioned by a growing literature on information risk that 
provides theoretical and empirical support for the idea that the quality of information is 
priced into a firm‘s cost of capital (see for example Easley and O‘Hara, 2004); Francis 
et al, 2005). Theoretically, this literature suggests two different paths by which 
information quality is priced in a firm‘s cost of capital. The first path is information 
asymmetry. Easley and O‘Hara propose a model wherein information asymmetry 
arising from poor information quality is a non-diversifiable risk that is directly reflected 
in the firm‘s expected return. Some earlier papers such as Diamond and Verrecchia 
(1991) and Kim and Verrecchia (1994) theorise an indirect link between information 
asymmetry (arising from public information quality) and the cost of capital through the 
information asymmetry component of the firm‘s bid-ask spreads. In contrast, a second 
path is the direct effect of earning quality on the cost of debt; Lambert et al (2007) make 
the suggestion that earnings quality can directly affect the cost of equity capital because 
earnings quality reduces the firm‘s non-diversifiable covariance with other firms‘ cash 
flows. Empirically, Francis et al (2005) find that poorer accounting quality is associated 
with higher implied cost of equity. Easley et al (2002) find that PIN (a proxy for 
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information asymmetry) is associated with realised returns, and Bhattacharya et al 
(2009) find that the association between accounting quality and the implied cost of 
equity arises through both a direct path from earnings quality to the cost of equity and 
an indirect path through information asymmetry.
23
 
However, the link between information quality and the cost of capital has been 
disputed on both theoretical and empirical grounds. Theoretically, the non-
diversifiability of information risk has been questioned. For example, Hughes et al 
(2007) conclude that information risk is either diversifiable or subsumed by existing 
risk factors. Also, Lambert et al (2007) find that when the number of traders becomes 
sufficiently large, information risk is fully diversifiable.  
Empirically, Core et al (2008) dispute the findings of Francis et al (2005) by 
showing that that accounting quality is not a priced risk factor; that is, it has no 
association with future returns. In addition, Mohanram and Rajgopal (2009) cast doubts 
on whether the information asymmetry (proxied by PIN) reflects information risk that is 
systematically priced by investors. Finally, Duarte and Young (2008) show that the 
information asymmetry component of PIN is not priced by the market, but the 
illiquidity component is priced. 
At the same time, we can see that cash flow management can demolish cash 
flow quality and may affect accounting quality through its effect on information quality.  
In this respect, the thesis explores which cash flow qualities can affect accounting 
quality, and accounting quality‘s effect on the cost of debt (Francis et al, 2005). It is 
hypothesised that cash flow management affects the cost of debt both directly and 
                                                          
23 Proxied by the adverse selection component of bid-ask spreads and PIN 
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indirectly through destroyed accounting quality (Figure 5.3). Accordingly as a null 
hypothesis, H4 would be stated as follows: 
H4. Managed OCF is associated with the cost of debt both (a) 
directly, and (b) indirectly through decreased accounting quality. 
 
5.3 Summary  
This chapter has explained the development of hypotheses in this study. Base on the 
rational relation between the cost of debt and cash flow manipulation the first 
hypothesise which is; managed OCF has no association with the cost of debt has been 
stated in null form. Furthermore the effect of manipulation of OCF on the cost of debt 
when firms have incentive discussed. In addition the chapter gives details of   the effect 
of cash flow management in the cost of debt through the impact on accounting quality.   The 
next chapter, Chapter 6, investigates the research data collection of this study to select 
the sample. The chapter also discusses the criteria to select the sample, and the final 
sample of the study. Furthermore, the chapter will explain the commercial data sets 
problems, including Thomson One Banker, and specifically the Worldscope, Thomson 
and Extel data platforms. Finally the chapter will report some descriptive statistics about 
the firms included in the study. 
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Figure 5.2 
 How reported OCF can be managed  
 
 
 
The chart above illustrates how reported operating cash flows can be managed with no 
change in earnings: 
i. Classification refers to the shifting of items between the statement of cash 
flow categories, namely operating, investing and financing, holding earnings 
and aggregate cash flows as constant. To increase reported operating cash 
flows, firms can classify cash inflows (outflows) from the non-operating 
(operating) section to the operating (non-operating) section of the Cash Flow 
Statement. 
ii. Timing refers to the adjustment of working capital to alter reported OCF, 
holding earning constant. To increase reported operating cash flows using 
timing, firms can delay payments to suppliers and hasten collections from 
customers. 
Source: Lee (2009), p 37   
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Figure 5.3 
 Path diagram of the relationship between cash flow manipulation, accounting quality 
and the cost of debt 
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Chapter 6 
Data, sampling and research methods 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter explained the hypotheses of the study. The first part reviewed the 
relation between the cash flow management and the second part explained the 
relationship between the cost of debt and cash flow manipulation when firms have 
incentives for cash flow manipulation. In addition, the chapter gave a hypothesis 
development for the impact of cash flow manipulation directly and indirectly on the cost 
of debt capital. This chapter investigates the research data collection and explains the 
research methodology of this study. This includes illustrating the sample of the study 
and discussing the criteria for selecting the sample, and the final sample of the study. 
Furthermore, the chapter explains the commercial data sets problems, including 
Thomson One Banker, and specifically the Worldscope, Thomson and Extel data 
platforms. The econometric approaches employed in the study are discussed in Section 
6.5. Finally, Section 6.6 gives an explanation of the models that are estimated in the 
empirical evidence section. 
 
6.2 Data validity, the implications of using commercial sources, and sample 
structures  
According to the Encyclopaedia of Computer Science and Technology, ‗rough data sets‘ 
are defined as those which include uncertain or inaccurate information (Düntsch and 
Gediga, 2000). It may seem odd at first to allude to corporate accounting data that is 
available commercially in this way, especially given the audited nature of the published 
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financial statements which are the primary source. Furthermore, we could expect that 
the market demand for online information would impose a market discipline that 
encourages high levels of completeness and accuracy. Nevertheless, the paper of Izadi 
et al,(2010)
24
 presented at the 46th annual British Accounting Association Conference 
demonstrates that there can be considerable uncertainty surrounding those data points 
which are left blank or recorded as not applicable in portfolio download. In fact, in 
some cases, the underlying information appears to be available, and can be retrieved 
using alternative methods of interrogating the data services, e.g. by examining the 
financial statement summaries for each individual firm rather than by downloading 
items for portfolios of companies. This paper also notes that there are cases where 
missing information is not in the database but nevertheless can be retrieved by referring 
to the primary source, e.g. the accounts published by the company involved. 
Furthermore, the aforementioned paper demonstrates how some missing values 
may be deduced directly from the data that are available, by backfilling via the 
appropriate accounting identity. Finally, it shows that a few basic errors do creep into 
these data sets, in spite of the evident internal checks. 
This thesis considers the data structure of the most common UK provider, 
Thomson One Banker, and specifically the Worldscope, Thomson and Extel data 
platforms. We are already aware from prior research that such financial data banks are 
not perfect substitutes, not only as the coverage of firms and accounting items varies 
across the databases, but also because there are differences in the way each database 
defines and constructs key variables (Alves et al, 2007). 
                                                          
24 Using Rough Data Sets in Accounting Research: An Evaluation of the Integrity of UK Company Data in 
Commercial Databases (2010) 
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However, the main aim of this kind of work is not to compare these data 
structures and values per se, but rather to consider the potential for uncovering ‗hidden 
values‘ amongst items that are reported in downloads as ‗not applicable‘, or that are 
recorded ambiguously in the form of a dash, or simply left blank. 
With reference to a recent paper on earnings management (Botsari and Meeks, 
2008), the JBFA discussant makes the suggestion that the results reported in the paper 
may be influenced by the use of Worldscope data for the empirical analysis. The 
Worldscope financial statement data items are said to have been adjusted by Thomson 
analysts in order to reverse differences in local accounting practices, with the aim of 
enhancing their international comparability (Young, 2008). The use of standardised 
information in the database rather than as-reported numbers is potentially problematic 
because the comparability adjustments made by Worldscope may be conflated with the 
discretion exercised by company management in computing earnings, a problem which 
is exacerbated in the research design when such adjustments vary across the items that 
comprise estimated accruals. The evidence to support these claims is set out clearly in 
another paper (Alves et al,  2007), where the properties of items from the Worldscope 
income statement, cash flow statement and balance sheet are compared with those of 
corresponding items from Extel Financial and the Datastream Company Accounts 
Archive (both of which are said to contain as-reported data). The results are based on a 
single sample of UK firm-years that is common to all three databases, and they reveal 
some dramatic disparities. For instance, the mean and median Worldscope values for 
operating cash flow are 25 per cent lower than the Extel equivalents, and the results 
reported by Tesco PLC illustrate this difference between operating cash flow computed 
according to UK GAAP and Worldscope‘s adjusted operating cash flow figure – 
Tesco‘s reported operating cash flows are £1,321 million for the financial year ending in 
113 
 
 
February 1999, whilst Worldscope gives a figure of £955 million. Yet, at the same time, 
the operating profit is identical on the two delivery platforms. 
The effects of database choice on accounting research have also been examined 
recently by Lara et al (2006). They regress the book value of shareholders‘ equity and 
earnings on the market value of the company, using EU data from seven sources for the 
period 1990–99. They conclude that much of the variation is attributable to differences 
in firm coverage across databases. In the US and Canada, Ulbricht and Weiner (2005) 
compare Worldscope and Compustat over the period from 1985 to 2003. 
Full UK listed company data sets were formed in Worldscope and Thomson 
Financial in order to download accounting data, and then banking firms and other 
financial institutions were excluded (GeneralIndustryClassification 4 and 5), as the 
corporate accounting identities used in the study apply only to industrial groupings 1-3 
and 6. The data was downloaded for ten years, from 1999 to 2008, for all income 
statement and balance sheet items, including all subtotals. For now, this work has not 
been extended to the completion of firm series that are interrupted by balance sheet date 
changes where two fiscal periods end in the same calendar year, and it is to be noted 
that this represents an additional source of ‗hidden values‘ across the entire ‗missing‘ 
financial statement set, which can generally be recovered directly from the database in 
question. The accounting identities that underlie the following line items were then 
evaluated: 
CashAndSTInvestments 
TotalInventories 
TotalCurrentAssets 
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Total Investments 
TotalPropPlantEquipGross 
AccumulatedDepreciation 
TotalPropPlantEquipNet 
TotalOtherAssets 
TotalAssets 
TotalCurrentLiabilities 
LTDebtExclCapitalizedLeases 
TotalLTDebt 
DeferredTaxesBalSht 
TotalLiabilities 
TotalCommonEquity 
TotalLiabAndShareholdersEquity 
GrossIncome 
TotalOperatingExpenses 
OperatingIncomeAfterDepr 
EarningsBeforeInterestAndTaxes 
IncomeBefIncomeTaxes 
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IncomeBefExtraItemsAndPfdDiv 
IncomeBefPreferredDividends 
NetIncome 
Table 6.1 provides an indication of the initial results for a subset of the key 
aggregates in the above listing. Two line items, Current Assets and Current Liabilities, 
which are often used in accounting research, are characterised by incomplete data that 
can be obtained by backfilling the missing value, by summing components and/or by 
logical deduction, e.g. from balance sheet net totals of other aggregates. It was found 
that the highest recovery was with Worldscope‘s Current Assets: 3900 backfilled firm-
years. 
In certain cases, the failed accounting identity could not be backfilled from other 
line items, as these were not all present. In such cases, the firm‘s financial statements 
were referred to systematically on the system, and then to any available copy of the 
relevant annual report. The highest recovery rate was for Thomson‘s Total Receivables: 
70 firm-years. 
Finally, a number of instances where there was an error were also noted, which 
could be verified not only because the financial statement clearing identity failed, but 
also because recourse to the original annual accounts proved this to be the case. The 
greatest number of corrections was with respect to Thomson‘s Sales: 23 firm-years. 
Lastly, this provides initial evidence that seems to point to a potential drawback 
in accounting research that is based on commercial data sets. Evidence of missing 
values has been provided that can be readily reconstructed from accounting identities, of 
other missing values that are retrievable either from the underlying database or from the 
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source accounts, and finally of incorrect summations of accounting identities that lead 
to the discovery of data errors.  
 
6.3 The identification of extreme values in accounting research  
The nature of accounting data plays a vital role in empirical accounting studies. The 
identification of influential observations, which can have a marked impact on 
modelling, enhances the generalisation of the estimations (Mottaghi, 2010). 
As mentioned earlier (Section 6.2), financial database information sometimes 
presents difficulties in articulating the financial statements that are covered (see Izadi et 
al 2010), Before we use this financial data, we consider data cells that are left blank and 
also others that are recorded as ‗not applicable‘, or thatcontain numbers that prove to be 
incorrect, which can be corrected using alternative methods of validating the accounting 
numbers. 
As it is normal to expect that extreme values in the data will influence this 
empirical study, as is generally the case in accounting research, we may consider 
following many other studies which have simply used winsorising to resolve the 
problem, by replacing the upper and lower extremes of the empirical distribution (say 1 
per cent at either end, i.e. the 1st and 99th percentiles) with the values of the 2nd and 
98th percentiles respectively (see for example Liu and Thomas, 2000 and Jones et al, 
2008). An alternative is truncation, which involves discarding the upper and lower 
extreme values, for instance at the 1 per cent extremes of each tail (see for example 
Kothari and Zimmerman, 1994; Fama and French, 1998). A combination of the two 
methods can also be applied (see for example Hogan and Wilkins, 2008). Christodoulou 
117 
 
 
and Bradbury (2009) indicate that winsorising is not suitable for economic ratio 
variables, and also demonstrate that these are not robust against ‗masking‘ and 
‗swamping‘ problems: that is, when one extreme value may mask the appearance of 
another, or a small cluster of outliers may swamp the mean and inflate the variance in 
such a manner that another observation will appear as an outlier when in fact it is not. 
More importantly, trimming and winsorising are univariate approaches that fail 
to address the problem of multivariate robustness that is of main concern to regression 
analysis (Christodoulou et al, 2010). Hadi and Simonoff argue that the filter developed 
by Hadi (1992) is specifically designed for multivariate analysis (Hadi and Simonoff, 
1993; Hadi, 2006). Hadi‘s filter is applied by jurisdiction to the multivariate relationship 
prior to estimation on the level of firm-means, and outliers are detected at the 5 per cent 
level of statistical significance (Christodoulou, et al, 2010). This study uses truncation 
for solving the extreame value problems and also includes Hadi‘s filter in order to 
control the results.     
 
6.4 Sample selection  
This thesis uses two different observations as an overall measure of the cost of debt: 
backward-looking market and forward-looking accounting proxy. For the backward-
looking market the study includes two different samples: the UK and the USA. 
However, for the forward-looking approach the study uses UK data. 
As outlined in Table 6.2, the sample comprises 8,684 (23,935) firm-year 
observations from 1998 to 2010 for 1,699 (3,363) non-financial UK (USA) companies 
on the 2011 Worldscope database. Prior studies also exclude financial firms from the 
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sample because financial firms‘ leverage is highly affected by explicit (or implicit) 
investor insurance schemes such as deposit insurance. Moreover, financial firms‘ debt-
like liabilities are not strictly comparable to the debt issued by non-financial firms. 
Following the previous studies related to the cost of debt, in order to obtain a sample of 
firms with a calculated cost of debt, this requires the exclusion of 3,181 (6,889) firm 
years with interest equal to zero and 1,590 (2,790) with total debt equal to zero or not 
available on the database, where accounting numbers could not be substituted using 
alternative methods. 
Outliers were controlled for by following the procedures in Barth et al (2001) 
and Lev et al (2009). Thus, after truncating the top and bottom one percentile of 
observations for the variables included (cost of debt, OCF and INTSAL), 613 (1,527) 
firm-year observations were excluded. In addition, in order to calculate the one-year lag, 
the first year for which the effect of cash flow quality on debt was examined is 2000, 
thus a further 346 (254) firms were excluded with 2,411 (4,415) firm-year observations. 
Studentised residuals greater than 2 or less than -2 were treated as influential outliers 
and removed, leaving a final sample comprising 8,684 (23,935) firm-year observations 
from 1,699 (3,363) firms. 
Table 6.2, Panel A illustrates the effect of each of the sample filters and breaks 
down the sample by year and by industry. The study uses the ICB (Industry 
Classification Benchmark) for the firms‘ industry classification. Ten sectors are 
represented in the samples. Panel B includes the number of firm-year observations of 
the final sample by industry. The ‗others‘ in the last column of Panel B report all firms 
with missing ICB. Panel B shows that in both samples the ‗industries‘ sector has the 
highest number of observations, while the ‗telecommunications‘ sector has the lowest. 
119 
 
 
There is not much difference between distributions of the number of companies per 
year. 
The sample selection process for the bond market is summarised in Table 6.3. 
Data on the total sample of UK companies were obtained from 1998-2009. Only 378 
issuers including 821 firm-years identify as public companies. Financial firms were also 
eliminated as their financing decisions are affected by somewhat different factors than 
those of industrial firms. Finally, after excluding issues without a fixed coupon rate, the 
final sample comprises 194 observations from 82 issuers. The relatively small sample 
size is mostly due to the fact that there are fewer firms with publicly traded bonds. It is 
also consistent with the literature analysing corporate bonds. For example, Qi et al 
(2010) analyse a sample of Eurobond issues from 1980-2006 that contains only 180 
issues from the UK, and Kabir et al (2010) over 2003-2006 analysed a sample of 150 
firm-year observations from the UK. 
Stata 11 software was used for analysing the models and regression results. This 
is due to the fact that Stata 11 is a complete statistical software package for managing, 
graphing and analysing data, and also Stata 11 enables the estimation of all econometric 
techniques that are used in the study (e.g. the pooled sample analysis, the panel data 
analysis etc.). Furthermore, Stata 11 can deal with samples with missing observations. 
 
6.5 Econometric techniques 
In order to achieve the aims of the study, several econometric techniques have been 
employed. In this section a brief explanation of each econometric technique is offered. 
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6.5.1 Ordinary Least Squares regression and Panel Data analysis  
The method of Ordinary Least Square (OLS) is used to estimate most of the models that 
are employed in the study. OLS has very attractive statistical properties that have made 
it one of the most powerful and popular methods of regression analysis. 
The following model and assumptions underlie the method of Ordinary Least Square. 
Yt= ß0 + ßIX1i + ß2X2i + ei 
where: 
ß0: is the intercept. 
Yt: is the dependent variable. 
Xi: is the independent variable (s). 
ei: is the error term (the disturbance). 
The assumptions underlying the OLS method are: 
1. The mean or expected value of the random disturbance term ei  is zero.  
11. Given the value of X, the variance of the error term ei is the same for all 
observations (the disturbances are homoscedastic)(no heteroskedasticity) 
III. Given any two X values, Xi and Xj (i  j), the correlation between any two ei and ej 
(i  j) is zero (there is no autocorrelation between the disturbances) 
IV. There is no correlation between the disturbances and any independent variable (zero 
covariance between ei and Xj).  
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V. The regression model is correctly specified (there is no specification bias or error in 
the model used in the empirical analysis). 
VI. There is no perfect multicollinearity. That is, there are no perfect linear relationships 
among the explanatory variables (Gujarati, 2003). 
Panel Data Analysis 
It is well known that OLS standard errors are unbiased when the residuals are 
independent and identically distributed (Peterson, 2009). In order to overcome the 
problems of using pooled sample analysis, and due to the advantages of using panel 
analysis, the models that are employed in the study are estimated using panel data 
analysis. Murray (2006) argues that we call data that contain a time series of cross 
sections a panel data. 
The Advantages of Panel Data Analysis 
Murray (2006) argues that panel data offer three main advantages over studying a single 
cross section or time series: 
1. The panel data analysis increases the sample size. 
II. The additional observations of a panel may bring additional variation in the 
explanatory variables. 
III. Panel data can overcome some omitted variable biases that might plague a single 
cross section. 
Gujarati (2003) points out that Baltagi (1995) mentioned the following advantages of 
panel data analysis: 
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I. The technique of panel data estimation can take the firm‘s heterogeneity explicitly 
into account by allowing for individual-specific variables.  
II. By combining a time series of cross-section observations, panel data give ―more 
informative data, more variability, less collinearity among variables, more degrees of 
freedom and more efficiency‖. 
Ill. By studying the repeated cross section of observations, panel data are better suited to 
studying the dynamics of change. 
IV. Panel data can better detect and measure effects that simply cannot be observed in 
pure cross-section or pure time series data. 
V. Panel data allows for studying more complicated behavioural models. Greene (2003) 
contends that the fundamental advantage of a panel data set over a cross-section is that 
it will allow the researcher great flexibility in modelling differences in behaviour across 
individuals. 
Murray (2006) points out that panel data with unobserved heterogeneity come in 
two varieties. The unobserved heterogeneity may be the same from one sample to the 
next or it may vary randomly from one sample to the next. Fixed effect models are 
suitable when the unobserved differences among groups are the same from one sample 
to the next. Error component models (random error models) are those in which the 
unobserved differences among groups vary randomly from one sample to the next. In 
the following two sub-sections a brief explanation of both kinds of panel data analysis is 
offered. 
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6.5.2 The fixed effects model for panel data  
Gujarati (2003) contends that the fixed effect model (FEM) takes into account the 
specific effect of each firm‘s ‗individuality‘. This can be achieved by letting the 
intercept vary for each firm, but still assumes that the slope coefficients are constant 
across firms. The following model explains the fixed effect model: 
Yit = ß01 + ßIX1it + ß2X2it + eit 
where: 
ß01: is the intercept. 
Yit: is the dependent variable. 
Xit: is the independent variable. 
eit: is the error term. 
The subscript i on the intercept term is to suggest that the intercepts of the firms 
included in the sample may be different. This difference is due to special characteristics 
of firms. It is worth mentioning that the FEM assumes that the slope coefficients of the 
regressors do not vary across individuals or over time. Ordinary Least Square analysis is 
used in estimating the FEM. 
The FEM is based on the assumption that the error term follows the classical 
assumptions, namely, eit ~ (0, σ
2
). In the fixed effect, eit is uncorrelated with the 
explanatory variables, so OLS is consistent if the explanatory variables are not 
asymptotically perfectly collinear (Murray, 2006). The term ―fixed effects‖ is attributed 
to the idea that although the intercept may differ across individuals (firms), each 
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individual‘s intercept does not vary over time; that is, it is time invariant. This model is 
usually referred to as the Least Squares Dummy Variable (LSDV) model. Gujarati 
(2003) argues that although the Fixed Effect Model is easy to use, it has problems that 
need to be kept in mind, such as: 
I. If you introduce too many dummy variables, you will run up against the degree of 
freedom problem. 
II. With so many variables in the model, there is always the possibility of 
multicollinearity. 
III. A fixed effect approach may not be able to identify the impact of time invariant 
variables (sex, colour, and ethnicity). 
6.5.3 The random effects (error correction) model  
It has been argued that instead of capturing the individual specific effects by different 
intercepts for each firm (the Fixed Effect Model). The effect in the Random Effect 
Model appears in the error component as a random disturbance that is the same for 
every observation for a given sample, but that is random across samples. The individual 
specific disturbance is one component of the total disturbance term (Murray, 2006). 
The following model explains the Random Effect Model: 
Yit= ß0 + ßIX1it + ß2X2it + wit 
where: 
ß0: is the intercept. 
Yit: is the dependent variable. 
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Xit: is the independent variable. 
wit: is the composite error term.  
wit= eit +uit .  
eit is the random error term.  
uit is the combined time series and cross-section error. 
In the Random Effect Model, instead of treating ß0 as fixed, we assume that it is a 
random variable with a mean value of ß0 for all the individuals (firms) (no subscript i 
here). The intercept value for an individual firm can be expressed as: 
ßIi= ßI +ei        i=1,2,......,N where ei is a random error term with a mean value of zero and 
variance σ2. The idea here is that the firms in the sample are drawing from a much 
larger universe of such firms and that they have a common mean value for the intercept 
(=ßI), and the individual differences in the intercept values of each firm are reflected in 
the error term ei (Gujarati, 2003). 
The underlying assumptions of the Random Effects Model are: 
I. E (wit) =0. 
11. The two sorts of disturbances, the uit and ei, have means of zero and are 
homoscedastic. 
Ill. The uit are uncorrelated over time and across individuals. 
IV. The ei, are uncorrelated across individuals. 
V. The uit and ei are uncorrelated. 
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VI. Var (wit) = σ
2 
ε + σ
2 
u (homoscedastic). 
It is worth noting that in estimating the Random Effects Model, the Generalised 
Least Square (GLS) is used. This is because the GLS technique takes into account the 
different correlation structure of the error term in the REM (Gujarati, 2003). Gujarati 
argues that if we do not take this correlation structure into account, and we estimate by 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS), the result estimators will be inefficient. 
Fixed Effects Model versus Random Effects Model 
The difference between fixed and error components is that in the fixed effect each cross-
sectional unit has its own (fixed) intercept value, while in the error correction model, the 
intercept ß0 represents the mean value of all the (cross-sectional) intercepts and the error 
component ei represents the (random) deviation of individual intercepts from this mean 
value. The error term ei is not directly observable; it is an unobservable or latent 
variable (Gujarati, 2003). 
It has been argued that the answer to whether to use fixed effects or random 
effects depends on the assumption that we make about the likely correlation between the 
individual, or cross-section specific, error component ei and the X regressors. If it is 
assumed that ei and the X‘s are uncorrelated, the ECM may be appropriate, whereas if 
ei and the X‘s are correlated, the FEM may be appropriate (Gujarati, 2003). 
Greene (2003) argues that the crucial distinction between the FEM and the REM 
is whether the unobserved individual effect embodies elements that are correlated with 
the regressors in the model, not whether these effects are stochastic or not. What makes 
a fixed effect appropriate for one and an error component appropriate for the other is the 
persistence or variability of the individual specific effect across samples (Murray, 
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2006). In order to select between the Fixed Effect and Error Correction Models, the 
Hausman test is employed. The null hypothesis is that the FEM and ECM estimators do 
not differ substantially. The test has asymptotic X2 distribution. If the null is rejected, 
the conclusion is that the ECM is not appropriate and we may be better off using FEM, 
in which case statistical inferences will be conditional on the ei in the sample. 
All the models that are employed in the study are estimated using OLS 
regression and then are re-estimated with pooled sample analysis. The pooled analysis 
uses the full data set with cross-sectional observations in each period in the series (basic 
details are available in Gujarati, 2003). Fixed and random effects estimators have also 
used for re-estimating the models, allowing for the firm panel structure and it can be 
noted here that the Hausman‘s test reported later in this thesis show conclusively that 
fixed effects are sufficient and that a random effects model is not appropriate. 
Therefore, generalised least squares is not been applied in this thesis given that the 
variances of the observations are generally not shown to be heteroscedastic, suggesting 
that ordinary least squares is statistically efficient and will not give misleading 
inferences. 
The study employs pooled sample analysis because of the advantages of pooling 
the sample. It has been argued that pooled samples have many advantages. Pooling data 
generates more informative data, more variability, less collinearity among variables, 
more degrees of freedom and more efficiency. Furthermore, aggregating data of many 
observations minimizes the bias that might result if we aggregate individuals or firms 
into broad aggregates (Gujarati, 2003). 
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6.6 Research designs 
In general, this study employs three models in order to achieve its objectives. This 
section gives a brief explanation of the models that will be used in the chapter. A 
detailed explanation and the justification of each variable, and the hypotheses that are 
tested, are given in the following chapter. 
6.6.1 The determinants of abnormal cash flow  
Abnormal operating cash flow is estimated from the components of operating cash flow 
in a manner similar to Roychowdhury (2006), Zhang R (2006) and Cohen  and Zarowin 
(2010), who apply the Dechow et al (1998) abnormal accruals model in two stages. This 
thesis estimates normal OCF, as driven by the level of revenues and change in revenues 
in the current period. Zhang L. (2006) and Lee (2009) include a constant in the normal 
cash flow estimation model and get similar results from a cash flow estimation model 
without a constant. To estimate the model the following regression for each industry-
year group (see Appendix A) has been run: 
 OCFt/TAt =β0 + β1(1/ TAt) + β2(REVt/TAt) + β3(∆REVt/TAt) + εt   (1) 
where TAt is the total assets at the end of period t, REVt the sales during period t and ∆REVt= 
REVt- REVt-1 
It is a general convention in the literature to include a scaled intercept, β1 
(1/TAt), when estimating nondiscretionary accruals. This avoids a spurious correlation 
between scaled operating cash flows and scaled due to variations in the scaling variable 
or total assets (Roychowdhury, 2006). To ensure that the mean abnormal operating cash 
flows for every industry-year are zero, Roychowdhury also includes an unscaled 
intercept. He adds that including the intercepts allows the average OCFt/TAt for a 
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particular industry year to be non-zero even when the primary explanatory variables in 
the model, revenues and change in revenues, are zero. Eliminating the unscaled 
intercept does not materially affect the results, nor does retaining the unscaled intercept, 
but eliminating the scaled intercept 1/TAt . 
After estimates of β1, β2, and β3 are obtained from the regressions for the pooled 
data, abnormal cash flow from operations is computed as the actual OCF minus the 
‗normal‘ level of OCF as follows: 
ABN_OCFt /TAt= OCFt /TAt – [ß1(1/TA t) +ß2(REVt/TA t) +ß3(∆REVt/TA t)] 
(2) 
Panel A of Table 6.4 provides descriptive statistics for coefficient estimates in Equation 
(2) for samples, in the regression used to estimate abnormal cash flows. The coefficient 
on ∆REVt/TAt for the UK firms is significantly positive (0.007) and the coefficient on 
REVt/TAt is also significantly positive (0.057), which is higher than the mean adjusted 
R-Squared of 45 per cent reported by Roychowdhury (2006), who estimated the 
regression at the industry level every year, and the 38 per cent reported by Lee (2009). 
Table 6.4 also reports descriptive statistics for coefficient estimates in Equation (2) for 
the USA sample, where the regression is used to estimate abnormal cash flows. The 
coefficients are as predicted by Dechow et al (1998), Roychowdhury (2006), Zhang W. 
(2008) and Lee (2009). The coefficient on ∆REVt/TAt is significantly negative (-0.014) 
and the coefficient on REVt/TAt is significantly positive (0.043). The average R-Squared 
is 27 per cent.  
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6.6.2 The determinants of cost of debt 
Prior studies have typically used two different observations as an overall measure of the 
cost of debt: forward-looking market proxy for the cost of debt and backward-looking 
accounting proxy for the cost of debt. 
Certain prior research studies have used the credit rating spread or initial bond 
yield spread as a proxy for the cost of debt (see for example Sengupta, 1998; Minton 
and Schrand ,1999; Ahmed et al, 2002; Shi 2003; Anderson et al, 2004; Yu, 2005; 
Jiang, 2008; Mansi et al, 2009; Qi et al, 2010).  
Sengupta (1998) uses two proxies to measure cost of debt: yield and interest 
cost. He defines yield as yield to maturity on the first debt issue of year t + 1. This 
represents the effective rate of interest that equates to the present value of the principal 
and interest payments with the amount paid by the lender. Interest rate is defined as the 
total interest cost to the firm on its first debt issue of year t + 1. This also represents the 
effective rate of interest at which the present value of the principal and interest payment 
is equal to the amount received by the firm, net of underwriter discounts. Minton and 
Schrand (1999) also use two proxies for the cost of debt: S&P bond rating (the average 
S&P rating) and yield-to-maturity (weighted-average yield-to-maturity on long-term 
debt calculated using data from S&P Bond Guides). However, convertible debt has been 
excluded. Ahmed et al (2002) use senior debt rating assigned by Standard and Poor‘s 
(S&P) as a proxy to measure firms‘ cost of debt. Shi (2003) uses average yield on 
Moody‘s Aaa bonds for the month of issue less average yield on 30-year US Treasury 
bonds for the month of issue. This variable is intended to control for the time series 
variation of risk premiums over the economic cycle. 
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Anderson et al (2004) use yield spread (spread), which is measured as the 
difference between the weighted-average yield to maturity on the firm‘s outstanding 
(non-provisional) publicly traded debt, and the yield to maturity on a Treasury security 
with a corresponding duration, where the weight of each debt issue is the fraction of the 
amount outstanding for that issue divided by the total market value of all outstanding 
traded debt for the firm. Jiang (2008) measures a firm‘s cost of debt using firm credit 
ratings and initial bond yield spread. Mansi et al (2009) use yield spread.  
In the backward-looking accounting approach, several researchers have used 
accounting data to calculate the cost of debt. For instance Pittman and Fortin (2004) use 
interest as a proxy for the cost of debt. They use accounting data for calculating the cost 
of debt and define it as interest expense for the year divided by the average of total 
short- and long-term debt during the year. Francis et al (2005) calculate cost of debt as 
the ratio of firm j‘s interest expense in year t + 1 to average interest-bearing debt 
outstanding during year‘s t and t + 1. In Pizzo et al (2009) the dependent variable cost 
of debt is represented by the realised cost of debt, given by firm j‘s interest expense in 
year t to average interest-bearing debt outstanding during years t and t - 1. 
 Following Pittman and Fortin (2004), Francis et al (2005),  Pizzo et al (2009), 
and Ghosh and Moon (2010), the dependent variable (cost of debt) is given by the 
firm‘s reported Interest Expense On Debt (Field No 03054 in Worldscope), divided by 
the average over the year of the sum of Long-Term Debt (Field No 03251), plus Short-
Term Debt and Current Portion of Long-Term Debt (Field No 03051), plus Debt 
Capitalised Lease Obligations (Field No 03249)25. 
                                                          
25
 Note that other researchers describe their methods in various ways. For example, Francis et al. (2005) 
calculate cost of debt as the ratio of firm j‘s interest expense in year t+1 to average interest-bearing debt 
outstanding at the end of years t and t+1. Similarly, Pittman and Fortin (2004) calculate the interest rate as 
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The following model of a firm‘s cost of debt has been used in this study; 
Cost of Debt  
= β0 + β1SIZE + β2LEV + β3INTSAL + β4LOSS + β5∆EARN_POS + β6LIBOR 
+ β7OCF + ε                                                                                                 (3) 
 
 
We include a number of well-established variables in the model, following a 
considerable number of recent related studies, for example Sengupta (1998), Shi (2003), 
Anderson et al (2004), Pittman and Fortin (2004), Mansi et al (2004), Nikolaev and  
Vanlent (2005), Francis et al (2005), Jiang (2008),  Mansi et al (2009) and Ghosh and 
Moon (2010).  
 Among the predictor variables which have been found by a large number of 
studies to influence a firm‘s cost of debt include firm size (SIZE), leverage (LEV), 
interest coverage (INTCOV), the level of the operating cash flow (OCF), and dummies 
for the sign of negative earnings (LOSS) and the change in earnings (∆EARN_POS). 
Definitions of test variables and expected signs of regression coefficients are shown in 
Table 6.5. 
It seems that there is an agreement between theories about the positive effect of 
SIZE on a firm‘s capital structure, though their explanation differs. From the point of 
view of the trade-off theory, firms trade-off between the benefits of LEV, such as tax 
savings or mitigation of agency problems, against the costs of leverage, such as the 
costs of bankruptcy. Rajan and Zingales (1995), however, argue that large firms tend to 
be more diversified and so suffer bankruptcy less often. Accordingly, an observed 
                                                                                                                                                                          
interest expense for the year divided by average short- and long-term debt during the year. More recently 
Rendeiro (2011) also calculates cost of debt as interest expense divided by average interest bearing debt. 
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positive dependence is expected between LEV and firm SIZE. Alternatively, because of 
information asymmetries, smaller firms are likely to face higher costs for obtaining 
external funds. Moreover, Bevan and Danbolt (2002) argue that due to credit ratings, 
large companies are more likely to have access to non-bank debt financing. In turn, this 
too would suggest a positive relationship between size and debt. Hence, an inverse 
relation is predicted between interest rates and firm SIZE (measured as the natural 
logarithm of one plus total assets). Larger firms are perceived to have lower default risk 
and therefore are expected to incur lower costs of debt. (Carey et al, 1993), so SIZE 
should be negatively related to cost of debt. The logarithmic specification that provides 
for the expected decreasing marginal impact of size follows extant research, e.g. 
Kennedy (1998).  
LEV proxies for default risk. A higher debt ratio indicates a greater risk of 
default, so firms with more debt are likely to have a higher cost of debt, resulting in a 
positive coefficient. 
The INTSAL interest cover ratio is frequently used to measure a firm‘s ability to 
pay its interest obligations. Although interest coverage is often defined as operating 
income before taxes to interest expenses, that definition is avoided here because the 
ratio is difficult to interpret for firms with losses. One potential solution is to delete 
firm-year observations with negative interest coverage ratios but that might result in 
firms that are central to the hypothesis being discarded. Instead, the variable used is 
interest expense deflated by revenues (interest expense) as a proxy for debt financing 
(Ghosh and Moon, 2010). This measure avoids problems associated with loss firms and 
can be interpreted in the same way as debt, with the prediction that higher INTSAL 
ratios are associated with a higher cost of debt. 
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OCF measures a firm‘s ability to generate cash in order to meet interest 
payments, and consistent with prior research studies (Minton and Schrand, 1999; 
Pittman and Fortin, 2004; Anderson, 2004), it is predicted therefore that OCF should 
have a negative association with the cost of debt. 
Two earnings benchmarks are also included to control for achieving earnings 
targets, in order to isolate the association of operating cash flow information and the 
cost of debt. By controlling for the earnings targets, it is hoped that this will control for 
operating cash flow management that is designed to achieve earnings targets, thus 
capturing manipulation to achieve cash flow targets. LOSS is an indicator variable equal 
to 1 if the firm‘s earnings are negative and zero otherwise, and ∆EARN_POS is a second 
indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm records a positive increase in earnings and zero 
otherwise. LOSS also acts as a control for an increased likelihood of bankruptcy, where 
a company with negative earnings is expected to incur a higher cost of debt to reflect the 
added failure risk (Amir et al, 2009). 
To examine H1, that managed operating cash flows have no association with the 
cost of debt, first the study runs the following regression without a control variable: 
Cost of Debt= β0 + β1ABN_OCF+ε                                                            (4) 
As explained above, OCF is subdivided into abnormal and normal components; 
therefore the study ran the following regression and added the normal component of 
OCF to the model: 
Cost of Debt = β0 + β1ABN_OCF + β8NOR_OCF + ε                                (5) 
The results from the reduced model excluding control variables might be overstated 
because they do not account for the other factors that explain the variation in earnings 
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quality. Therefore, a number of other factors are included that are expected to be 
associated with the cost of debt, and the cost of debt model is modified as follows: 
Cost of Debt  
=β0 + β1SIZE + β2LEV + β3INTSAL + β4LOSS + β5∆EARN_POS + B6 
LIBOR + β7ABN_OCF + β8NOR_OCF + ε.                                    (6)                                                      
where the total reported operating cash flow is now divided into the estimated abnormal 
operating cash flow ABN_OCF and the residual normal operating cash flow NOR_OCF, 
each of which is scaled by total assets in year t.  
If omitted variables are a source of endogeneity bias in Equation (6) then 
including the variables described above will reduce the amount of bias, and OLS 
estimation of the augmented Equation should be consistent (in the absence of firm 
heterogeneity effects). Therefore, changes in the coefficient estimate on disclosure in 
Equation (6) will be documented in order to evaluate the extent of the endogeneity bias 
caused by omitted variables. 
Finally, both sources of endogeneity bias are investigated simultaneously, using 
panel (fixed effects and random effects)26
 
to estimate the following Equation: 
                                                          
26 In principle, Equation (7) could be estimated using fixed and random effects respectively. The 
appropriateness of each estimator depends on assumptions about the correlation between a i and the 
included independent variables. If the firm-specific characteristics captured in ai are independent of the 
regressors, random effects estimation is consistent and efficient. However, if the firm-specific 
characteristics are correlated with any of the regressors this estimation procedure is inconsistent and 
fixed effects are preferred. Since we have strong theoretical reasons to believe that firm-specific 
characteristics are correlated with the disclosure variable, our priors are that fixed effects estimation is 
the most appropriate when estimating Equation (7). In fact, unreported results of a Hausman test of the 
consistency of random and fixed effects estimation support the choice of random effects. This is further 
evidence that firm heterogeneity is important in the current setting and should be taken into account 
(using fixed effects) when estimating the relation between disclosure and cost-of-debt capital. 
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 Cost of Debt 
=β0 + β1SIZE + β2LEV + β3INTSAL + β4LOSS + β5∆EARN_POS + B6 
LIBOR + β7ABN_OCF +  β8NOR_OCF + α + ε                             (7) 
 
where: 
α = any unobservable firm-specific variable that remains fixed over time, and all other 
variables are as defined above. 
H2 predicts that creditors are motivated to detect and price the managed 
component of operating cash flows when firms experiencing financial problems. 
Financial problems are measured using the following indicators: 1) losses; 2) low cash 
flow levels; and 3) low earnings levels. Following Minton and Schrand (1999), the 
operating cash flows and earnings are ranked into deciles where the low (LOW) group 
is deciles 1 through 3 and the high (HI) group is deciles 7 through 10.  The following 
models are used: 
Cost of Debt 
  =β0 + β1SIZE + β2LEV + β3INTSAL + β4LOSS + β5∆EARN_POS + B6 
LIBOR + β7ABN_OCF + β8NOR_OCF + β9LOSS*ABN_OCF + ε           (8)    
Cost of Debt  
=β0 + β1SIZE + β2LEV + β3INTSAL + β4LOSS + β5∆EARN_POS + B6LIBOR 
+ β7ABN_OCF + β8NOR_OCF + β9 OCFLOW + β10 OCFHI + 
β11OCFLOW*ABNOCF + β12OCFHI*ABNOCF+ ε                                (9)         
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Cost of Debt 
=β0 + β1SIZE + β2LEV + β3INTSAL + β4LOSS + β5∆EARN_POS + B6 
LIBOR + β7ABN_OCF + β8NOR_OCF + β9OCFLOW + β10 OCFHI + 
β11OCFLOW*ABNOCF + β12 OCFHI*ABNOCF + β13EARNLOW + 
β14EARNHI + β15ABNOCF*EARNLOW + β16ABNOCF*EARNHI +  
β17ABNOCF*OCFLOW*EARNLOW + ε                                                (10)   
where: 
OCF_LOW = bottom three deciles of reported operating cash flow 
OCF_HI = top three deciles of reported operating cash flow 
EARN_LOW = bottom three deciles of earnings before interest and tax 
EARN_HI = top three deciles of earnings before interest and tax 
For regressions (8), (9), and (10), we predict a positive association between managed 
cash flows and cost of debt when conditioned on losses or low cash flow and earnings 
levels.Significant coefficients on β9, β11 and β17 for regressions (8), (9) and (10) 
respectively may suggest when firms are in a loss position or have low levels of cash 
flow or earnings; cash flow information comes under stronger scrutiny by the market. 
As a result, the market will penalise the firm for managed operating cash flows through 
an increase in the cost of debt. 
6.6.3 The effects of cash flow management on the cost of debt  
H3 predicts the impact of cash flow management on the accounting quality. Based on 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) and Francis et al (2005), the following regression for each 
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industry-year group has been estimated. The accounting quality measure in year t is the 
standard deviation from the regression. For ease of interpretation, the measure is 
multiplied by -1 so that higher values of accounting quality measures represent better 
accounting quality. 
TCAt /TAt= β0 + β1(OCFt-1/ TAt) + β2(OCFt/TAt) + β3(OCFt+1/ TAt) + 
β4(∆REVt/TAt) + β5(PPEt/TAt)+ εt                                                             (11) 
where TCAt is firm j‘s total current accrual and PPEt is firm j‘s gross value of property, 
plant and equipment (all other valuables follow the definitions in previous paragraphs). 
ABN_OCF is also used to measure cash flow management. Again for ease of 
interpretation, ABN_OCF has been multiplied by -1 and called operating cash flow 
quality (OCFQ) so that higher values of cash flow quality represent better cash flow 
quality. For the estimation of the relation between cash flow quality (OCFQ) and 
accounting quality (AQ) I run the following regression: 
AQt= β0 + β1(OCFQt) + εt                                                                          (12) 
For testing the relation between accounting quality and the cost of debt, the 
following regression is employed: 
Cost of Debt 
= β0 + β1SIZE + β2LEV + β3INTSAL + β4LOSS + β5∆EARN_POS + B6 
LIBOR + β7AQ + ε                                                                                      (13) 
 It is hypothesised that Operating Cash Flow Quality affects the cost of debt both 
directly and indirectly through accounting quality. To formally test this hypothesis, path 
analysis is required, involving decomposition of the incremental explanatory power. 
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Path analysis allows us to compare the magnitude of the direct effect of cash flow 
quality on the cost of debt and the indirect effect through accounting quality.  
 
6.7 Summary 
This chapter has explained the research data collection and investigated the research 
methodology of this study. The chapter has also discussed the criteria used to select the 
sample, and the final sample of the study. Furthermore, the chapter has explained the 
commercial data sets problems, including Thomson One Banker, and specifically the 
Worldscope, Thomson and Extel data platforms. The chapter has also discussed the 
econometric techniques that are employed in the empirical results section. These include 
Ordinary Least Square, pooled sample analysis, panel data analysis (the Fixed Effect 
Model and the Random Effect Model) and path analysis. In addition, the chapter has 
given a brief explanation of the models and the variables that are employed in the study. 
The next chapter, Chapter 7, investigates the empirical evidence of the determinants of 
cash flow management and the cost of debt in the UK and USA markets during the 
period 2000-2010. 
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Table 6.1  Enhancing downloaded data using backfilled accounting identities and other procedures 
  
Downloaded data Backfilled by 
deduction 
Obtained from source 
documents 
Corrections Enhanced data 
Downloaded  as 
values 
Downloaded as 
‗N/A‘  
Useable 
values 
Missing 
values 
Thomson Financial 
      TF.CashAndSTInvestments 15,070 5,670 0 69 14 15,139 5,601 
TF.TotalReceivables 14,856 5,884 0 74 20 14,930 5,810 
TF.TotalInventories 14,835 5,905 0 40 7 14,875 5,865 
TF.TotalCurrentAssets 11,184 9,556 3,896 46 18 15,126 5,614 
TF.TotalPropPlantEquipNet 12,953 7,787 0 48 16 13,001 7,739 
TF.TotalAssets 15,084 5,656 2 46 15 15,132 5,608 
TF.AccountsPayable 10,720 10,020 0 52 0 10,772 9,968 
TF.TotalCurrentLiabilities 11,186 9,554 1,779 42 13 13,007 7,733 
TF.TotalLiabilities 15,082 5,658 11 38 17 15,131 5,609 
TF.TotalCommonEquity 15,084 5,656 0 49 19 15,133 5,607 
TF.Sales 15,073 5,667 0 31 23 15,104 5,636 
TF.NetIncome 15,076 5,664 52 5 20 15,133 5,607 
Worldscope 
      WS.CashAndSTInvestments 15,164 5,576 4 2 1 15,170 5,570 
WS.TotalReceivables 15,012 5,728 0 3 0 15,015 5,725 
WS.TotalInventories 14,981 5,759 2 1 1 14,984 5,756 
WS.TotalCurrentAssets 11,265 9,475 3,900 2 0 15,167 5,573 
WS.TotalPropPlantEquipGross 11,722 9,018 40 1 1 11,763 8,977 
WS.TotalAssets 15,177 5,563 0 0 0 15,177 5,563 
WS.AccountsPayable 10,846 9,894 0 3 4 10,849 9,891 
WS.TotalCurrentLiabilities 11,267 9,473 1,736 1 0 13,004 7,736 
WS.TotalLiabilities 15,175 5,565 2 1 0 15,178 5,562 
WS.TotalCommonEquity 15,177 5,563 0 0 3 15,177 5,563 
WS.Sales 15,167 5,573 0 1 0 15,168 5,572 
WS.NetIncome 15,172 5,568 4 1 4 15,177 5,563 
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Table 6.2  
Sample construction: accounting-based cost of debt 
 
Panel A: Sample selection  
   
UK  USA 
Number  of firms Number of observations Number  of firms Number of observations 
          
Companies with reported financial statements (1998-2010) 2,968 19,603 4,103 44,517 
Less:     
 Firm-years with missing Interest Cost data, or Interest Cost equal to 0  -294 -3,181 -174 -6,889 
  Firm-years with missing Total Debt data    -150 -1,590 -84 -2,790 
  Studentised residuals greater than 2   -391 -3,124 -140 -4,961 
  Outlier truncation (±1%) -88 -613 -88 -1,527 
  Lag operation -346 -2,411 -254 -4,415 
Final sample   1,699 8,684 3,363 23,935 
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Panel B: The number of firm-year observations by industry and year 
by Industry: UK Sample 
 Oil and Gas Basic Materials Industrial Consumer Goods Consumer Services Telecoms Utilities Technology Others 
2000 16 30 219 78 135 7 13 53 243 
2001 15 28 230 78 147 8 12 64 204 
2002 14 28 242 80 166 11 12 72 165 
2003 17 31 261 80 196 13 12 76 120 
2004 21 35 276 88 199 13 13 75 61 
2005 21 37 281 85 198 14 13 73 47 
2006 21 36 269 88 197 14 14 70 64 
2007 24 38 270 84 179 13 13 72 73 
2008 28 42 258 80 169 15 15 73 89 
2009 33 44 258 73 153 13 16 73 90 
2010 10 24 145 48 108 10 12 44 59 
Total 220 373 2,709 862 1,847 131 145 745 1,215 
Others‘ in the last column report all firms with missing ICB 
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Panel C: The number of firm-year observations by industry and year (continued) 
          by Industry: USA Sample          
Year Oil and Gas  Basic Materials  Industrial Consumer Goods Health Care Consumer Services Telecoms Utilities Technology Others 
2000 107 100 435 233 224 274 29 90 213 139 
2001 111 104 455 246 233 292 30 94 236 152 
2002 119 110 465 254 246 310 32 95 262 164 
2003 133 120 471 259 269 333 34 99 263 171 
2004 135 124 477 256 276 331 35 100 254 187 
2005 143 124 484 258 275 344 35 100 243 223 
2006 148 125 496 260 276 347 34 101 252 257 
2007 158 137 523 271 286 342 34 103 265 296 
2008 165 138 534 279 304 363 38 103 291 336 
2009 167 141 561 281 314 380 40 104 296 363 
2010 110 101 362 192 181 220 20 81 190 159 
Total 1,496 1,324 5,263 2,789 2,884 3,536 361 1,070 2,765 2,447 
Others‘ in the last column report all firms with missing ICB 
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Table 6.3 
 Sample construction: market-based cost of debt  
 
 
Number of  
issuers  
Number of   
firm-years  
Full sample  2,089  3,055  
Identifiable public  companies  378 821 
After excluding financial companies  166 428 
Matched with company financial statement data  143 335 
After excluding issues without fixed coupon rates  82 194 
The sample comprises 194 firm-year observations from 1998 to 2009: data from bond issues file 
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Table 6.4 
 Estimation of abnormal operating cash flow   
 UK  USA  
 Mean Median  Mean Median  
Intercept 0.029 0.051  0.010 0.022  
1/TA -724,108 -67,2811  -288,785 -212,532  
REV/TA 0.057 0.049  0.043 0.033  
ΔREV/TA 0.007 0.051  -0.014 -0.015  
Adj R-Squared 0.462 0.415  0.269 0.263  
The table reports the mean and median parameter estimates and adjusted R-squared across industries, based on the original samples of 7,548 UK and 21,119 USA firm-year 
observations during 1998-2009. The estimates presented are for the regression Equation: OCFt/TAt = β1(1/ TAt) + β2(REVt/TAt) + β3(∆REVt/TAt) + εt , where: TAt is the Total 
Assets at the end of period t, REVt  the Sales Revenues during period t and  ∆REVt= REVt - REVt-1 
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Table 6.5 
 Definitions of test variables and expected signs of regression coefficients 
Variable  Expected 
Sign 
Definition  Similarly defined in 
prior research 
Cost  of  Debt (COD)  Firm j‘s interest cost at t ’ Average short- and long-term debt plus capitalised 
lease obligations (i.e. average of opening and closing balance sheet amounts) 
Francis et al (2005: 307) 
Nikolaev & Van Lent 
(2005:695) 
Mansi et al (2009 :707) 
Natural logarithm of Total Assets (SIZE)  - Natural logarithm of Total Assets for firm j at t-1 Nikolaev & Van Lent 
(2005: 695) 
Jiang (2008: 384) 
Mansi et al (2009: 707) 
Leverage (LEV) + Long-term debt  at t-1 ÷ Total Assets at t-1 Nikolaev & Van Lent 
(2005: 695) 
Francis et al (2005: 307) 
Jiang (2008: 384) 
Mansi et al (2009: 707)  
Interest to Sales (INTSAL) + Interest cost ÷ Sales Revenues  Nikolaev &  Van Lent 
(2005: 695), 
Negative earnings (LOSS) + Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm has negative earnings before interest and 
tax, and 0 otherwise  
Nikolaev & Van lent 
(2005: 715) 
Increase in earnings (∆EARN_POS) - Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm increased earnings before interest and 
tax from the prior year, and 0 otherwise 
  
EARN_LOW + Deciles 1-3 of earnings before interest and tax  
EARN_HI - Deciles 7-10 of earnings before interest and tax  
Operating Cash Flow (OCF) - Total reported operating cash flow at year t deflated by total assets at year t-1 Francis et al (2005:302)   
Jiang (2008:384) 
OCF_LOW + Deciles 1-3 of deflated operating cash flow   
OCF_HI - Deciles 7-10 of deflated operating cash flow   
Monthly money market reference rate (LIBOR) + London Inter Bank Offered Rates at year t-1  Valta (2010:13) 
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Appendix A: Roychowdhury’s synthesis of models of accruals and cash flows  
Dechow et al (1998) present a model that relates the earnings of a company to its cash 
flows and accruals. They make some simplifying assumptions: absent manipulation, 
sales follow a random walk, accounts receivables at the end of the year are a constant 
fraction of the current year‘s sales, target inventories at the end of the year are a 
constant fraction of next period forecasted cost of sales, accounts payable are a constant 
percentage of the firm‘s purchases during the year and there are no fixed costs. Note 
that these are the same assumptions underlying the Jones (1991) model of non-
discretionary accruals. Earnings can be represented as 
Et = π St,                                                                                                                      (A.1) 
where π is the profit margin, Et is earnings for period t and St is sales for period t. 
Dechow et al (1998) presume the following about current asset items. 
Accounts receivables, ARt, are given by a constant fraction α of sales in period t. 
ARt = α St. 
Target inventory is a constant fraction, γ1, of the next period‘s forecasted cost of 
sales. Under the assumptions that sales follow a random walk, target inventory at end of 
period t is γ1(1-π)St, γ1>0. Actual inventory deviates from target inventory because of 
sales realisations in period t different from what was expected for period t, and it can be 
shown that the deviation is given by γ2 γ1 (1- π)(St - St_1), where γ2 is a constant that 
captures the speed with which a firm adjusts its inventory to its target level. So, actual 
inventory at the end of period t is given by 
INVt = γ1 (1- π) St - γ2 γ1 (1- π) (St - St_1). 
Purchases are calculated as (cost of goods sold + closing inventory - opening 
inventory). Accounts payable at the end of period t are a constant fraction b of that 
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amount. Working capital is defined as (accounts receivable + inventory - accounts 
payable). The change in working capital in period t gives the accruals for period t, At. 
 
(A.2) 
where a is the constant percentage of accounts receivables to sales, b the constant 
percentage of accounts payable to purchases, γ1 the constant percentage of target 
inventory to expected cost of sales next period, γ2 a constant that represents the speed at 
which the firm adjusts inventory, εt = St – St-1, Δ is the first difference operator. 
Dechow et al (1998) further simplify this expression by noting that the second and the 
third terms are likely to be negligible in practice and denoting [α + (1- π) γ1 – (1- π)β] by 
Δ. Essentially, Δ is a measure of the operating cash cycle and accruals in this model 
would be the operating cash cycle times the change in sales, or the sales shock, given 
last period‘s expectation. 
After this simplification, accruals are given by 
At = Δεt 
This is the basic underlying equation for the Jones (1991) model for determining normal 
working capital accruals. To estimate normal depreciation accruals, Jones (1991) also 
includes property, plant and equipment as an explanatory variable. 
Cash flows from operations, CFOt, is then given by 
CFOt = Et - At = πSt – ðεt = πSt – ð (St – St-1).                                                             (A.3) 
The above Equation expresses cash flows as a function of current-period sales 
and last period sales. This is the Equation used in the subsequent regressions. The 
estimation Equation does not change much in the presence of fixed costs. Equation (3) 
is augmented by another term, the change in outflow on fixed costs, assuming that fixed 
expenses are paid in cash. Incorporating this into the equation would make the model 
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for normal cash flows more powerful, but this term is omitted for the sake of simplicity. 
Besides, in the estimation of abnormal cash flow from operations, other variables 
included are industry membership, size and the market-to-book ratio. To the extent that 
operating leverage is likely to be correlated with these variables, a control is added for 
the effect of fixed costs. 
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Chapter 7 
Analysis and Results 
7.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter explained the research methodology of this study and also 
discussed the analysis of the results. Furthermore, the chapter discussed the econometric 
techniques that were employed in the empirical results section. These include the 
Ordinary Least Squares, pooled sample analysis, panel data analysis (the Fixed Effect 
Model and the Random Effect Model) and path analysis. Finally, the chapter gave a 
brief explanation of the models and the variables that are employed in the study. 
The aim of this chapter is to investigate the effects of cash flow management on 
the cost of debt. The chapter is organised as follows: Section 7.2 explains the 
descriptive statistics; Section 7.3 discusses the results of testing obtained from 
estimating the models; Section 7.4 Model extensions and Section 7.5 include Sensitivity 
analysis. 
 
7.2 Descriptive statistics 
UK sample  
Table 7.1 Panel A presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the models 
for the UK. The average (median) value of our cost-of-debt capital for the UK sample is 
8.20 (7.04) with a standard deviation of 4.75, which is similar to the findings in 
Sengupta (1998) and Nikolaev and Van Lent (2005). Inter quartiles for cost of debt is 
changed from 5.53 to 9.23. The average (median) for OCF (deflated by total assets) is 
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0.040 (0.070). With 0.17 standard deviation, the inter quartile changes from 0.01 to 
0.12. For a normal component of OCF the average is 0.050 (SD 0.13; IQR 0.03: 0.90). 
The average of abnormal OCF (deflated by total assets) is -0.10 (SD 0.15; IQR -0.05 : 
0.06)
27
, and for abnormal OCF (absolute deflated by total assets) the mean is also 0.09 
(SD 0.12; IQR 0.02 : 0.12), with the spread suggesting that our sample firms exhibit 
considerably varying degrees of operating cash flow manipulation.  
As can be seen in Table 7.1, SIZE with an average of 18.43 and 2.29 standard 
deviations changes from 16.95 across the inter quintile.  
The average for LEV is 0.24 (SD 0.18; IQR 0.1: 0.34), which suggests that the 
UK companies are more equity based. For INTSAL (interest to sales), instead of using 
operating income before taxes to interest expenses, interest expense deflated by 
revenues is used as a proxy for debt financing. This measure avoids problems associated 
with loss firms, which is expressed here as the reciprocal of interest cover (interest 
expense divided by operating income). The average for INTSAL is 0.04 and the IQR is 
0.010: 0.032. Table 7.1 also reports that the numbers are highly skewed and peaked. It 
should be noted however that such skewness and kurtosis is attributable to the nature of 
accounting data. 
USA sample  
As can be seen in Table 7.1 Panel B, the summary statistics for US companies have 
been presented. Mean, standard deviation, 25
th
 percentile, median, 75
th
 percentile and 
skewness, kurtosis are the detectors used in the presented table. The average (median) 
value of our dependent variable of cost-of-debt capital is 8.14 (6.96) with a standard 
                                                          
27
 The average of abnormal operating cash flow (deflated by total assets) is -0.01 (SD 0.17; IQR -0.05 : 
0.06). 
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deviation of 4.83 (IQR 5.41: 9.12), which is also similar to the findings in Sengupta 
(1998) and Nikolaev and Van Lent (2005). Pittman and Fortin (2004) report 0.093 
(N=3,339) average for interest rate and Francis et al (2005), with a sample of 91,280 
firm-year observations over 1970-2001, report cost of debt with a mean (median) of 
9.9% (9.2%), with 80% of the sample having a cost of debt between 5.9% and 14.4%. 
With a standard deviation of 0.23, the average for scaled OCF is 0.04, and it changes 
from 0.02 to 0.13 between the first and third inter quartiles. Panel B shows the normal 
component of OCF as 0.03 for average and 0.18 for standard deviation and inter quartile 
from 0.01 to 0.08. For the abnormal component of OCF the mean is 0.01 (SD 0.24; IQR 
-0.04: 0.09), with the spread suggesting that our sample firms exhibit considerably 
varying degrees of OCF manipulation. The average of abnormal OCF (absolute deflated 
by total assets) is 0.12 with 0.20 standard deviation and changes in first and third inters 
quartile from 0.03 to 0.13. 
The average (median) for SIZE is 19.44 (19.69) (SD 0.71; IQR 0.14: 0.044). The 
average for LEV is 0.33, (SD 0.28; IQR 0.14: 0.43) and for INTSAL (interest to sales) 
the average (median) is 0.070 (0.02). Panel B also reports the skewness and kurtosis of 
variables. Again, these levels of high skewness and kurtosis in the above characteristics 
are due to the fact of nature of accounting data. 
UK vs US  
Table 7.2 reports the comparison firm characteristics between the UK and the USA. 
With respect to the first item, which is cost of debt, the mean for the US companies is 
almost the same as for the UK companies, which are 8.140 and 8.200 respectively. In 
addition to the mean statistic, another factor, median, also performs almost the same, as 
it is marginally lower for the US companies in comparison to the UK ones, which are 
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6.96 and 7.04 respectively. Drawing a comparison between the standard deviation of the 
two groups of companies, this implies a slightly more volatile situation for the US 
companies in comparison to the UK companies. The values for standard deviations are 
4.83 and 4.75 respectively. The average for the second item, OCF, for both samples is 
the same (0.04), while the median for the US is more than for the UK (0.08 and 0.07 
respectively), which also shows OCF for the US companies is more volatile than for the 
UK (SD 0.23 vs.  0.17). Drawing a comparison between the normal and abnormal OCF 
of these two groups of companies implies more degrees of OCF manipulation for the 
US companies in comparison to the UK companies (0.03, 0.05 average of NOR_OCF 
and 0.12, 0.09 average of |ABN_OCF| , for the US and the UK respectively). 
The comparison between the natural logarithm of total assets for UK and US 
firms shows that US firms are comparatively larger then UK firms (19.44, 18.43 
average of SIZE for the US and the UK respectively). The mean LEV of US firms is 
0.33 and 0.24 for UK firms, which suggests that the US companies used debt more than 
the UK ones.
28
The mean of INTSAL for the UK firms (0.04) is significantly lower than 
the mean for US firms (0.07). Means for the dummy variables, negative earnings and 
changes in earnings are almost identical for US and UK firms and are not significantly 
different.     
Pearson correlations; UK sample  
Table 7.3 reports the Pearson correlations and their significance levels (in italics) 
between the selected variables for the UK (below diagonal) and for the US (above 
diagonal). 
                                                          
28
 Francis et al (2005) report leverage with a mean of 0.276. 
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A preliminary indication of the association between ABN_OCF and the cost of 
debt measures for UK firms can be obtained by looking at the simple (Pearson) 
correlations between variables presented in the below diagonal in Table 7.3 The table 
reveals that the cost of debt is positively and significantly associated with ABN_OCF 
(the proxy for the managed component) at the 0.01 level, which means that the market 
punishes companies with higher cash flow management by greater cost of debt. Panel A 
Figure 7.1 plots the mean and the median values of cost of debt by the ABN_OCF 
deciles. There is a strong monotonic increasing pattern for the cost of debt across the 
deciles of the ABN_OCF. To provide evidence of the trend and variability in the cost of 
debt across the ABN_OCF deciles, the study also plots the mean in Panel B of Figure 
7.1, plus or minus one standard deviation. Interestingly, the variance of each cost of 
debt increases with the magnitude of the ABN_OCF. This pattern is consistent with 
increased costs of debt for companies with more managed operating cash flows. 
Table 7.3 (below diagonal) also reports that the cost of debt is negatively and 
significantly associated with NOR-OCF (the proxy for the unmanaged component). As 
expected, the cost of debt is negatively and significantly associated with SIZE, which is 
a similar to finding to that reported in prior studies (e.g. Pitman and Fortin, 2004; 
Anderson et al, 2004; Anderson and Mansi, 2009; Subramanyam et al, 2010 and Shaw, 
2011) and positively correlated with LOSS and LIBOR. However, for the correlation 
between cost of debt with INTSAL and LEV, the signs are surprisingly negative when in 
effect we would expect it to be positive. In fact, there is already contradictory evidence 
in this respect. Whilst most prior research (e.g. Sengupta 1998; Ahmed et al. 2002; 
Anderson et al. 2004; Jiang, 2008; Anderson and Mansi, 2009) find a positive relation 
between LEV and COD, the work of Pittman and Fortin (2004), Francis et al. (2005) 
and Pizzo et al. (2009) has also found, as here, that LEV may be negatively related to 
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COD. Analysing the correlations among the operating cash flow component proxies 
reveals that the correlation coefficient between ABN_OCF and NOR-OCF is negative 
and significant. The other variables with the highest negative correlation with 
ABN_OCF are SIZE (-0.391, p-value <0.001) and LOSS (0.193, p-value <0.001).  
SIZE has a positive correlation with NOR_OCF (0.495, p-value <0.001) while it 
has a negative correlation with ABN_OCF (-0.346 p-value <0.000). Correlations 
between SIZE and LOSS are also relatively high (-0.309, p-value <0.001). This high 
correlation between accounting-based control variables is consistent with prior studies 
on the cost of debt (Sengupta, 1998; Pittman and Fortin, 2004; Dhaliwal et al, 2004; 
Jiang, 2008). Nevertheless, whilst the correlation between LEV and INTSAL is also 
relatively high at 0.382, it may be noted that LEV shows low association with other 
variables.  
Pearson correlations; USA sample  
Table 7.3 (above diagonal) reports Pearson correlations between the selected variables 
and their p-values for US companies. Here the cost of debt is significantly associated 
with all control variables and has the same sign as predicted. As predicted, the cost of 
debt is positively and significantly associated with ABN_OCF (the proxy for the 
managed component), which implies that the market punishes companies with higher 
cash flow management by higher cost of debt. Panel C Figure 7.1 plots the mean and 
the median values of cost of debt by the ABN_OCF deciles. There is a strong monotonic 
increasing pattern for the cost of debt across the deciles of the ABN_OCF. To provide 
evidence on the shape of the distribution of each cost of debt across the ABN_OCF 
deciles, we also plot the mean plus or minus one standard deviation in Panel D of Figure 
7.1 Interestingly again the variance of each cost of debt increases with the magnitude of 
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the ABN_OCF. This pattern is consistent with increased costs of debt for companies 
with more managed OCF. 
Table 7.3 (above diagonal) also reports that the cost of debt is negatively and 
significantly associated with NOR-OCF (the proxy for the unmanaged component). The 
other control variables are significant and have the same sign as the predicted 
correlation with the cost of debt. 
ABN_OCF is negatively associated with NOR-OCF. The variable with highest 
correlation with SIZE is LOSS (-0.362, p-value <0.001). Correlations across most other 
variables are relatively low. Again, the high correlation among control variables is 
consistent with prior studies on the cost of debt (Sengupta, 1998; Pittman and Fortin, 
2004; Dhaliwal et al, 2004; Jiang, 2008). 
Moreover, firm characteristics are examined here across the deciles of abnormal 
cash flows, with the expectation of finding systematic difference in firm characteristics 
across the deciles. A two-sample t-test is also performed with respect to the null 
hypothesis that the difference in firm characteristics between deciles one and ten is zero, 
against the alternate hypothesis that the difference is not equal to zero. The results are 
reported in Table 7.4.  
It is found that the cost of debt significantly increases as the abnormal OCF 
increases for both UK (2.58 increase) and USA (5.59 increase) samples. Size 
monotonically decreases as the abnormal OCF increases for both UK (-3.02) and USA 
(-3.91) firms. This suggests the cash flows are managed in small companies more than 
in larger companies. The rate of interest to sales decreases as the abnormal OCF 
increases; however the differences are only marginally significant in both samples. LEV 
between deciles of abnormal OCF for the UK companies does not seem to be 
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economically different, but for the USA firms, changes in LEV across the deciles of 
abnormal cash flows significantly increases as the abnormal operating cash flows 
increase. 
 
7.3 Model Estimation  
Results of the regression models 
The study starts with the estimation of Equations 3 - 6 by pooling the sample for the 
period 2000-2010 (pooling time-series and cross-sectional data). In the case of pooling 
the sample, we assume that intercept and slope coefficients are constant across time and 
firms, and the error term captures differences over time and firms (Gujarati, 2003). 
Gujarati argues that the assumptions of the pooled sample that the intercept and the 
slope coefficients are constant across time and firms and that the error term captures 
differences over time are highly restrictive. Therefore, despite its simplicity, the pooled 
regression model may distort the true picture of the relationship between the dependent 
and independent variables. In this section we also investigate whether using panel data 
analysis is better than pooling the data. Furthermore, the study aims to investigate 
whether the Fixed Effects Model or the Random Effects Model is more suitable. 
Table 7.5 reports the main regression results (OLS) and contains the findings for 
the fixed effects estimation of the model
29
 developed on 7,548 and 21,119 observations 
for the UK and USA firms respectively on both the baseline model, including total 
operating cash flows and OCF, and on the components of OCF shown in Equations (3), 
(4), (5) and (6). 
                                                          
29
 The Fixed Effects and Random Effects Models also produce unbiased standard errors, but only when 
the firm effect is permanent. 
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Results of the regression models – UK sample 
Table 7.5 shows (Equation 3) for UK firms, OCF is negative and significant (coeff. = -
1.433, t-stat. = -4.23, p-value <0.001). The next column (Equation 4) has only included 
ABN_OCF (absolute) for testing the relation between cost of debt and cash flow quality; 
as is expected, the coefficient on ABN_OCF (absolute) is positive (5.474, t-statistic = 
12.80, p-value <0.001) but with a very low adjusted R-Squared (1.84%). A positive 
relationship is consistent with the view that cost of debt increases with cash flow 
manipulation. More formally, the null hypothesis (H1) that managed OCF has no 
association with the cost of debt is rejected for the UK sample. Because OCF has been 
divided into managed and unmanaged, the next column includes ABN_OCF and 
NOR_OCF. Compared with Equation (4), the magnitude of the coefficients for 
ABN_OCF in Equation (5) remains the same (5.507, t-statistic = 11.85, p-value <0.001), 
but the coefficient on    NOR_OCF is not significant. Further, adjusted R-Squared in the 
regression model which includes one more variable does not marginally change. 
 As mentioned above, results from the reduced model excluding control 
variables might be overstated because they do not account for the other factors that 
explain the variation in earnings quality. Therefore, a number of other factors associated 
with the cost of debt are included, as in  Sengupta (1998), Shi (2003), Anderson et al 
(2004), Pittman and Fortin (2004), Mansi et al (2004), Nikolaev and Van Lent (2005), 
Francis et al (2005), Jiang (2008), Mansi et al (2009) and Ghosh and Moon (2010). 
These include: SIZE, since previous studies find a significant association between the 
COD and the SIZE of the firm, with larger firms being perceived to have lower default 
risks and therefore expected to incur lower COD (Carey et al, 1993); LEV controls for 
default risk, a higher debt ratio indicating a greater risk of default; and INTSAL, the 
159 
 
 
 
interest cover ratio that is frequently used to measure a firm‘s ability to pay its interest 
obligations. For macroeconomic control, the study also uses LIBOR as a control 
variable. Finally, two earnings benchmarks are included to control for achieving 
earnings targets in order to isolate the association of operating cash flow information 
and the cost of debt (LOSS is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm‘s earnings are 
negative and zero otherwise, and ∆EARN_POS is a second indicator variable equal to 1 
if the firm records a positive increase in earnings and zero otherwise). For Equation (6), 
including all control variable for UK firms, the two components of OCF are positive 
and significant (3.683, t-statistic = 8.08, p-value <0.001 and 2.857, t-statistic = 4.89, p-
value <0.001 for ABN_OCF and NOR_OCF respectively). Although the coefficients are 
similar, the unmanaged component of OCF does have a lower positive coefficient. This 
is consistent with the debt market relatively discounting the cash flow information in the 
managed component. 
Results for the control variables are consistent with findings in earlier studies 
and with our expectations, except for ∆EARN_POS  the sign is surprisingly positive 
although predicted to be negative and LEV: surprisingly again  the sign is negative 
when in effect it is expected to  be positive. Prior research using either the credit rating 
spread or initial bond yield spread to proxy for cost of debt (e.g. Sengupta, 1998; 
Ahmed et al, 2002; Anderson et al, 2004: Jiang, 2008) generally finds a positive relation 
between LEV and COD. However research on the relation between the realised COD 
and LEV includes Pittman and Fortin (2004), who argue that realised debt cost is a noisy 
proxy for the underlying construct. Francis et al (2005) and Pizzo et al (2009) find COD 
negatively related to LEV. The negative coefficient on LEV suggests the possibility that 
firms with little debt in their capital structures are minimally levered because they face a 
high cost of debt. Francise et al (2005) for solving this problems excludes firms with 
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debt less than 20% of assets, however the thesis re-estimates the model after excluding 
firms with low debt (firms with LEV less than 25%) financing. Nevertheless the 
research sample reduces from 8,684 to 3,674, Apendex B shows the coefficient on LEV 
becomes significantly positive, and does not affect inferences about other variables 
except ∆EARN_POS that becomes insignificant. 
Further, by including control variables, the explanatory power jumps 
substantially; an adjusted R-Squared increases to 10.45 per cent for Equation (6) from 
1.84 per cent in Equations (4) and (5).  
The study also estimates models used in Equation (6), but this time using panel 
data analyses rather than the pooled sample. Table 7.5 (fixed effects column) contains 
the findings for the fixed effects estimation of the model
30
 for UK firms.  These 
regressions attempt to simultaneously control for firm-specific heterogeneity bias and 
for endogeneity caused by omitted variables. The findings are consistent throughout the 
table. Cost of debt is positively and significantly associated with ABN_OCF (coeff. 
1.008, t-stat. 2.01, p-value 0.04). NOR_OCF is also positive and significant. These 
results support the finding with the OLS regression results in Equation (6). The random 
effects estimator is another econometric method for panel data. This method assumes 
that the individual level effects and not correlated with the independent variables. When 
the random effects assumption is satisfied, the random effects model is more efficient 
than the fixed effects model and should be used.  Housman‘s test is used to evaluate 
whether a fixed effects or random effects model is appropriate. When the test is 
reflected, the random effects model is biased and the correct estimation model is the 
fixed effects model. The result of Housman test shows the fixed effects is suitable.    
                                                          
30
 The Fixed Effects and Random Effects Models also produce unbiased standard errors, but only when 
the firm effect is permanent. 
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Results of the regression models – USA sample 
Table 7.5, also represents the empirical results of the regression analysis base on 
Equations (3) to (6) for the USA companies (21,119 observations).Here also for 
Equation (3), OCF has negative and significant (coeff.= -2.846, t-stat.= -19.09, p-value 
<0.001) correlation with the cost of debt. First in next column (Equation 4) we only 
include ABN_OCF (absolute) for testing the relation between cost of debt and cash flow 
quality; as predicted, the coefficient on ABN_OCF(absolute) is positive (5.337, t-
statistic = 35.93, p-value <0.001) with 5.11 per cent adjusted R-squared. This finding of 
a positive relationship between managed OCF and COD indicates that the cost of debt 
increases with cash flow manipulation. That is, the null hypothesis (H1) that managed 
OCF has no association with the cost of debt is rejected for the USA sample, as also 
found above for the UK sample. In the next column (Eq.5) we include ABN_OCF and 
NOR_OCF. Compared with the result of Equations (4), with almost the same magnitude 
of the coefficients, ABN_OCF is positive and significant (5.588, t-statistic = 30.31, p-
value <0.001), although the coefficient on NOR_OCF is positive but does have a very 
low t-test and magnitude coefficient (0.474, t-statistic = 2.30, p-value 0.022). This is 
also consistent with the debt market comparatively discounting the cash flow 
information in the managed component. 
As mentioned above (Results of the regression models – UK sample) we include 
a number of other factors associated with the cost of debt. For Equation (6), including 
all control variables for US firms, the two components of OCF are positive and 
significant (2.959, t-statistic = 16.86, p-value <0.001 and 1.561, t-statistic = 8.11, p-
value <0.001 for ABN_OCF and NOR_OCF respectively). Again, although the 
coefficients are similar, the unmanaged component of OCF does have a lower positive 
coefficient. This is consistent with the US debt market also relatively discounting the 
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cash flow information in the managed component. The control variables are generally 
significant and have the same sign as predicted, but in the predicted direction for LEV, 
the sign is surprisingly negative when in effect should be positive , and the sign for 
∆EARN_POS is also positive when it should be negative. Again the negative coefficient 
on LEV suggests the possibility that firms with little debt in their capital structures are 
minimally levered because they face a high cost of debt. To explore this possibility, the 
thesis re-estimates the model after excluding firms with low debt (firms with LEV less 
than 10%) financing. Despite the research sample reduces from 23,935 to 19,653, 
Apendex B shows with 25% adjusted R-Squared the coefficient on LEV becomes 
significantly positive, and does not affect inferences about other variables. Together the 
independent variables have a good explanatory power; the adjusted R-squared is about 
17.46 per cent. 
In the last column, for the USA sample fixed effects (the result of Housman test 
shows the fixed effects is suitable)
31 
regression also shows that the cost of debt is 
positively associated with both ABN_OCF and NOR_OCF. 
 
7.4 Model extended  
In order to control the effect of macroeconomic factors on the cost of debt, in addition 
the study uses adjusted dependent variables instead of the cost of debt. LIBOR has been 
deducted from COD and the new dependent variable denoted as COD_LIB. Table 7.6 
shows the regression results for the Equations 3 to 6 using COD_LIB as a dependent 
variable. Overall the results are the same as those of our main findings in the previous 
section. 
                                                          
31
 Random effects estimate results are available from the authors upon request. 
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7.5 Sensitivity analysis 
Alternative Research Design  
In order to examine whether the market distinguishes between overstating and 
understating OCF, the full samples have been partitioned based on positive and negative 
abnormal OCF. Table 7.7 represents the results for disaggregating abnormal OCF to 
positive (overstating) and negative (understating) for UK and USA companies.For the 
UK Column 1 reports the regression results for 4,506 overstated operating cash flows‘ 
firms‘ year observations. The ABN_OCF is positive and significant (2.433, t-statistic = 
4.07, p-value 0.001), while NOR_OCF is insignificant. For the USA Column 2 gives the 
regression results for 14,849 US overstated ABN_OCF companies (over 60%). The 
result shows that with almost 14.5 per cent R-squared, ABN_OCF and NOR_OCF are 
positive and significant (1.575, t-statistic = 5.12, p-value <0.001 and (0.939, t-statistic = 
3.36, p-value <0.001 respectively). This is consistent with the findings in the main 
regression models, and implies the debt market (both UK and US) can identify the 
managed component of OCF and price the information differently from the unmanaged 
component.  
Table 7.7 also presents the results of underestimating OCF for both samples 
(4,506 and 9,086 firm years for the UK and the USA respectively). ABN_OCF for both 
samples is positive and significant (3.793, t-statistic = 5.12, p-value <0.001 and 3.323, t-
statistic = 13.40, p-value <0.001 respectively). The control variables are generally 
significant and have the same sign as predicted, but in the predicted direction for LEV 
and ∆EARN [±] the signs are surprisingly negative when in effect should be positive.  
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Table 7.8 presents regression results for the UK and US samples for H2, 
assessing whether firms with financial problems are likely to exhibit more pronounced 
associations between managed OCF and COD, testing more precisely whether managed 
operating cash flows are conditioned on losses, low cash flows and low earnings levels. 
Table 7.8 shows for the UK sample, ABN_OCF and NOR_OCF are positive and 
significant (coeff.2.993, T-test=4.15, p-value <0.001, coeff.2.131, T-test=14.66, p-value 
<0.001). LOSS, a dummy variable for companies with negative earnings (a proxy for 
financial distressed firms), is positive and significant, but ABN_OCF *LOSS is not 
economically significant. Consequently the first part of the second hypothesis (H2) – 
that managed OCF has an incremental positive association with the cost of debt when 
firms report losses – is rejected for the UK sample. Equation 9 (UK sample) examines 
managed operating cash flows, conditioned on low cash flow levels. The results show 
that ABN_OCF*OCFLOW (interaction variable) has a more positive magnitude of the 
coefficients than ABN_OCF (coeff. 3.871, 2.683 respectively). Given it is significantly 
associated with the cost of debt, means the financial problems firms (low cash flow 
levels) face more cost of debt with overstating operating cash flows, when conditioned 
on measures of financial problems. Therefore the second part of the hypothesis (H2) – 
that managed OCF has an incremental positive association with the cost of debt when 
firms have low levels of cash flow – is accepted for the UK sample. 
 Equation 3 (UK firms) shows the result of examining managed OCF 
conditioned for firms that face low and high cash flow and earnings levels at the same 
time. The results show that firms with low cash flow levels face greater costs of debt 
when overstating operating cash flows than firms with high cash flow levels. However, 
earnings levels and also interaction variables are not significant. As a result, the third 
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part of the hypothesis (H2) – that managed OCF has an incremental positive association 
with the cost of debt when firms have low levels of both cash flow and earnings at the 
same time – is rejected for the UK sample. Table 7.8 also reports the regression results 
for Equations 8, 9 and 10 for the USA companies. ABN_OCF and NOR_OCF in 
Equation 8 are positive and significant (coeff. 2.663, T-test=14.66, p-value <0.001 and 
coeff. 1.725, T-test=8.89, p-value <0.001), which is the same as the results for the UK 
companies. LOSS is positively and significantly associated with the cost of debt. The 
coefficient for ABN_OCF *LOSS is positive and significant, but the coefficient is less 
than coefficient of ABN_OCF. Consequently, for the USA sample as well, this finding 
does not support the first part of the proposed hypothesis that managed OCF has an 
incremental positive association with the cost of debt when firms report losses. 
Consistent with Minton and Schrand (1999), OCF_LOW (low cash flow levels) is 
positive and significant indicating that when cash flow levels are low, firms incur higher 
costs of debt (coeff. 0.270, T-test=3.41, p-value 0.001). The coefficient for 
ABN_OCF*OCFLOW interaction variables in Equation 9 is less than ABN_OCF, but 
has significance associated with the cost of debt,  so it can be stated that the second part 
of the hypothesis 2 – that managed OCF has an incremental positive association with 
the cost of debt when firms have low levels of cash flow – is rejected for the USA 
sample, consistent with the results obtained with the UK sample. The last column 
(Equation 10) shows the results for combined cash flow and earnings levels. 
ABN_OCF*OCFLOW, with almost twice the magnitude of the coefficients then 
ABN_OCF is positive and significant (coeff. 3.700, T-test=5.99, p-value <0.001). 
However, ABNOR*EARNLOW and ABNOR*OCFLOW*EARNLOW are surprisingly 
negative and significant. Hence the third part of the hypothesis (H2) – that managed 
OCF has an incremental positive association with the cost of debt when firms have low 
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levels of both cash flow and earnings at the same time –  is also rejected for the USA 
sample. 
Further Analysis 
In this section the study examines whether accounting quality differs with managed 
OCF. No tabulated results show that better OCF quality (less managed) for both 
samples (UK and USA) associated with higher accounting quality. Based on the 
findings, it can be concluded that null hypothesis (H3) – that managed OCF has no 
association with accounting quality – is rejected.  Following prior research, the relation 
is examined between accounting quality and the cost of debt. The results (untabulated) 
are consistent for both samples (UK and USA), with prior studies indicating that better 
accounting quality is associated with a lower cost of debt (see for example Francis et al, 
2005 ; Subramanyam et al, 2010). 
According to the regression results in the two prior paragraphs, the study 
hypothesise that cash flow management (hereafter cash flow quality) affects the cost of 
debt both directly and indirectly. For testing this hypothesis, path analysis has been 
used. As mentioned before (Chapter 6 Section 6.6.3), path analysis allows us to 
compare the magnitude of the direct effect of cash flow quality on the cost of debt, and 
the indirect effect through accounting quality effects. Path analysis is used to obtain the 
total effect of cash flow quality on the cost of debt. The total effect informs us how 
much the cost of debt changes as a result of changes in cash flow quality. Table 7.9 
reports that the direct coefficient of OCF quality on the cast of debt for UK firms is -
0.155, and with accounting quality it is 0.193. The direct coefficient of accounting 
quality and cost of debt is -0.105 and the indirect effect of OCF quality, and the cost of 
debt, is -0.03 (0.193 * -0.155). The significant total effect (indirect and indirect) of OCF 
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quality on the cost of debt is -0.135(-0.030+ (-0.105)). Table 7.9 also reports that the 
direct coefficient of operating cash flow quality on the cost of debt for the USA sample 
is -0.014, and with accounting quality it is 0.194; the direct coefficient of accounting 
quality and the cost of debt is -0.158; so the indirect effect of operating cash flow 
quality and the cost of debt is very low: -0.003(0.194* -0.014). The significant total 
effect (indirect and indirect) of operating cash flow quality on the cost of debt is -0.161 
(-0.003+ (-0.158)). Based on above findings the fourth hypothesis which is managed 
OCF is associated with the cost of debt both (a) directly, and (b) indirectly through 
decreased accounting quality is accepted. 
The study also did some more robustness tests. First, in order to measure the 
effect of industry classification, the regression is run for each industry group; the result 
did not provide any additional insights into the pricing of managed operating cash 
flows. 
Second, the study examines the association between managed operating cash 
flows and ex ante costs of debt, using yield as a dependent variable for the UK 
sample.
32
 The sample size for these tests is small (including 194 firm-year observations 
from 1998 to 2009: data from bond issues files). As mentioned in Chapter 6, the 
relatively small sample size is mostly due to the fact that there are fewer firms with 
publicly traded bonds and is consistent with the literature analysing corporate bonds. 
Consistent with the results for the realised cost of debt, the regression results (Table 
7.10) are not statistically significant.  
Third, for controlling the mergers and acquisitions effects on the results, the 
study using the same sampling process, observations with 50% or more increase or 33% 
                                                          
32
 We have some limitations in accessing bond data bases, so I have been not able to carry out checks 
with USA bond market data. 
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or more decrease in total assets (Finger, 1994) have been dropped. Despite the research 
samples reduces from 8,684 to 7,703 for the UK and from 23,935 to 21,610 for the USA 
the results consistent of the regression estimations for both sample (Table 7.11). 
Forth, according to differents method for outlier test, mentionented in Section 
6.3 in Chapter 6, the study includes the Hadi multivariate outlier test. The recalculated 
sample selection and regretion results based on Hadi‘s filter are shown in Table 7.12. 
Althouth the research samples are redused but, the regression results confirm the main 
result are given by truncation method.                                                                                                                                  
Finally, the thesis has examined whether inactive firms are likely to exhibit 
pronounced associations between managed operating cash flows and the cost of debt. 
Partitioning the full sample between active and inactive firms, a stronger association 
between the components of operating cash flows and the cost of debt is predicted for the 
now inactive companies, because they might have needed to manipulate operating cash 
flow to achieve cash flow targets for financing under conditions of distress. However, 
the result does not provide any additional insights into the pricing of managed OCF. 
 
7.6 Summary  
This chapter has investigated the empirical evidence of the relation between cash flow 
manipulation and the cost of debt. Two separate samples are examined in this study: 
8,684 firm-year observations for UK firms and 23,935 firm-year observations for USA 
firms, each comprising cash flow data reported between 1998 and 2010. The chapter has 
explained descriptive statistics for variables used in the models for both samples. The 
Pearson correlations for both samples have also been given. The study uses two 
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econometric techniques to estimate the model, namely Ordinary Least Square and Panel 
Data analysis. In particular, a positive and significant association is found between the 
cost of debt and managed OCF. The relation between the cost of debt and managed 
OCF has also been examined for the case when firms have losses, low cash flow and 
low earnings levels. Furthermore, the chapter has investigated alternative research 
design and further analysis, include: using COD_LIB as a dependent variable and 
research models using Yield as a proxy for cost of debt and re exam the models and also 
path analysis. 
The next chapter (Chapter 8) includes the summary conclusions of the study. In 
addition, the chapter discusses a comparison with other prior study finding. Furthermore 
the limitations, implications and the potential further research of the thesis have been 
given.  
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Figure 7.1 
Cost of debt by decile of abnormal operating cash flow (ABN_OCF)  
 
Panel A; Cost of debt by decile ABN_OCF for UK Sample 
 
 
Panel B: Variability in cost of debt estimates (mean±σ) by decile of abnormal 
operating cash flows (UK sample) 
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Panel C: Cost of debt by deciles of ABN_OCF for the USA sample. 
 
 
Panel D: Variability in cost of debt estimates (mean±σ) by decile of abnormal 
operating cash flows (USA sample) 
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Table 7.1 
Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: UK 
 Mean Standard 
deviation 
25
th
  
percentile 
Median 75
th
  
percentile 
Skewness Kurtosis 
Cost of debt (COD) 8.200 4.750 5.530 7.040 9.230 1.874 6.928 
Operating cash flow (OCF) 0.040 0.170 0.010 0.070 0.120 -2.434 13.666 
Normal operating cash flow (NOR_OCF) 0.050 0.100 0.030 0.070 0.090 -4.421 40.768 
Abnormal operating cash flow (ABN_OCF) -0.010 0.150 -0.050 0.010 0.060 -1.051 13.393 
Abnormal operating cash flow – absolute (|ABN_OCF|) 0.090 0.120 0.020 0.060 0.120 3.429 20.837 
Natural logarithm of total assets (SIZE) 18.430 2.290 16.750 18.230 19.950 0.349 2.878 
Leverage (LEV) 0.240 0.180 0.100 0.210 0.340 1.181 4.947 
Interest /Sales (INTSAL) 0.040 0.080 0.010 0.012 0.032 4.357 25.233 
Negative Earnings (LOSS)  0.310 0.460 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.835 1.697 
Change in Earnings:  positive = 1, negative = 0 (∆EARN_POS) 0.460 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000 0145 0157 
Monthly money market reference rate (LIBOR) 3.830 1.740 2. 190 3.740 5.350 1.021 1.774 
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Table 7.1 
 (Con.) 
 
Panel B: USA 
 Mean Standard 
deviation 
25
th 
 percentile 
Median 75
th
  
percentile 
Skewness Kurtosis 
Cost of debt (COD) 8.140 4.830 5.410 6.960 9.120 1.975 7.212 
Operating cash flow (OCF) 0.040 0.230 0.020 0.080 0.130 -4.253 30.551 
Normal operating cash flow (NOR_OCF) 0.030 0.180 0.010 0.050 0.080 -20.440 56.854 
Abnormal operating cash flow (ABN_OCF) 0.010 0.240 -0.040 0.020 0.090 4.069 78.954 
Abnormal operating cash flow – absolute (|ABN_OCF|) 0.120 0.200 0.030 0.070 0.130 11.069 87.955 
Natural logarithm of total assets (SIZE) 19.440 2. 400 17.860 19.690 21.100 -0.328 2.966 
Leverage (LEV) 0.330 0.280 0.140 0.280 0.430 2.626 15.696 
Interest /Sales (INTSAL) 0.070 0.160 0.010 0.020 0.060 7.843 87.896 
Negative Earnings (LOSS)  0.320 0.470 0.001 1.000 1.000 0.783 1.613 
Change in Earnings:  positive = 1, negative = 0 (∆EARN_POS) 0.480 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.0698 1.004 
Monthly money market reference rate (LIBOR) 3.770 1.710 2.190 3.740 5.350 0.180 1.816 
The table provides summary statistics for all variables used in cost of debt predictions. The samples include 7,548 firm-year observations in the UK and 21,119 in the USA, 
from 1,019 and 3,483 companies respectively, for the period 1998-2009. 
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Table 7.2 
Firm characteristics UK vs USA 
 UK USA   
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. t-test P- Value 
COD 8.201 4.750 8.140 4.825 -1.07 0.288 
OCF 0.044 0.166 0.040 0.225 -1.41 0.158 
NOR_OCF 0.046 0.102 0.034 0.182 -7.31 <0.001 
ABN_ OCF -0.002 0.151 0.006 0.235 3. 84 0.001 
(|ABN_OCF|) 0.094 0.118 0.117 0.204 12.62 <0.001 
SIZE 18.401 2.287 19.443 2.403 35.85 <0.001 
LEV 0.242 0.184 0.328 0.281 31.88 <0.001 
INTSAL 0.037 0.075 0.066 0.164 21.62 <0.001 
LOSS 0.307 0.461 0.317 0.465 1.77 0.076 
∆EARN_POS 0.463 0.498 0.482 0.499 3.03 0.002 
 
 
 
 
 
  
175 
 
 
 
Table 7.3 
 Pearson correlations and their significance levels (in italics)  
US above diagonal, and UK below diagonal 
  COD ABN_OCF NOR_OCF SIZE LEV INTSAL LOSS ∆EARN_POS LIBOR 
COD   0.226 -0.122 -0.363 0.032 0.145 0.288 -0.075 0.012 
  <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
ABN_ OCF 0.136  -0.592 -0.335 0.119 0.167 0.202 -0.033 0.0195 
 <0.001  <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.002 
NOR_ OCF -0.052 -0.391  0.265 -0.155 -0.157 -0.183 0.039 0.012 
 <0.001 <0.001  <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.066 
SIZE -0.152 -0.346 0.495  -0.082 -0.096 -0.362 0.081 -0.023 
 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001  <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.004 
LEV -0.247 -0.062 0.004 0.145  0.367 0.182 -0.022 -0.008 
 <0.001 <0.001 0.690 <0.001  <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.176 
INTSAL -0.078 -0.055 -0.143 0.098 0.382  0.196 -0.056 0.015 
 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001  <0.001 <0.001 0.019 
LOSS  0.119 0.193 -0.300 -0.309 0.058 0.073  -0.278 -0.049 
 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001  <0.001 <0.001 
∆EARN_POS  -0.003 -0.035 0.087 0.091 -0.042 -0.074 -0.286  -0.081 
 0.776 0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001  <0.001 
LIBOR 0.107 0.034 0.035 -0.001 -0.051 0.008 -0.090 -0.076  
 <0.001 0.002 0.001 0.949 <0.001 0.420 <0.001 <0.001  
Pearson correlation and their significance levels are reported above the diagonal for the USA firm-year sample and below the diagonal for the UK. The samples consist of 
7,548 firm-year observations for the UK and of 21,119 for the USA. See Table 3 for variable definitions. 
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Table 7.4 
Firm Characteristics by deciles of abnormal operating cash flows 
Panel A: UK sample  
Variable  Low 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 High 10 Dif. t-test 
Cost of debt 7.61 7.54 7.73 7.70 8.13 8.08 8.49 8.67 8.72 10.19 2.58 -8.78 
Size 19.29 19.25 19.10 18.96 18.68 18.45 18.20 18.01 17.47 16.27 -3.02 28.63 
INTCOV 0.06 0.12 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.05 -0.01 1.21 
LEV 0.26 0.27 0.18 0.26 0.24 0.23 0.34 0.21 0.24 0.23 -0.03 2.36 
 
Panel B: USA sample 
Variable  Low 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 High 10 dif t-test 
Cost of debt 7.15 7.57 7.44 7.58 7.66 7.87 8.22 8.23 9.10 12.74 5.59 --25.92 
Size 20.09 20.17 20.08 20.03 19.83 19.66 19.38 19.27 18.72 16.18 -3.91 46.38 
INTCOV 0.11 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.16 0.10 0.04 -0.07 -1.67 
LEV 0.32 0.33 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.32 0.30 0.30 0.39 0.62 0.30 -68.13 
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Table 7.5 
 Regression of the Cost of Debt (COD) on Abnormal Operating Cash Flow (ABN_OCF) 
  UK (N=8,684) USA (N=23,935) 
 Predicted Sign (Eq.3) (Eq.4) (Eq.5) (Eq.6) Fixed effects (Eq.3) (Eq.4) (Eq.5) (Eq.6) Fixed effects 
Intercept + 10.788 7.685 7.678 10.681 26.629 16.742 7.511 7.465 16.441 24.156 
  <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
OCF_TA - -1.433     -2.846     
  <0.001     <0.001     
ABN_ OCF +*  5.474 5.507 3.683 1.008  5.337 5.588 2.959 0.148 
   <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.045  <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.023 
NOR_ OCF -*   0.097 2.857 1.949   0.474 1.561 0.614 
    0.856 <0.001 0.030   0.022 <0.001 0.007 
SIZE - -0.146   -0.172 -1.046 -0.515   -0.534 -0.874 
  <0.001   <0.001 <0.001 <0.001   <0.001 <0.001 
LEV + -6.163   -6.227 -5.859 -1.111   -1.051 -1.449 
  <0.001   <0.001 <0.001 <0.001   <0.001 <0.001 
INTSAL  + 0.494   1.830 8.736 2.096   2.771 1.860 
  0.484   0.010 0.003 <0.001   <0.001 <0.001 
LOSS + 1.128   1.306 0.404 1.513   1.852 0.592 
  <0.001   <0.001 0.001 <0.001   <0.001 <0.001 
∆EARN_POS - 0.385   0.365 0.388 0.151   0.107 -0.071 
  <0.001   <0.001 <0.001 0.010   0.067 0.128 
LIBOR + 0.293   0.281 0.228 0.317   0.321 0.301 
  <0.001   <0.001 <0.001 <0.001   <0.001 <0.001 
Adj R-squared  9.89% 1.84% 1.83% 10.45% 5.80% 19.59% 5.11% 5.13% 19.32% 16.26% 
   Within       6.41%     5.37% 
   Between      7.52%     26.75% 
Chi2
*
      152.22     268.20 
Prob>chi2
*
      <0.001     <0.001 
Table 7.5 provides estimators for Equations 3-7. OCF_TA is computed as a real OCF deflated by total assets, ABN_ OCF is abnormal OCF deflated by total assets and 
NOR_OCF is computed as real OCF minus abnormal OCF deflated by total assets. Size is computed as the natural logarithm of Total Assets. LEV is Leverage and computed 
as long–term (interest-bearing debt) debt divided by total assets. INTSAL is Interest expenses divided by sales, LOSS is an earnings dummy and ∆EARN_POS is a change in 
earnings dummy, and LIBOR is London Inter Bank Offered Rates at year t-1.
 *
Hausman test; H0: difference in coefficients not systematic. 
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Table 7.6  
Regression of the Cost of Debt minus LIBOR (COD_LIB) on Abnormal Operating Cash Flow (ABN_OCF) 
  UK (N=8,684) USA (N=23,935) 
 Predicted Sign (Eq.3b) (Eq.4b) (Eq.5b) (Eq.6b) Fixed effects (Eq.3b) (Eq.4b) (Eq.5b) (Eq.6b) Fixed effects 
Intercept + 7.247 4.312 4.333 7.090 11.002 13.313 4.194 4.158 12.882 6.986 
  <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
OCF_TA - -1.408     -2.579     
  <0.001     <0.001     
ABN_ OCF +*  5.153 5.062 3.518 1.341  5.333 5.531 3.061 0.373 
   <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.008  <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.049 
NOR_ OCF -*   -0.265 2.687 2.590   0.372 1.581 0.808 
    0.630 <0.001 0.004   0.079 <0.001 <0.001 
SIZE - -0.097   -0.121 -1.065 -0.467   -0.478 -0.938 
  <0.001   <0.001 <0.001 <0.001   <0.001 <0.001 
LEV + -6.131   -6.187 -6.113 -1.033   -0.980 -1.484 
  <0.001   <0.001 <0.001 <0.001   <0.001 <0.001 
INTSAL  + 0.824   2.093 9.756 2.115   2.692 2.024 
  0.259   0.005 <0.001 <0.001   <0.001 <0.001 
LOSS + 1.582   1.761 0.221 2.008   2.306 0.4.4 
  <0.001   <0.001 0.0731 <0.001   <0.001 <0.001 
∆EARN_POS - 0.807   0.791 0.306 0.531   0.448 -0.188 
  <0.001   <0.001 <0.001 <0.001   <0.001 <0.001 
Adj R-squared  8.84% 1.54% 1.53% 9.31% 7.11% 17.44% 4.84% 4.85% 17.46% 14.99% 
   Within       3.66%     2.83% 
   Between      9.75%     26.22% 
Chi2
* 
     56.65     341.18 
Prob>chi2
* 
     <0.001     <0.001 
Note: Table 7.6 provides estimators for Equations 3-7, but using COD – LIBOR as a dependent variable. OCF_TA is computed as a real OCF deflated by total assets, ABN_ 
OCF is abnormal OCF deflated by total assets and NOR_OCF is computed as real OCF minus abnormal OCF deflated by total assets. Size is computed as the natural 
logarithm of Total Assets. LEV is Leverage and computed as long-term (interest-bearing debt) debt divided by total assets, INTSAL is Interest expense divided by sales, LOSS 
is an earnings dummy and ∆EARN_POS is a change in earnings dummy, and LIBOR is London Inter Bank Offered Rates at year t-1. 
*
Hausman test; H0: difference in coefficients not systematic. 
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Table 7.7  
Regression of the Cost of Debt (COD) on positive and negative Abnormal Operating 
Cash Flow (ABN_OCF) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
   
  
Positive ‗Managed‘ OCF 
ABN_ OCF >0 
Negative ‗Managed‘ OCF
ABN_ OCF <0 
UK USA UK USA 
Intercept  9.476 15.641 12.733 17.114 
   <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
ABN_ OCF  2.433 1.575 3.793 3.323 
   0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
NOR_ OCF  0.702 0.939 3.940 -0.401 
   0.371 <0.001 <0.001 0.289 
SIZE  -0.113 -0.491 -0.261 -0.547 
   <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
LEV  -5.713 -1.000 -6.581 -0.962 
   <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
INTSEL   -0.073 1.700 2.710 2.765 
   0.952 <0.001 0.003 <0.001 
LOSS   1.131 1.681 1.131 1.627 
   <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
∆EARN_POS  0.314 0.074 0.393 0.216 
   0.018 0.829 0.012 0.051 
LIBOR  0.307 0.328 0.246 0.305 
   <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
      
Adj R-squared  9.06% 14.46% 11.04% 20.51% 
N  4,506 14,849 4,178 9,086 
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Table 7.8 
Low and high values of the cash flow and earnings variables 
 UK(N=8,684) USA(N=23,935) 
 (Eq. 8) (Eq. 9) (Eq.10) (Eq. 8) (Eq. 9) (Eq.10) 
Intercept 11.966 10.631 12.163 16.324 16.024 17.332 
 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
ABN_ OCF 2.993 2.683 2.651 2.663 2.562 2.317 
 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
NOR_ OCF 2.952 3.423 3.817 1.725 1.731 1.719 
 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
SIZE -0.174 -0.165 -0.260 -0.528 -0.5150 -0.599 
 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
LEV -6.201 -6.304 -6.347 -1.065 -1.028 -1.050 
 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
INTSEL 1.768 2.122 2.242 2.736 2.650 2.672 
 0.013 0.003 0.002 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
LOSS  1.198 1.253 1.276 1.829 1.768 1.640 
 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
∆EARN_POS 0.367 0.373 0.352 0.108 0.112 0.090 
 <0.001 <0.001 0.001 0.064 <0.001 0.123 
LIBOR 0.281 0.277 0.276 0.321 0.319 0.313 
 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.056 <0.001 
ABN_OCF * LOSS 1.255   0.612   
 0.112   <0.001   
OCF_LOW  -0.502 -0.557  0.270 -0.082 
  0.001 0.002  <0.001 0.358 
OCF_HI  -0.293 -0.363  0.026 0.029 
  0.043 0.013  0.704 0.682 
EARN_LOW   0.219   0.894 
   0.209   <0.001 
EARN_HI   0.704   0.953 
   <0.001   <0.001 
ABN_OCF*OCFLOW  3.871 4.229  0.684 3.700 
  <0.001 0.001  <0.001 <0.001 
ABN_OCF*OCFHI  1.984 2.281  0.017 0.047 
  0.009 0.005  0.787 0.445 
ABN_OCF*EARNLOW   -1.379   -1.067 
   0.397   0.003 
ABN_OCF*EARNHI   -1.083   -1.145 
   0.442   0.053 
ABN_OCF*OCFLOW*EARNLOW   0.757   -2.066 
   0.665   0.002 
Adj R-squared 10.46% 10.98% 11.09% 19.45% 19.54% 20.13% 
The regression results are for Equations 8, 9 and 10, when managed operating cash flows are conditioned 
on losses, cash flow and earnings levels.  
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Table 7.9  
Direct and indirect effects of cash flow quality on the cost of debt 
 UK USA 
 AQ Cod Total AQ Cod Total 
OCFQ Indirect Through AQ 0.193 -0.155 -0.030 0.194 -0.014 -0.003 
Direct OCFQ  -0.105 -0.105  -0.158 -0.158 
Total Effect   -0.135   -0.161 
Table 7.9 describes the direct and indirect effects of cash flow quality on the cost of debt for the UK and 
the USA. The table reports the results of SEM (path analysis) that analyse the relations between cash flow 
quality, accounting quality and the cost of debt depicted in Figure1. OCFQ is abnormal operating cash 
flow multiplied by -1. 
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Table 7.10 
Regression of the Cost of Debt (COD) on Abnormal Operating Cash Flow (ABN_OCF) 
using yield as the proxy for COD  
Dependent Variable: YIELD   (Eq.3) (Eq.6) 
Intercept 19.481 18.833 
 <0.001 <0.001 
OCF_TA -0.844  
 0.660  
ABN_ OCF  -0.998 
   0.562 
NOR_ OCF  2.659 
   0.400 
SIZE -0.597 -0.574 
  <0.001 <0.001 
Bond maturity  -0.842 0.732 
  0.343 0.416 
LEV   -6.301 -5.118 
  0.147 0.258 
INTSEL   -0.978 -0.928 
  0.002 0.003 
LOSS 0.146 0.145 
  0.498 0.500 
∆EARN_POS -0.368 -0.405 
  <0.001 <0.001 
   
Adj R-squared 49.30% 49.34% 
N 194 194 
The regression results are for Equations 3 and 6, using the coupon rate as the proxy for COD.  
Bondmaturity is log of number of years until maturity.     
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Table 7.11 
Regression of the Cost of Debt (COD) on Abnormal Operating Cash Flow (ABN_OCF) 
with consider the effects of mergers and acquisitions 
 UK  USA 
Intercept 10.449 15.417 
  <0.001 <0.001 
ABN_ OCF 3.245 3.275 
  <0.001 <0.001 
NOR_ OCF 2.432 1.609 
  <0.001 0.289 
SIZE -0.159 -0.484 
  <0.001 <0.001 
LEV -6.489 -1.214 
  <0.001 <0.001 
INTSEL  2.008 3.311 
  0.008 <0.001 
LOSS  1.384 1.746 
  <0.001 <0.001 
∆EARN_POS 0.406 0.125 
  <0.001 0.051 
LIBOR 0.298 0.319 
  <0.001 <0.001 
Adj R-squared 10.78% 17.28% 
N 7,703 21,610 
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Table 7.12 
Hadi multivariate outlier test 
Panel A: Sample selection, using Hadi multivariate outlier test 
   
UK  USA 
 Number of 
observations 
 Number of 
observations 
Companies with reported financial statements (1998-
2010) 
 19,603  44,517 
Less:     
Firm-years with missing Interest Cost data, or Interest 
Cost equal to 0  
 -3,181  -6,889 
Firm-years with missing Total Debt data     -1,590  -2,790 
Studentised residuals greater than 2    -3,124  -4,961 
Outliers remaining; Hadi test  -877  -1,527 
Lag operation  -2,411  -4,415 
Final sample    8,420  23,935 
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Panel B: Regression of the Cost of Debt (COD) on Abnormal Operating Cash Flow 
(ABN_OCF), using Hadi multivariate outlier test 
  UK USA 
Intercept  12.823 16.259 
   <0.001 <0.001 
ABN_ OCF  2.995 3.802 
   <0.001 <0.001 
NOR_ OCF  7.721 3.698 
   <0.001 <0.001 
SIZE  -0.273 -0.512 
   <0.001 <0.001 
LEV  -9.534 --3.200 
   <0.001 <0.001 
INTSEL   24.101 8.934 
   <0.001 <0.001 
LOSS   1.278 1.871 
   <0.001 <0.001 
∆EARN_POS  0.336 0.129 
   <0.001 0.032 
LIBOR  0.261 0.305 
   <0.001 <0.001 
    
Adj R-squared  12.04% 15.18% 
N  8,420 23,557 
Panel B, Table 7.5 provides estimators for Equations 6 using Hadi multivariate outlier. ABN_ OCF is 
abnormal OCF deflated by total assets and NOR_OCF is computed as real OCF minus abnormal OCF 
deflated by total assets. Size is computed as the natural logarithm of Total Assets. LEV is Leverage and 
computed as long–term (interest-bearing debt) debt divided by total assets. INTSAL is Interest expenses 
divided by sales, LOSS is an earnings dummy and ∆EARN_POS is a change in earnings dummy, and 
LIBOR is London Inter Bank Offered Rates at year t-1.
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Apendex B 
Regression of the Cost of Debt (COD) on Abnormal Operating Cash Flow (ABN_OCF), 
after excluding firms with low LEV 
 UK  USA 
Intercept 6.533 15.279 
  <0.001 <0.001 
ABN_ OCF 2.842 2.532 
  <0.001 <0.001 
NOR_ OCF 1.612 1.427 
  0.009 0.289 
SIZE -0.101 -0.510 
  <0.001 <0.001 
LEV 0.778 0.302 
  0.016 0.004 
INTSEL  -0.018 2.777 
  0.970 <0.001 
LOSS  1.238 1.759 
  <0.001 <0.001 
∆EARN_POS 0.339 0.031 
  0.001 0.565 
LIBOR 0.303 0.329 
  <0.001 <0.001 
Adj R-squared 9.11% 24.83% 
N 3,674 19,643 
Re-estimates the model after excluding firms with low debt (firms with LEV less than 25% and 10% for 
UK and USA recpectivly excluded) firms with LEV less than 10%  
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Chapter 8 
Summary and Conclusions 
 
The main focus of previous work on cash flow manipulation has been on earnings 
management, and although there is evidence that operating cash flow management 
techniques may impact on earnings performance, it is not clear that this is a direct and 
on-way effect. We know also from prior research that the stronger a firm‘s profitability, 
the lower is likely to be the cost of debt (e.g., Subramanyam et al, 2010; Mansi et al. 
2009; Jinang, 2008; Anderson et al, 2004; Mansi et al, 2004; Pittman and  Fortan, 2004; 
Shi, 2003). This thesis considers the linkage between these two previous findings, and 
assesses whether an increase in the information risk associated with managed operating 
cash flows is reflected in the cost of debt. 
Two large samples are examined in this respect: 8,684 UK firm-years and 
23,935 USA firm-years, between 1998 and 2010. The results show that, for both 
samples, abnormal operating cash flow has a positive and significant relationship with 
the cost of debt. More specifically, while operating cash flow is often thought of as a 
value not manipulated, this thesis demonstrates that such manipulation is likely, that the 
market appears to recognise the cash flow management involved, and that this is 
reflected in debt costs. In particular, a positive and significant association is found 
between the cost of debt and managed OCF when firms have losses, low cash flow and 
low earnings levels. This suggests that bondholders and creditors are more likely to 
detect and price the components of OCF when firms have a greater likelihood of 
experiencing financial problems.  
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It is also argued here that high cash flow management not only increases the cost 
of debt directly but also increases it indirectly, thereby impacting on accounting quality. 
The thesis first documents that cash flow management negatively affects accounting 
quality, then demonstrates the effect of accounting quality on decreasing the cost of 
debt, concluding that the effect of cash flow management in increasing the cost of debt 
is largely through its impact on accounting quality. It can be said, therefore, that given 
the evidence provided by this study that an increase in the cost of debt associated with 
managed components of operating cash flows, firms would be better off without 
engaging in cash flow management. 
These findings should be of interest to policy makers and company creditors, as 
well as academic researchers. Three aspects in particular would benefit from further 
research. First, although a smaller sized bond sample is also employed, the explanatory 
power of the regression models is limited, and it is the two far larger samples based on 
accounting data that provide the significant and robust results. It should be 
acknowledged that using accounting data for calculating the cost of debt is likely to be 
subject to measurement error, and therefore future research should attempt to extend the 
study reported here in order to provide greater reconciliation between market debt 
pricing and the accounting-based cost of debt.  The results obtained with UK market 
data in this study are not statistically significant and it has not been possible to carry out 
checks with USA bond market data. Therefore, further analysis would be useful using 
USA market data in order to compare the results with those obtained with accounting 
data, which may provide more detail about the effect of cash flow manipulation on the 
cost of debt. In addition, given that the overall cost of capital includes the cost of debt 
and the cost of equity, and this thesis considers only the effect of cash flow 
manipulation on the cost of debt, further work should attempt to integrate these two 
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separate strands of research by considering interactions between earnings management 
and cash flow management and their joint effects on the costs of equity and debt. A 
third point concerns the fact that abnormal OCF has been evaluated for this study using 
Dechow‘s original 1998 procedure, taking account of Roychowdhury‘s 2006 
improvements. Other approaches to cash flow manipulation might be developed in 
future in order to obtain more detailed estimates relating to the timing and classification 
of cash flow components. 
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